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Abstract 
Individuals feel more empathy for those in their group (i.e., ingroup members) and less for 
those who are not (i.e., outgroup members). But evidence suggests that empathy is not merely 
selective to the other’s group, rather it fluctuates according to how the other’s group is 
perceived by the individual. This project was developed to investigate whether individuals 
truly differentiate between outgroups when it comes to empathy. Across several studies, I 
presented participants with images depicting others receiving physically painful stimulations. 
The other person in each case was a member of the ingroup or one of two outgroups, one of 
which was more of a competitive threat to the ingroup. In Study 3, I found that participants 
exhibited an ingroup bias, that is, greater levels of empathy to images of ingroup pain, 
compared to outgroup pain. In Study 4, I found that empathic responses also varied between 
the two outgroups: Empathy was significantly lower when targets were from the outgroup 
that was perceived as more of a competitive threat to the ingroup, than the other outgroup. 
This provided the first evidence that beliefs about outgroups, and not merely the ingroup-
outgroup distinction, modulates empathic processing. I also investigated the extent to which 
threats that are incidental to the ingroup context affect empathy. Across two studies I 
showed reliable evidence that priming incidental feelings of fear was sufficient to elicit 
intergroup bias in self-reported empathy, specifically against the outgroup, i.e., reduced 
empathy for outgroup targets, rather than increased empathy for ingroup targets. Finally, I 
investigated the extent to which my findings could be accounted for by individual 
differences. In a series of ‘mini meta-analyses’, I provide evidence that in an intergroup 
context a shared group membership confers an empathic advantage when responding to a 
target’s pain, regardless of one’s sex or their scores on a measure of trait empathy.  
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 1 General Introduction 
When we watch a film or play, read a book, or stare at a piece of art we’re often 
moved to emotion. We understand that what we’re seeing is not actually happening to us but 
we react as if it is: We laugh, cry, flinch, and gasp. To understand why this is, we first need to 
understand what happens when we do experience things first-hand. One way to do this is by 
considering what happens when we feel physical pain. When we fall over, break a limb, or 
cut ourselves, certain regions of the brain become active—not one region, but many (Peyron, 
Laurent, & García-Larrea, 2000). These distinct areas connect to one another and become 
active at the same time whenever we experience something that is painful. Crucially, though, 
these same regions also become active when we simply observe another person in pain 
(Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). In other words, feeling pain and seeing someone else in 
pain engages the same neural circuitry. In many ways, this phenomenon manifests physically 
through people’s behaviours: When watching videos of someone undergoing invasive 
surgery, people can’t help but winch or retract their limbs into a defensive pose. It is this 
phenomenon that forms the basis of how we understand and connect with other human beings 
(de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). A phenomenon that we refer to as empathy.  
Whilst there may exist more than a hundred ways to define what we mean by empathy 
(Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2014), at its core, to empathise with someone is to almost 
literally feel their pain. It’s our capacity to do this that makes films and books so enjoyable. 
When an actor, writer, or artist moves you to laughter or to tears they implicitly understand 
that for an audience to feel an emotion the actor/writer need only present a compelling 
version—the brain simulates the emotions that the observer sees (Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2006; Wicker et al., 2003). 
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We don’t, however, go about our daily lives feeling what everyone is feeling and 
experiencing the world through what we imagine is the other person’s eyes. If we did, it 
would be impossible to, for example, care for patients with chronic pain; to provide therapy 
for clinical depression; or to surgically remove a cancerous tumour. If we continually felt 
what other people feel, we’d be so incapacitated by a person’s agony that we could do 
nothing to help them. On a darker note, we could never have performed the acts of barbarity 
that are scattered in our history; events where people’s behaviour was driven by fear and 
loathing rather than empathy and compassion.  
Humans are capable of making tremendous cognitive leaps in order to put themselves 
in another person’s shoes but, seemingly, they are also able to completely avoid doing it 
(Zaki, 2014). So, how do we switch empathy on and off? The answer is quite simple: When 
we interact with another person our brain function differs according to a variety of contextual 
factors such as who the other person is and which social groups they belong to (Cikara & Van 
Bavel, 2014). We are far more likely to feel the pain of another person if they belong to a 
group that is the same or similar to our own (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; 
Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005). Robert Cialdini, a pioneer of the psychological 
investigation of empathy, identified that empathy is driven by what he referred to as 
‘oneness’ (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997): If the sense of who you are (i.e., 
your identity) overlaps with that of another person, you are far more likely to feel their 
suffering over others to whom there is no, or relatively little, overlap.  
Researchers have found that we feel more empathy for members of an ingroup (one of 
‘us’) and notably less for a member of an outgroup (one of ‘them’)—this is referred to as 
empathic bias. If the target is one of them, compared to one of us, then we feel less concern 
for their pain (Stürmer et al., 2006, 2005), perceive their expressions of pain to be less painful 
(Drwecki, Moore, Ward, & Prkachin, 2011), and even inflict pain upon them more often 
12                                                                                            CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
(Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010). This empathic bias emerges in a variety 
of different contexts, for example, when ‘them’ refers to a race that is different from our own 
(Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Azevedo et al., 2013; Chiao & Mathur, 2010; Xu, Zuo, 
Wang, & Han, 2009), when ‘they’ have different political ideologies (Combs, Powell, 
Schurtz, & Smith, 2009), support a different sports team (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011), 
and even when they are simply wearing a different coloured T-shirt (Montalan, Lelard, 
Godefroy, & Mouras, 2012). More recently, there is accumulating evidence to suggest that 
empathy is not simply switched on for ‘us’ and off for ‘them’; instead, it fluctuates according 
to how we perceive ‘them’ (Cikara & Fiske, 2011). If the person belongs to a group whose 
members we believe to be friendly and trustworthy, we might feel empathy for them even 
though they belong to an outgroup (Sessa & Meconi, 2015). But if the other’s group 
represents a threat or a rival to us then we feel less empathy for their pain, or even no 
empathy at all (Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014).  
1.1 Overview of This Thesis 
In this thesis, I describe a series of studies in which I investigate whether and how 
empathy is influenced by a number of different contextual factors. I start by going beyond the 
existing knowledge outlined above, to test the hypothesis that empathic biases emerge not 
merely as a function of an ingroup-outgroup distinction but rather as a function of the specific 
beliefs associated with a given ingroup-outgroup relation. I then go on to examine the extent 
to which empathy is influenced by other factors, such as individual differences, gender, and 
fear.  
In Chapter 2, I review the extant literature on empathy: How it is defined and studied 
in the lab. I then go on to discuss empathy through the lenses of Social Identity Theory and 
the Stereotype Content Model to review the current knowledge of when and why empathy 
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fails. In Chapter 3, I outline the development of the paradigm that allows me to study 
empathy. I also present an initial test of the hypothesis that intergroup biases in self-reports of 
empathy are driven by the context specific to a given ingroup-outgroup relation (such as 
beliefs about a group) rather than simply an ingroup-outgroup distinction. In Chapter 4, I 
report on two brain imaging studies to test whether the same context-specific biases also 
influence empathy at a (non-controllable) neurological level. In these studies, participants 
performed a cognitive task in which they observed other individuals (from either their own 
group or from one of two outgroups) experiencing physical pain while participants’ neural 
responses were measured via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Self-report 
results reveal that participants reported less empathy towards outgroup others, but only when 
that outgroup was perceived to be more of a threat in terms of competition with the ingroup. 
At the level of neural activation, participants exhibited lower levels of empathy-related brain 
activation while observing the pain of targets from the more competitive outgroup than 
targets from the ingroup or less competitive outgroup. In Chapter 5, I discuss the role that 
incidental fear plays during intergroup relations and the extent to which it influences 
empathy. I present data from two behavioural studies during which participants completed a 
task involving empathy while simultaneously receiving (or not) cues to induce fear. The 
results show that fear attenuated empathic responses, but only to outgroup targets. I discuss 
how these findings contribute to the existing literature on the role of emotions during 
intergroup conflict. I also discuss the broader role of threat in empathic bias, demonstrating 
that threat inherent to the intergroup context (e.g., by competition and social devaluation) 
can lead to attenuated empathy towards members of an outgroup, but threat from other 
sources (i.e., that are incidental to the intergroup context) can also affect empathy in the 
same way.  
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Chapter 6 outlines a secondary analysis using data from the empirical studies detailed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. This is an analysis of measures pertaining to the role of individual 
differences (gender and trait empathy) in empathy. I provide a short overview of the existing 
research in this area and presented findings from a set of meta-analyses. The results revealed, 
in short, that scoring above average in some measures of trait empathy correlated 
significantly with more empathy for another person’s suffering. However—consistent with 
principles from Social Identity Theory—in an intergroup context a shared group 
membership confers an empathic advantage when responding to a target’s pain, regardless of 
one’s chronic tendency to empathise with others. With these results, I provide a revised 
perspective on the role of individual differences in empathy. Chapter 7 is an overall summary 
and discussion of the project’s main goals and findings. Here, I present an overview my 
findings, integrate them into existing theory and empirical research, and discuss the 
implications of my work, what conclusions can be drawn, and what avenues await future 
researchers. 
             
2 Literature Review 
2.1 What Is Empathy? 
Since the philosopher Adam Smith first referred to the ‘fellow feeling’ (Smith, 1790, 
pp. 47-48) there has been enormous interest in empathy and the psychological mechanisms 
that underpin it. In the early 1900s, the term ‘empathy’ (from the German Einfühlung) was 
developed to express the ‘natural instinct’ of the audience to fuse or merge with an object of 
exquisite art (Lipps, 1903), sometimes involving the literal and unconscious movement of our 
legs, arms, or muscles of the face (Lee, 1912). It was not long before scholars began to think 
of empathy in terms of an interpersonal connection between people. Indeed, Lipps (1903) 
thought in these terms as well. He described one example of watching an acrobat on a 
tightrope and how their movements, feelings, and affective expressions are instinctively 
mirrored by their audience.  
Since the mid 1900s, scientific interest in empathy has rapidly grown. According to 
data from the Web of Science (Clarivate Analytics, n.d.), there have been over 16,000 articles 
published using the keyword ‘empathy’ with an average annual growth rate of 15.28%. What 
we mean when we refer to ‘empathy,’ however, has also grown somewhat out of control. As 
one team notes ‘there are probably nearly as many definitions of empathy as people working 
on this topic’ (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006, pp. 1). Broadly construed, we understand 
empathy as the ability to recognize and respond to another’s suffering (Batson, Bruce, 
Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). But within that definition is a great deal of ambiguity; 
it’s quite easy to get lost in the search for a precise definition to match one’s own notion. For 
some, empathy is strictly a ‘cool’ cognitive response characterised by the simulation of 
another’s emotional state, autonomic, and motor responses (Preston & de Waal, 2002), 
reflecting notions from the original aesthetic movement. For others, empathy is synonymous 
with sympathy, pity, and compassion, characterised by the feeling that pushes us to alleviate 
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suffering (C. D. Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). There is also a third sense to empathy 
that has to do with the capacity to understand what’s going on in people’s minds. The theory 
of mentalising or mental-state inference holds that we attribute mental states to others (such 
as beliefs, emotions, and intentions) and through this understand their behaviour, equivalent 
to a theory of mind (Frith & Frith, 2006). One could build a career simply investigating the 
phenomenology of empathy, but for a compelling review of definitions see Leiberg and 
Anders (2006).  
 I (like many other empathy researchers) seek a balance between the positions outlined 
above. In the context of my research, I have found the most constructive way to speak of 
empathy is as an umbrella term, conceptualising it by three general mechanisms: Mentalising, 
the ability to infer thoughts or experiences (Davis, 1983); empathic concern, the desire to 
alleviate a target’s distress (C. D. Batson et al., 1987); and experience-sharing, to vicariously 
experience or simulate another’s state (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). These sub-
components go by a variety of names, but capture most if not all characterisations of empathy 
in the literature. It is recognised that these are conceptually distinct processes (Zaki, 2014): I 
can possess a lot of one and none of the other. Individuals with autistic spectrum disorders, 
for example, often exhibit a deficit in perspective-taking, but not in experience-sharing (Bird 
et al., 2010); whereas individuals with psychopathy demonstrate a lack of concern, but no 
impairment in perspective-taking (Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer, Bartels, & Keysers, 2013). 
One can also feel more or less of each in a given situation. For example, I intuitively 
understand why someone is upset over the death of a loved one without needing to 
experience it first. Despite this, these are not completely independent processes (Zaki & 
Ochsner, 2012); one can and often does influence another. For example, thinking more 
deeply about another person’s perspective will increase empathic concern for them (C. D. 
Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995; C. D. Batson et al., 1997). Because these 
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processes are strongly related to one another, I define empathy in this broad sense. Doing so 
allows me to speak in broader terms, but crucially this also allows me to achieve greater 
precision in understanding how context specifically influences facets of empathy. I therefore 
do my best in this thesis to be mindful of those similarities but also the distinctions, 
recognising that different aspects of empathy behave differently in different contexts and are 
supported by distinct neural architectures.  
2.2 The Neural Architecture of Empathy  
Historically, empathy was the undertaking of scholars from social, developmental, 
and psychotherapy fields. It wasn’t until 2010—after a ground-breaking discovery by a team 
in Italy—that it attracted the interest of neuroscientists. This team discovered a specific class 
of neurons that responded to both the execution of an action and the observation of that same 
action by another (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). This finding inspired researchers to try and 
identify the precise neural circuitry responsible for processing empathy. Since then, hundreds 
of papers have been published providing evidence (sometimes mixed, sometimes converging) 
that empathy ‘resides’ in specific and dissociable regions (for a meta-analysis of these 
findings refer to Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011 or Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). For 
example, watching someone being pricked by a syringe leads to activation of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; associated with the felt unpleasantness of physical pain i.e., 
empathic-concern; Rainville, Duncan, Price, & Bushnell, 2011; Singer et al., 2004) and the 
anterior insula (AI; associated with the sensory-discriminative aspects of pain i.e., 
experience-sharing; Peyron et al., 2000). On the other hand, mentalising (such as trying to 
imagine what another person is thinking) is more strongly associated with the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), precuneus, and posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS) (a set of regions referred to as the 'mentalizing network'; Frith & 
Frith, 2006) (Figure 2.1). Interestingly, while there is evidence to suggest that there is both 
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dissociation and overlap in the involvement of these regions in different aspects of empathy 
(Zaki, 2014), there is little research in how they relate to the experience of empathy (i.e., how 
participants report their empathic experience to another’s pain). While not a primary focus of 
this thesis, one of my goals was to establish whether the brain regions most typically 
associated with empathy relate differently to how participants self-report their empathic 
experience.  
As many ways there are to define empathy there appear to be as many brain regions to 
support it. One researcher suggested that empathy was processed through a circuit involving 
no fewer than ten brain regions (Baron-Cohen, 2011)—many of which are associated with a 
dozen other mechanisms unrelated to empathy. One might argue that ‘finding’ empathy in the 
brain is not necessary—with behavioural and self-report findings, researchers have already 
developed a very clear understanding of when empathy flourishes and when it fails (e.g., 
Cialdini et al., 1997). However, self-report measures of empathy are subject to strategic 
responding given that empathy is a socially desirable trait (Decety & Jackson, 2006). It is 
therefore likely that measuring responses not within a participant’s volitional control 
(i.e., brain activation) can provide new insights into when and how humans empathise with 
one another. Indeed, major findings from neuroscience have informed our theoretical 
understanding of empathy in a number of important ways. For example, fMRI has allowed 
researchers to demonstrate that empathy involves multiple distinct mechanisms. It has also 
allowed researchers to study empathy without the filter of response control, revealing that 
empathy is not a universal response to another’s suffering and that the different aspects of 
empathy are influenced by a number of factors.   
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2.3 The Many Limits of Empathy  
Researchers have found that many of the brain regions that ordinarily respond when 
we see another person suffering or in pain are routinely dampened if the victim is distant to 
the observer in physical space or time, or socially, in their racial or social group memberships 
(these findings are reviewed in detail later in the chapter, but for a detailed recent overview, 
see Vanman, 2016). This is one of many reasons that scholars like Paul Bloom (e.g., 2017) 
and Jesse Prinz (e.g., 2011) have suggested that we should perhaps re-think how we consider 
empathy and whether or not large scale interventions to encourage it are actually useful for 
moral decision-making. Bloom (2017) suggests that to preserve rational moral principles we 
The Empathic concern and 
Experience-sharing Network 
The Mentalizing Network 
Insula cortex 
Anterior Cingulate cortex 
Medial Prefrontal cortex 
Superior Posterior 
Temporal sulcus 
Precuneus 
Figure 2.1. Brain maps depicting the most typical regions of activation in response to tasks involving empathic-
concern and experience-sharing (left) and tasks involving mentalizing or perspective-taking (right); masks were 
created using the Harvard-Oxford cortical structural atlas 
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should adopt a distant, cost-benefit calculation that is guided not by empathy but by 
compassion—which while bears great resemblance to empathic-concern differs from it in that 
it does not require one to vicariously share another person’s feelings (Zaki, 2014). The reason 
for this, Bloom suggests, is that empathy has a ‘spotlight quality’: Empathy can draw our 
attention towards the suffering of familiar individuals, but when we try to expand it either to 
groups of people or to the socially distant, empathy becomes ‘dim’—a ‘psychic numbing’ as 
Paul Slovic calls it (Slovic, Zionts, Woods, Goodman, & Jinks, 2017). In sum, they suggest 
that empathy is narrow, parochial, and biased (Bloom, 2017; Prinz, 2011).  
The modern conceptualisation of empathy is constructed from decades of studies 
focusing on interpersonal responses (i.e., participants responding to depictions of a single 
individual in pain). Indeed, generally, when we feel empathy we do so in relation to a single 
individual and it is very hard to conceive sharing the emotions of more than one person. The 
American economist Thomas Schelling illustrates that if a victim is one person needing 
thousands of dollars for an operation the post will be ‘swamped with nickels and dimes’, but 
if a hospital is set to go under, causing an increase in preventable deaths, then ‘not many will 
drop a tear or reach for their check books’ (Schelling, 1968). If that victim has a face and a 
name, we’re even quicker to mobilise. Researchers have referred to this as the identifiable-
victim effect (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). They found that people typically donate more 
money to help a single, sick child (compared to a group of sick children), if they are first 
shown a picture of the child and are told their name (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; D. A. Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003; D. Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). This is often why charity 
appeals depict one person’s story rather than presenting an overall picture in which thousands 
perish every day from famine. In this sense, empathy is limited to the one over the many; if 
we try to expand it past the individual it waxes and wanes.  
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Empathy is also limited in the sense that it appears to run out. The more empathy we 
give to one person, the less we have for another: If I’m busy at work, taking time to engage in 
effective work relationships with my colleagues, I may deplete those same resources I use to 
foster personal relationships at home (Halbesleben, Harvey, & Bolino, 2009). Research has 
shown that this is a particular problem for roles that are cognitively-taxing and laden with 
empathy. Healthcare workers, for example, are often required to deliberately take on the pain 
of others: For clinicians to diagnose mental disorder, therapists to broadcast their 
understanding, or medical practitioners to prescribe pain-relief. After repeated exposure to 
such suffering, physicians can experience fatigue (Abendroth, 2006). That is, they 
qualitatively report feeling stressed or burnt out as a result of sharing their patient’s suffering 
and caring for others over extended periods of time (Lombardo & Eyre, 2010). This 
experience leads to exhaustion, irritability, impairment of decision-making, dread of working 
with certain patients, and the reduction of empathy (Mathieu, 2007)—effects that also extend 
to other empathy-centred roles, such as voluntary charity work (Joslyn, 2002).  
If empathy is a finite resource, it’s intuitive that we might be conservative in where 
we direct it. If I only have a certain capacity for concern, I’m far more likely to give it to my 
partner or my son, over a stranger. One wouldn’t consider that an unpopular or immoral 
decision. In the famous example by Bernard Williams, a man who considers saving a stranger 
over his wife—out of a sense of duty rather immediate conjugal love—has ‘one thought too 
many’ (Williams, 1981, pp. 18). But this does illustrate a third way in which empathy is 
limited.  
Empathy can be compromised in a variety of ways. A study led by researchers at the 
University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry (Fiscella, Franks, Gold, & Clancy, 
2000), revealed that healthcare professionals often display biases in how they treat patients. 
Namely, biases in empathic concern appear to favour individuals with the same race (Chen, 
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Rathore, Radford, Wang, & Krumholz, 2001; Fiscella, Franks, Doescher, & Saver, 2002), or 
socioeconomic status (Lundy et al., 2015; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, & Paci, 1991; Willems, 
De Maesschalck, Deveugele, Derese, & De Maeseneer, 2005). As a result, ethnic minorities 
and individuals of low socioeconomic status (who typically experience significantly higher 
rates of illness) receive the poorest quality of healthcare than others in society (Hayward, 
Crimmins, Miles, & Yang, 2000). Research suggests that these inequalities do not necessarily 
reflect pernicious intent of health providers but rather an inability to accurately perceive pain 
in particular individuals. Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, and Oliver (2016) found that a substantial 
number of white medical students and residents held inaccurate beliefs about the biological 
differences between white and black individuals (such as black people have thicker skin) and 
these beliefs were strongly related to the inaccurate assessment and treatment of physical pain 
in black patients. Taken together, these reports suggest that there are inequalities in the extent 
to which physicians show empathy towards patients and that these perceptions have 
significant effects on downstream health outcomes (Mercer et al., 2016). 
Beliefs about another’s group, for example, that they biologically experience pain to a 
lesser extent, may affect the extent to which we feel empathy towards their pain and 
suffering; pain that is otherwise objectively equal to your own. A great deal of research has 
been conducted to understand real-world societal and systemic discrimination, for example, 
the increasing use of lethal force by authorities against black people in the US (Hehman, 
Flake, & Calanchini, 2017) or structural inequalities in healthcare (Bailey et al., 2017; 
Hoffman et al., 2016). These studies have identified that individuals feel less empathy for 
other race targets (Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al., 2013; Sessa, Meconi, Castelli, & 
Dell’Acqua, 2014; Xu et al., 2009). Xu et al. (2009), for example, found that watching 
individuals receiving painful injections led to activation of regions that process the sensory-
discriminative aspects of pain. Crucially, however, they found that activation was 
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significantly attenuated when the target was from a notably different race to the participant. 
But this bias is not based simply upon a person’s race: Avenanti, Sirigu, and Aglioti (2010) 
found that seeing a person being stabbed was associated with a mu suppression effect1 that 
was attenuated when the target ostensibly belonged to both a familiar racial outgroup (i.e., a 
black hand) and an unfamiliar racial outgroup (i.e., a violet-coloured hand). This suggests 
that empathic biases against other-race targets are not necessarily because of beliefs 
associated with the other’s race, per se, but because they represent the unfamiliar, pointing to 
the more general notion that we feel more empathy for those like us.  
This is hardly a novel idea. David Hume said the same thing in the 1700s: He 
cautioned that ‘similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language…facilitate the 
sympathy’ (Smith & Garrett, 2005, pp. 318). Hume recognised that there is something special 
about our closest kin that makes them more likely to be the objects of our thoughts and 
concern. Indeed, for empathy to have evolved it must have conferred some benefits to 
survival such as in parental and pair bonding (Hrdy, 2009). Several hundred years since 
Hume, researchers have found evidence to support the notion that similarity is a precursor to 
empathic processing. For example, empathy is strongest when individuals perceive more 
similarity or ‘oneness’ with the target (Maner et al., 2002), share a closer relationship with 
them (Cialdini et al., 1997), or when they rank the target as higher on measures of attachment 
(ranging from a romantic partner to familiar acquaintance; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017). 
As Preston and de Waal (2002) put it, a person who is more similar to us is easier to 
understand and represent at a cognitive level. There is a representational richness in 
                                                          
1 An electrophysiological measure of resting motor neurons that is suppressed by the execution of movement. 
The occurrence of such an effect following one’s mere observation of another’s actions is suggested to be a 
signature of the mirror neuron system (Hobson & Bishop, 2016).  
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similar others that drives our ability to share their experiences and feel empathy for their 
pain. 
2.4 Intergroup Empathic Bias  
Our preference towards the similar is not limited to interpersonal relationships—
where the other may be perceived as individually (dis)similar to us. It also extends to intra- 
and intergroup interactions. In classic group formation literature, the group is formed on 
the basis of our similarity with others (Festinger, 1954). Once the group is formed, 
cohesion between members of the group is a function of mutually perceived similarity 
(identity) in terms of the characteristics that define the group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). In this case, the like-minded or similar others (ingroup 
members) are often favoured over individuals that differ according to the salient 
categorisation criteria (outgroup members), a phenomenon referred to as intergroup bias (M. 
B. Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982).  
Our propensity to favour ingroup over outgroup members includes how we respond to 
their pain and suffering. Stürmer and colleagues (Stürmer et al., 2005, 2006) found that 
empathy motivates us to help others to the extent that the other is seen as similar to our 
ingroup. Indeed, since outgroup members are perceived as different from the self it is more 
challenging to take their perspective and experience empathic concern (Stotland, 1969). This 
manifests in a variety of ways: More mimicking of expressions and movements displayed by 
ingroup members (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Rauchbauer, Majdandžić, Stieger, & Lamm, 
2016); greater tendency to feel an ingroup, compared to an outgroup, member’s physical pain 
(Eres & Molenberghs, 2013; Montalan et al., 2012); greater concern for an ingroup member’s 
distress (Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009); and more preferential treatment of ingroup 
members in downstream moral decision-making, for example, prioritising organ transplants 
for those we feel a ‘oneness’ with rather than based on medical urgency (Batson et al., 1995). 
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This bias (referred to as empathic bias) also arises in a variety of group contexts: In response 
to racial, political, or social groups (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 
2011).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when groups are in overt competition with one another 
empathic bias intensifies. Empathy is significantly attenuated towards our competitors and we 
often even exhibit counter-empathic responses (i.e., joy) to their pain (Smith, Powell, Combs, 
& Schurtz, 2009). For example, researchers found that football fans not only showed less 
empathy-related activation when a fan of the rival team experienced physical pain, but also 
exhibited stronger activity in regions associated with reward processing (ventral striatum) 
(Hein et al., 2010). This malicious pleasure, or Schadenfreude, is often a socially 
unacceptable response to another’s pain but can become normative in a competitive context. 
This is because those feelings of joy relate to the opportunity for the ingroup to get ahead, 
particularly if we’re first reminded of our own group’s inferiority to the rival outgroup (Leach 
& Spears, 2009); the outgroup’s failure can facilitate the engagement of downward, or more 
favourable, comparisons for the ingroup. Thus, not feeling a rival’s pain is motivationally 
congruent with the desire for self-enhancement at the individual and collective level (Leach, 
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). Indeed, such responses likely serve an adaptive 
purpose, drawing our attention away from the negative aspects associated with another’s 
suffering. This is particularly useful when the other is someone we compete with for access to 
scarce resources (Hill & Buss, 2008). Importantly, Schadenfreude may explain why, during 
times of conflict, we often act against our moral intuitions and engage in violence towards 
outgroup others (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006). For example, participants who showed 
more reward-related activity when observing a rival’s pain were also more likely to harm 
them (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011).  
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Intergroup empathic bias occurs even when groups have no long standing feud or 
history of negative interaction. The tendency to favour ‘us’ over ‘them’ is so pronounced that 
it even occurs when the group is formed based solely on arbitrary (or minimal) labels such as 
red and blue team (Montalan et al., 2012). The Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) is a well-known tool for social psychologists to demonstrate 
that the categorisation of individuals into two groups, on the basis of a meaningless 
distinction (such as performance in an arbitrary dot estimation task; Diehl, 1990), is sufficient 
to produce intergroup bias. Studies using MGPs have demonstrated that individuals feel more 
empathy for ingroup members compared to outgroup members. For example, individuals rate 
an ingroup member’s physical pain as more severe than an outgroup member’s (Montalan et 
al., 2012) and exhibit differential activation of the concern and sharing network (anterior 
cingulate and anterior insula) according to the other’s performance in a meaningless dot 
estimation task (Feng et al., 2016).  
However, researchers have also been keen to point out that not all outgroups are 
perceived in the same way: Different outgroups elicit very different beliefs, emotions, and 
behaviours (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Indeed, the 
stereotypes we associate with ingroups and outgroups vary across contexts (Turner et al., 
1987). The Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) outlines that 
people rate social groups primarily using two dimensions of content: Competence and 
warmth. These dimensions intersect to elicit discrete emotions (Fiske et al., 2007). For 
example, social groups that are perceived as high in both competence and warmth elicit 
admiration whereas those low in both elicit contempt. These dimensions also relate to other 
aspects of intergroup relations, including that having higher status leads to one being 
perceived as more competent, and being perceived as more of a competitor leads to the 
perception that one is less warm.  
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Researchers have identified that empathy for another’s pain varies as a function of 
how the other’s social group is perceived in terms of competence and warmth (Cikara & 
Fiske, 2011). In their study, Cikara and Fiske demonstrated that participants reported the 
most empathic concern for targets of misfortune (such as stepping in chewing gum) if they 
appeared to belong to a typically pitied social group (one that is perceived as high in warmth 
but low in competence) but least empathic concern if the target belonged to an envied social 
group (one that is typically perceived as high in competence but low in warmth). Participants 
also exhibited greater empathy-related activations in the anterior insula when the suffering 
target was from a pitied social group, compared to targets from a group that is typically 
perceived as contemptible (Cikara & Fiske, 2011). This suggests that empathy is not strictly 
reserved for ingroup members, and not for outgroup members, but is influenced by our 
expectations about a person based on their specific group membership (i.e., how we perceive 
them and the stereotypes we hold about the social groups with whom they are associated). 
This converges with recent evidence demonstrating that beliefs about another’s group, such 
as the extent to which they are seen as trustworthy (Sessa & Meconi, 2015) or likeable 
(Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010), substantially distorts one’s empathic responses towards them.  
This Thesis  
My goal with this thesis was to determine whether or not empathic biases emerge 
specifically according to beliefs about an outgroup. Existing evidence suggests that this is 
indeed the case however it relies upon the notion that how we perceive particular social 
groups is fixed. Cikara and Fiske (2011), for example, presented participants with targets 
from social groups that—through ratings of perceived warmth and competence—fit in 
particular quadrants of the SCM. These are the admired (e.g., one’s ingroup and close allies), 
envied (e.g., Asians and business professionals), pitied (e.g., elderly and disabled), and 
contemptible (e.g., drug addicts and homeless). Presenting targets from these groups, 
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researchers showed that empathy for others depends on how their group is perceived. 
However the intergroup context is a shifting thing; how we perceive social groups is not 
stable across contexts. In line with the principles of self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) any social group can be perceived as more or less of a 
relevant threat based on the salient criteria. Changing one’s representations of two groups 
(e.g., business professionals vs. the elderly) to one of a more inclusive or common group 
(e.g., White, British, or Western) can substantially improve intergroup contact (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000).  
Compared to a disadvantaged group like the homeless, a business professional is 
relatively enviable; perceived as high status but cold. When the salient criteria is not wealth, 
for example comparing a business professional to a member of a minority religious group, the 
business professional might be perceived quite differently and incorporated within a more 
common social identity (such as a Christian vs. a Muslim or a religious vs. non-religious 
person). In this context, we would expect that the typically envied group becomes one of the 
salient ‘us’ and is entitled to the benefits associated with that such as being the target of our 
empathic concern. Clearly, however, we don’t need this re-categorisation to occur before 
feeling empathy—we can feel empathy for the other even when they constitute a salient 
outgroup. In lieu of re-categorisation, then, what are the nuances in an intergroup context that 
lead us to feel empathy for some outgroups over others?  
The foregoing research suggests that status positions are an important factor in 
determining empathy for others; that the advantaged groups elicit envy but not empathy 
whereas the disadvantaged elicit empathy but not envy. I have made the case, however, that 
the social groups we envy are not the same in every situation and can dynamically switch 
given the salient criteria for group categorisation. To understand how empathy varies within a 
given intergroup context we need to give consideration to the relational importance between 
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different groups. In a given context who is relevant? Who should I be vigilant of? One of the 
primary goals and key contributions of this thesis is in highlighting the need to avoid being 
overly general about key concepts and to pay attention towards the importance of content and 
the specificity of intergroup relations.  
An additional goal of this thesis was to provide an initial investigation of the extent to 
which group-based beliefs alter a specific component of empathy, that is, how we implicitly 
process another’s physical pain (i.e., experience-sharing). There is compelling evidence  
using race as the salient criteria that shows we process the pain of an outgroup target to be 
less painful than that an ingroup target’s pain (e.g., Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). To a 
certain extent, the visual differences between races explains a significant proportion of that 
bias (e.g., Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Azevedo et al., 2013)—that is, empathy is 
reduced towards a target that is visually different to us even when there is no meaning in that 
difference (e.g., a non-existent racial group, coloured violet). But when there is meaning in 
that difference, empathy is even further attenuated (e.g., an existing racial outgroup).  
Visual cues to categorisation clearly activate beliefs or prejudices about the other race 
and this appears to interfere with how we implicitly understand someone’s pain. Indeed, 
Hoffman and colleagues (2016) identified that medical residents perceive an ethnic 
outgroup’s pain as less than an ethnic ingroup’s and this owes to false beliefs (or stereotypes) 
that residents have about the outgroup. This suggests that even at this relatively automatic 
level of empathy it’s not the group distinction that drives bias, per se, but the meaning behind 
it. But our group memberships are rarely visually marked in this way. What happens to 
empathy when the other looks the same but is different in some more abstract way? It seems 
that biases still emerge. For example, if the target is low in socioeconomic status the same 
bias emerges just as if the target were from an ethnic outgroup (Lundy et al., 2015). So 
30                                                                                 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  
clearly it is not simply about visual difference it is about the meaning behind that 
difference—through which visual cues are an efficient (if somewhat inaccurate) route.  
My question is, do abstract beliefs about another’s group drive biases in pain 
perception or are they simply used as an adjunct to more salient cues to categorisation? The 
above research seems to suggest that beliefs drive bias but there is very little experimental 
evidence to support it. The evidence that does exist primarily uses ethnicity as a salient cue to 
categorisation. This may not seem like a problem given that the visual cues associated with 
an ethnic identity are a naturally occurring confound. But as I have mentioned above, a 
significant portion of the bias in response to an ethnic outgroup’s pain is accounted for by 
visual differences. In order to get a clear test of whether beliefs drive bias I consider it 
necessary to rule out any bias that emerges simply because the other looks different.  
In my research, I studied individuals’ empathy in response to a target’s physical pain. 
To investigate the extent to which empathic bias is driven by group-based beliefs, I presented 
targets from either the salient ingroup or from one of two outgroups—one that was rated to be 
relatively higher in perceived competence, status, and competition than the other. Crucially, 
to control for any bias in empathy that may emerge from visual differences, I used targets that 
were matched for perceived age, race, gender, and physical attractiveness. To measure 
empathy, I asked participants to respond to self-report items while I simultaneously recorded 
their neural responses via functional magnetic resonance imaging. With this cutting-edge 
approach I was able to demonstrate, first, the importance of intergroup relations in predicting 
empathic bias. Second, my approach revealed a number of interesting effects that may be 
crucial in guiding future research in the field: I observed that self-reported empathy and the 
neural signatures associated with empathy do not always converge, but in fact often depart 
from one another. With this thesis I also advocate for paying particular attention to the 
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manner in which we measure self-reported empathy because the data I have collected shows 
that the sorts of items we use plays an important role in eliciting particular styles of thinking.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the literature on empathy. I have 
discussed how empathy is defined in research contexts and illustrated the various ways in 
which empathy is studied. I have also outlined the current understanding of when empathy 
flourishes and when it fails. I have illustrated that there is emerging evidence that empathy is 
not simply driven by ingroup-outgroup distinctions but rather by contexts that are specific to 
a given ingroup-outgroup relation, for example, when an outgroup is perceived to be 
threatening or competitive with the ingroup. Furthermore, I have identified how existing 
research is limited: Studies that use minimal intergroup contexts do not speak to the notion 
that empathy may differ between outgroups depending on the intergroup context. Studies that 
use racial intergroup contexts use identities that are confounded by visually salient 
characteristics.  In Chapter 2, I went into further detail regarding how I have tried to 
overcome the issues that I have discussed above, justifying my approach with arguments 
derived from theory and pilot research. 
             
3 The Role of Group Relations in Self-Reported Empathic Bias 
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that intergroup biases in experience-sharing 
(a specific facet of empathy) are driven by the context specific to a given ingroup-outgroup 
relation (such as the beliefs about a group) rather than simply an ingroup-outgroup 
distinction. In this chapter I describe the development of the paradigm we used to examine 
this issue. 
The paradigms that are typically used to investigate intergroup empathy suffer from 
two main problems: 1) Minimal group paradigms prime empathic bias in contexts where 
there are no beliefs about the target group and where empathy is measured in relation to an 
ingroup and a single outgroup, not multiple outgroups to which the ingroup might relate 
differently and 2) racial intergroup contexts tap into pre-existing beliefs, but these are 
confounded by visually salient cues to categorisation. 
To clarify whether group-based beliefs can drive biases in experience-sharing it is 
essential to resolve the issues that I have highlighted above (and discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2). Resolving these issues required some thought as to what might be the ideal 
method through which to elicit 1) experience sharing and 2) intergroup bias in experience 
sharing. The first part was relatively easy: There are many examples in the literature of 
paradigms that reliably evoke experience-sharing, most often involving the presentation of 
images or videos of hands being stabbed or pricked (e.g., Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2006). When deciding which features of the intergroup context to make salient, it 
was crucial that I ensure the target’s identity (e.g., the person being hurt) could be depicted in 
a manner that was clear to the observer but, at the same time, could be easily manipulated 
without confounding the identity with visually salient information (such as the race, age, 
gender, and physical attractiveness of individual targets).  
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After closely studying the literature, I decided to use university affiliation as a cue to 
group categorisation. Tarrant, Dazeley, and Cottom (2009) demonstrated the effect of social 
categorisation on empathic-concern using student identities. In this study, researchers 
presented students from Keele University in the UK with a target describing a distressful 
experience. The target was either a student from Keele or a student from Staffordshire 
University (i.e., a relevant outgroup). Participants (from Keele) showed the expected ingroup 
preference, reporting stronger empathic-concern and helping intentions toward students from 
Keele, compared to students from Staffordshire University. In the context of my research, 
student identity was certainly an easily accessible identity to impose as a social 
categorisation, while controlling for other social categories (such as race, age, and gender), 
since participants were students who were recruited exclusively from one specific university. 
University affiliation is not visible by default, therefore the identity could be easily 
manipulated, requiring only an additional cue (a text prompt, as I elected to do, or a symbol, 
such as an object with a logo) to indicate the university to which the student was affiliated.  
With a university context in mind, I needed to select two universities that could 
function as an outgroup to the ingroup university (the University of Exeter) and that differed 
in how they are perceived by participants (i.e., students at Exeter). In the first pilot study, I 
aimed to select which universities to use in the main studies. To do this, I measured 
participants’ perceptions of their group (fellow students from the University of Exeter) 
compared to a selection of outgroups. Given the importance of a background of similarity in 
engaging in relevant comparisons (Tesser & Campbell, 1980), I selected outgroups that 
shared geographical proximity to the ingroup (i.e., universities within the south west of the 
UK). Given that competitive threat and perceived rivalry are key dimensions of intergroup 
empathic bias (Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014), I chose universities that were 
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also closely matched in status positions—based on attributes that are relevant to the 
categorisation as a student for example, entry requirements and national ranking.  
In the second study, I aimed to test the appropriateness of the selected intergroup 
contexts to examine empathic biases, measuring whether and how participants’ empathic 
responses varied as a function of the group membership of the target. Empathy was measured 
using two self-report items, one that was constructed to gauge the extent to which the 
participant perceived the image as unpleasant for them to observe (i.e., a self-focussed 
response; e.g., Lamm, Nausbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007), and the other item to gauge 
their feelings of concern towards the target (i.e., an other-focussed response). Self- and other-
focussed responses to pain rely on distinct processes and are supported by separate neural 
networks (Zaki, Ochsner, Hanelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007). It was expected that self-
focussed items would be associated more strongly with regions that process the sensory-
discriminative aspects of pain i.e., experience-sharing (AI; Peyron et al., 2000) than other-
focussed items, which I expected to be associated more strongly with regions that support the 
ability to infer what the other person is thinking/feeling (the mentalising network; Frith & 
Frith, 2006). There is very little research that considers the influence that self-report measures 
can have on empathy. With this analysis I hoped to demonstrate the need to carefully 
consider how we use and construct self-report items.  
3.1 Study 1 
3.1.1 Method 
Design. This study followed a repeated measures design with target identity as the 
only manipulated variable (University of Exeter, Cardiff University, University of Bath, 
University of Plymouth, and University of Bristol). The ingroup was the university where the 
study was conducted (University of Exeter).  
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Participants. A total of 47 first and second year students at the University of Exeter 
(M age = 19.87, SD = 1.20, 28 female) completed an online survey concerning their 
perceptions of students at UK universities. Participants were recruited through the online 
Psychology Research Participation System (SONA) and offered entry into a lottery of one 
£20 Amazon voucher as remuneration for their time. The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the School of Psychology, University of Exeter. Participant consent was 
obtained according to the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013). 
Measures. Participants completed measures of perceived group competence (3 items 
on seven-point scales, all alphas > .80; e.g., to what extent do you think that students of the 
University of Exeter are generally perceived as competent within British society?), sociability 
(3 items, all alphas > .80; adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002, e.g., to what extent 
do you think that students of the University of Exeter are generally perceived as warm within 
British society?), status (4 items, all alphas > .90; e.g., to what extent do you think that Exeter 
is a prestigious university?), rivalry (2 items, all alphas > .80, Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 
1995; e.g., to what extent do you see Cardiff students as  rivals of Exeter students?), and 
similarity (2 items, all alphas > .80, Simon, 1992; e.g., to what extent do you think that 
students at Cardiff University are similar to students from the University of Exeter?). All 
items were completed by reference to all of the groups, so participants completed these five 
times, with the exception of perceived similarity and rivalry—these items were only asked 
with reference to the outgroups (and not the ingroup) since they were always asked in relation 
to the ingroup. For a full account of these measures please see Appendix A.  
Procedure. To make the social identity based on university affiliation salient, 
participants were informed that the research concerned Exeter students’ opinions of students 
at other UK Universities. After providing informed consent, participants were presented with 
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a set of 66 items and were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very 
much) to what extent they agreed with each statement, for example: 
“To what extent do you think that students of Exeter University are generally 
perceived as competent within British society?”  
The items were ordered according to the target group rather than according to the measure 
(i.e., participants completed all items regarding one group before moving on to the next). The 
order in which participants rated target groups was randomised. The measures were ordered 
in the following way: Competence, sociability, status, similarity, and rivalry. The order of 
measures was not randomised in order to avoid cross item influence, for example, feelings of 
rivalry influencing perceived competence and status. Upon completing the questionnaire, 
participants were given a full debriefing as to the background and purpose of the study and 
given the opportunity to ask questions.  
3.1.2 Results  
All alphas were greater than .80, therefore ratings of each perceived attribute were 
compiled into a single average score per target group, per participant. All p values correspond 
to two-tailed tests, Bonferroni-corrected, unless noted otherwise.  
Competence and sociability. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed that there was significant variability in how participants rated the perceived 
competence of the target groups, F (4, 180) = 32.33, p < .001, While participants 
rated their ingroup (M = 5.48, SD = 1.08) as significantly more competent than students at 
Cardiff (M = 4.76, SD = .94), t (45) = 5.49, p <.001, 95% CI [.45, .98], d = .71 and Plymouth 
(M = 4.29, SD = 1.05), t (45) = 7.12, p <.001, 95% CI [.85, 1.52], d = 1.12, they rated 
students at Bath (M = 5.57, SD = .70), t (45) = -.769, p =.446, 95% CI [-.34, .15], d = .09 and 
Bristol (M = 5.61, SD = .79), t (45) = -.852, p =.399, 95% CI [-.44, .18], d = .14, to be as 
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competent as the ingroup. Relative to the ingroup (M = 5.09, SD = 1.05), participants rated 
students from Plymouth (M = 4.62, SD = .92) to be significantly lower in perceived 
sociability, t (46) = 2.97, p =.047, 95% CI [.15, .77], d = .48, but equal to students from 
Cardiff (M = 4.87, SD = .82), t (46) = 1.64, p =.107, 95% CI [-.05, .49], d = .23, Bath (M = 
5.01, SD = .91), t (46) = .62, p =.537, 95% CI [-.16, .30], d = .08, and Bristol (M = 4.88, SD = 
.96), t (46) = 1.36, p =.182, 95% CI [-.10, .51], d = .21 (see Figure 3.2).  
Group status. Participants’ ratings of group status were similar to their ratings of 
perceived group competence, F (4, 184) = 37.73, p < .001, : Participants rated their 
ingroup (M = 5.39, SD = 1.12) as significantly more competent than students at Cardiff (M = 
4.43, SD = 1.03), t (46) = 5.21, p <.001, 95% CI [.59, 1.34], d = .89, and Plymouth (M = 3.71, 
SD = 1.14), t (46) = 8.28, p <.001, 95% CI [1.28, 2.09], d = 1.49, but rated students at the 
ingroup university as equal in competence as students at Bath (M = 5.41, SD = 1.02), t (46) = 
-.195, p =.846, 95% CI [-.30, .25], d = .18, and Bristol (M = 5.61, SD = 1.02), t (46) = -.107, 
p =.915, 95% CI [-.42, .38], d = .21. 
Similarity and rivalry. Participants’ ratings of perceived similarity significantly 
varied between the target groups, F (3, 138) = 29.49, p < .001, Students at Bath (M 
= 5.31, SD = .92) were rated as significantly more similar to the ingroup, relative to students 
at Cardiff (M = 4.59, SD = .88), t (46) = 4.62, p <.001, 95% CI [.40, 1.02], d = .79, and 
Plymouth (M = 3.84, SD = 1.22), t (46) = 7.42, p <.001, 95% CI [1.07, 1.87], d = 1.36, but 
not relative to students at Bristol (M = 5.27, SD = .99), t (46) = .249, p =.804, 95% CI [-.30, 
.39], d = .04. Participants also rated groups as varying in perceived rivalry with the ingroup, 
F (3, 138) = 32.19, p < .001, Students at Bath (M = 5.14, SD = 1.00) were rated as 
significantly more of a rival to the ingroup, relative to students at Cardiff (M = 4.16, SD = 
.90), t (46) = 6.05, p <.001, 95% CI [.66, 1.31], d = 1.03, and Plymouth (M = 3.81, SD = .95), 
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t (46) = 8.172, p <.001, 95% CI [1.00, 1.66], d = 1.36, but not relative to students at Bristol 
(M = 5.18, SD = 1.18) where the difference was non-significant, t (46) = -.175, p =.862, 95% 
CI [-.45, .38], d = .04 (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean ratings of sociability and competence per target group from Chapter 3, Study 1. Error 
bars depict the 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 3.3. Mean ratings of similarity and rivalry per target group from Chapter 3, Study 1. Error bars 
depict the 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 3.1. Summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations for scores on perceived competence, 
sociability, status, similarity with the ingroup, rivalry with the ingroup from Chapter 3, Study 1.  
Exeter          
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3  
1. Competence 5.48 1.08 —    
2. Sociability 5.09 1.05 .67** —   
3. Status 5.39 1.12 .78** .46** —  
Cardiff           
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Competence 4.47 0.94 —    
2. Sociability 4.87 0.82 .37* —   
3. Status 4.43 1.03 .74** .41** —  
4. Similarity 4.59 0.88 .26 .22 .44** — 
5. Rivalry  4.16 0.90 .14 .11 .35* .29* 
Bath           
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Competence 5.57 0.7 —    
2. Sociability 5.01 0.91 .42** —   
3. Status 5.42 0.86 .77** .31* —  
4. Similarity 5.31 0.92 .53** .13 .62** — 
5. Rivalry  5.14 1.00 .54** .23 .51** .31* 
Plymouth           
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Competence 4.29 1.05 —    
2. Sociability 4.62 0.92 .79** —   
3. Status 3.71 1.14 .84** .63** —  
4. Similarity 3.84 1.22 .67** .48** .77** — 
5. Rivalry  3.81 0.95 .59** .51** .67** .59** 
Bristol           
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Competence 5.61 0.79 —    
2. Sociability 4.88 0.96 .67** —   
3. Status 5.41 1.02 .82** .59** —  
4. Similarity 5.27 0.99 .65** .32* .73** — 
5. Rivalry  5.18 1.18 .68** .38** .71** .78** 
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
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3.1.3 Discussion 
 The goal of Study 1 was to select groups (universities) that could function as an 
outgroup to the ingroup (the University of Exeter) and that differed in how they are perceived 
by participants (i.e., students at Exeter). Participants were asked to rate the ingroup as well as 
a selection of outgroups that shared a background of similarity with the ingroup, on a range 
of attributes that are relevant to intergroup relations and have been shown as key dimensions 
of intergroup empathic bias. Participants were all students from the University of Exeter and I 
ensured that the salient ingroup comprised fellow students at the University of Exeter. The 
outgroups comprised students from a variety of other universities that were geographically 
similar to the ingroup, but varied in category-relevant dimensions relative to the ingroup and 
to each other (such as university rankings and entry requirements). The ultimate goal was to 
establish whether university affiliation would produce a context in which I might elicit and 
study intergroup empathic bias.  
The results demonstrated that participants reported an ingroup bias on measures of 
perceived competence and sociability, rating their own university as highest, or equally 
highest, in both attributes. Participants also showed a consistent tendency to rate two of the 
outgroups (students from Bath and Bristol) as equal to each other and on par with the ingroup 
in terms of competence and status, relative to the other outgroups. Participants also rated 
members of these two particular outgroups as highly similar and as greater rivals to the 
ingroup, relative to the other outgroups. This demonstrated that some of the outgroups were 
not perceived to be equal to the ingroup and the outgroups themselves were not all rated as 
equal to each other.  
The goal of Study 2 was to test whether self-reported empathy for targets in pain 
would differ according to their ostensible membership to one of the social groups examined 
in Study 1. Previous research has demonstrated that participants feel more empathy for 
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targets with whom they share a social categorisation (i.e., ingroup members) compared to 
targets with whom they don’t (i.e., outgroup members; Tarrant et al., 2009). Therefore, I 
expected participants would report feeling more empathy for targets from the ingroup 
university (Exeter) compared to targets of any of the outgroup universities. Crucial to this 
thesis, empathy also differs according to how particular groups are perceived along 
dimensions of stereotype content (Cikara & Fiske, 2011) and competitive threat (Cikara et al., 
2014). Given that these dimensions are key drivers of intergroup empathic bias, I expected 
that participants would report less empathy for students at a university that is perceived to be 
more of a salient competitor to students at the University of Exeter (in this case, students 
from Bath and Bristol), compared to students at a university that is not seen as a competitor 
(students from Plymouth and Cardiff).  
3.2 Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was to examine whether the groups used in Study 1 would elicit 
empathic biases in self-reported experience-sharing.  
3.2.1 Method 
Design. This study followed a 2 (event: painful vs. neutral) x 5 (university affiliation: 
Exeter vs. Cardiff vs. Bath vs. Plymouth vs. Bath) x 2 (target occupation: student vs. worker) 
2 repeated measures design. 
Sample size, statistical power, and precision. Using sample data from previously 
published research in social categorisation and empathy (Tarrant et al., 2009), an a-priori 
power analysis (G* Power [Version 3.1], Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009)  
                                                          
2Aside from allowing me to conceal the goals of the study, manipulating the target’s occupation allowed me to 
consider whether empathic biases would emerge when comparing students versus workers. Empathic bias was 
particularly expected when comparing empathic responses to students relative to workers within the ingroup 
university, since only then did workers constitute a relevant outgroup. Workers at other universities did not 
constitute a relevant outgroup for our participants, so I did not expect empathy to be reduced for those targets. 
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demonstrated that to reach a minimum of 80% estimated power, under a two-tailed 
hypothesis and a confidence level of 5%, would require a sample of at least 40 participants in 
total for a repeated measures design. We therefore aimed to collect data from 40 participants 
for this study. 
Participants. A total of 41 first and second year Psychology students from the 
University of Exeter (M age = 19.68, SD = .81, 30 female) were recruited to complete a 
computer task in individual lab sessions. These sessions took place in the middle of the 
second-term of the academic year. Participants were recruited via the online Psychology 
Research Participation System (SONA) and remunerated with either £3 or 1 course credit, 
according to their preference. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the School 
of Psychology, University of Exeter. Participant consent was obtained according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013). 
 Stimuli. Participants viewed photos of individuals who were denoted as either 
ingroup members or outgroup members experiencing painful or neutral events (Figure 
4.3Figure 4B). Information about the target’s identity was presented in advance of the event3. 
The nature of the event was manipulated using either objects that can cause pain (Figure 
4.3C, upper row) or neutral objects (Figure 4.3C, lower row). Objects across the two 
categories were semantically matched as closely as possible, for example, a Q-tip and syringe 
are both used to prepare a part of the body for surgery: A Q-tip to clean the area and a syringe 
to provide anaesthetic. The event animations consisted of 2-frame sequences of photographs 
(Figure 4.3A). The first frame (500ms) showed a face and hand/arm in neutral position beside 
an object. In half of the sequences, the object was one of three harmful objects (Figure 4.3C, 
upper row) and in the other it was one of three semantically matched neutral objects (Figure 
                                                          
3 Within each condition, the target’s identity was held constant throughout the study to ensure that the social 
identity would not be perceived as transient or arbitrary.  
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4.3C, lower row). The second frame (500ms) showed the object stimulating the hand 
resulting in either a painful or neutral facial expression. No inter-stimulus interval was used 
in order to create apparent motion. This paradigm was inspired by one used by Morrison and 
colleagues  ( 2013) however has a number of substantial changes (for example, orientation of 
the perceived hand and the addition of the target’s face) and, for the first time here, is applied 
to a task involving empathy. Stimuli were created using 20 photographs of faces (10 male, 10 
female) adapted from the pain expressions image set in the Psychological Image Collection 
(PICS; pics.stir.ac.uk) and photographs of hands and arms (1 male and 1 female) that were 
created for this purpose. The images of hands and arms were coded to appear in an allocentric 
perspective to depict a target sitting opposite, and facing, the participant. All photographs 
were created or edited using GNU Image Manipulation Program version 2.0 (The GIMP 
team). The photographs were matched for dimension, orientation, perceived age, and race. 
All stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) on an 800x600 LCD monitor.  
Measures. Following each event, participants were asked to identify the target (e.g., 
‘is this a student of Cardiff University’, response alternatives: Yes or no) and to respond to 
two empathy-related items: ‘How unpleasant was the event for you to witness?’ (Self-
focussed) and ‘How bad did you feel for the target?’ (Other-focussed). Responses were made 
on five-point scales (from 1 = Not at all, to 5 = Very much). After completing the main task, 
participants were asked to answer a series of questions designed to gauge their feedback on 
the paradigm (e.g., to what extent were the events realistic? Did the facial expressions appear 
to genuinely express pain?).  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were presented with a set 
of 10 practice trials followed by a short break in which participants were given the 
opportunity to request clarification of any aspects of the task that may be unclear to them. In 
45                                                                  CHAPTER 3. INTERGROUP EMPATHIC BIAS 
 
  
the task itself, participants were asked to observe and respond to photographs of individuals 
from different universities, some that depicted people experiencing negative events (e.g., an 
injection). At the onset of each trial, participants were required to memorise the target’s 
identity (i.e., a student or a worker from one the target universities). Participants then 
observed that same target experiencing either a neutral or painful event. Following this, 
participants were asked to recall the identity of the target in a simple 1-back task. Finally, 
participants were asked to respond to two questions gauging their self- and other-focussed 
empathy towards the target of that event. Participants completed 120 trials in total: 50% 
depicted painful events (60), 50% depicted students (60), and 20% per university (24). After 
completing 120 trials, participants were debriefed on the background and purpose of the 
study, remunerated, and given the opportunity to ask questions.  
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3.2.2 Results  
Recall task. Participants were on average 86% accurate at correctly recalling the 
target’s identity, which did not differ according to the perceived events, F (1, 39) = .405, p 
=.528, ηp2 = .01, target occupation, F (1, 39) = .570, p =.455, ηp2 = .01, or target group, F (1, 
39) = .846, p =.498, ηp2 = .02.  One participant consistently scored below 3 standard 
deviations from the mean (scoring 50.5% on average) and was thus removed from further 
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Figure 4.3. (A) Trial structure; (B) Example of the four possible events from the combination of the object types 
(painful and neutral) and the target group membership (ingroup and outgroup); (C) Object stimuli depicted as 
causing either painful or neutral stimulations to the target. 
47                                                                  CHAPTER 3. INTERGROUP EMPATHIC BIAS 
 
  
analysis. Of the remaining sample, only trials in which participants correctly recalled the 
target were analysed. This ensures that the trials analysed are those where the identity was 
correctly identified.   
Self-focussed empathy. A repeated measures analysis of variance revealed a 
significant main effect of the perceived event on ratings of self-focussed empathy, F (1, 39) = 
216.03, p <.001, ηp2 = .84. Participants reported painful events (M = 3.51, SD =.13) to be 
more unpleasant to witness compared to neutral events (M = 1.32, SD = .07), t (39) = 14.69, p 
< .001, 95% CI [1.89, 2.49], d = 20.98. This confirms that participants perceived the events 
as intended.  
I observed floor effects in empathic responses to neutral trials with no variability 
between the target groups, F (4, 156) =.717, p =.581, ηp2 = .02. This was to be expected given 
that the neutral events did not involve pain, which is what participants were required to rate. 
Therefore the decision was made to analyse the effects of group categorisation on empathy 
only using trials that would invoke empathy (i.e., trials involving pain). This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of target group, F (4, 156) = 3.59, p =.008, ηp2 = .08, which 
was explained only by the difference in ratings between targets from Bath (M = 3.43, SD 
=.13) and Bristol (M = 3.59, SD =.13), t (39) = -2.95, p = .05, 95% CI [-.34, .06], d = 1.23.  
There was no main effect of target occupation, F (4, 156) = 2.72, p =.107, ηp2 = .06, 
but there was a significant interaction between occupation and group, F (4, 156) = 5.02, p 
=.001, ηp2 = .11.  Participants reported photographs of pain to seem more unpleasant when the 
target was a worker, compared to a student, at Cardiff, t (39) = 2.23, p = .031, 95% CI [.02, 
.29], d = .15, and Plymouth, t (39) = 2.87, p = .007, 95% CI [.05, .29], d = .17, whereas they 
reported them to be significantly less unpleasant when the target was a worker, compared to  
a student, at the ingroup university, t (39) = -3.18, p = .003, 95% CI [-.26, -.06], d = .19. 
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There was no difference in unpleasantness ratings for targets who were workers compared to 
students at Bath, t (39) = .981, p = .337, 95% CI [-.06, .16], d = .05, and Bristol, t (39) = .108, 
p = .921, 95% CI [-.13, .14], d = .01.  
Participants reported photographs of pain to seem more unpleasant when the target 
was a fellow student from Exeter (M = 3.56, SD = .83) compared to when the target was a 
student from Cardiff (M = 3.44, SD = .89), t (40) = 2.19, p =.034, 95% CI [.01, .23], d = .14, 
Bath (M = 3.40, SD = .88), t (40) = 2.61, p =.013, 95% CI [.04, .28], d = .19, or Plymouth (M 
= 3.43, SD = .87), t (40) = 2.35, p =.024, 95% CI [.02, .26], d = .15, but not when the target 
was a student from Bristol (M = 3.59, SD = .88), t (40) = -.462, p =.647, 95% CI [-.17, .11], d 
= .04.  
Other-focussed empathy. As with self-focussed empathy, a strong main effect of 
event emerged, F (1, 39) = 285.09, p <.001, ηp2 = .88: Participants reported feeling worse for 
targets who experienced a painful event (M = 3.82, SD =.09) compared to neutral event (M = 
1.35, SD = .08), t (39) = 16.87, p < .001, 95% CI [2.17, 2.76], d = 29.01.  
As before, there was no effect of type of perceived event and target group, F (4, 156) 
=.688 p =.601, ηp2 = .02. Analysing the effects of group categorisation on trials involving 
pain revealed a main effect of target group, F (4, 156) = 2.99, p =.021, ηp2 = .07, which was, 
as above, explained by the difference between Bath (M = 3.75, SD =.09) and Bristol (M = 
3.89, SD =.09), t (39) = -3.97, p = .003, 95% CI [-.25, -.03], d = .15.  
There was a marginally significant main effect of occupation, F (1, 39) = 3.99, p 
=.052, ηp2 = .09: Participants felt worse for workers compared to students overall, t (39) = -
1.97, p = .052, 95% CI [-.001, .15], d = .07. A significant interaction emerged between 
occupation and university affiliation: Participants reported feeling worse if the target in pain 
was a worker, compared to a student, at Cardiff, t (39) = 2.21, p = .034, 95% CI [.01, .30], d 
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= .15, and Plymouth, t (39) = 3.11, p = .003, 95% CI [.07, .33], d = .19. There was no 
difference in unpleasantness ratings for targets who were workers, compared to students, at 
the ingroup university, t (39) = 1.36, p = .183, 95% CI [-.05, .23], d = .09, Bath, t (39) = 1.02, 
p = .319, 95% CI [-.06, .183], d = .07, or Bristol, t (39) = .662, p = .510, 95% CI [-.09, .19], d 
= .05.  
Participants reported feeling significantly worse observing the pain of others when the 
target was a fellow student from Exeter (M = 3.86, SD = .57) compared to when they were a 
student from Cardiff (M = 3.74, SD = .69), t (40) = 1.83, p =.075, 95% CI [-.01, .25], d = .19, 
Bath (M = 3.72, SD = .64), t (40) = 2.75, p =.009, 95% CI [.04, .23], d = .23, or Plymouth (M 
= 3.71, SD = .67), t (40) = 2.39, p =.022, 95% CI [.02, .28], d = .24, but not when they were a 
student from Bristol (M = 3.87, SD = .67),  t (40) = -.220, p =.827, 95% CI [-.13, .11], d = .02 
(Figure 3.5).  
Feedback questionnaire. Responses to the feedback items demonstrated that 
participants perceived events involving syringe needles (M = 4.02, SD = .85) to be 
significantly less painful compared to a kitchen knife (M = 4.78, SD = .52) or broken wine 
glass (M = 4.63, SD = .58), F (2, 120) = 14.79, p <.001. Descriptive statistics also 
demonstrated that participants generally believed that the emotions displayed by the targets 
represented a genuinely painful experience (M = 3.71, SD = .87).  
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Figure 3.5. Mean ratings of other-focussed empathy per target group from Chapter 3, Study 2. Error 
bars depict the 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 3.6. Mean ratings of self-focussed empathy per target group from Chapter 3, Study 2. Error 
bars depict the 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 3.2. Summary of means and standard deviations for scores on empathy towards Students and Worker 
targets from Chapter 3, Study 2 
    Other-focussed Self-focussed 
  Target Group M SD M SD 
Students 
Exeter 3.86 0.57 3.56 0.83 
Cardiff 3.74 0.70 3.44 0.89 
Bath 3.72 0.64 3.40 0.88 
Plymouth 3.71 0.67 3.42 0.87 
Bristol 3.87 0.67 3.59 0.88 
Workers 
Exeter 3.77 0.61 3.40 0.84 
Cardiff 3.90 0.56 3.59 0.82 
Bath 3.78 0.66 3.46 0.87 
Plymouth 3.91 0.57 3.60 0.77 
Bristol 3.92 0.66 3.60 0.83 
3.2.3 Discussion 
Previous work has demonstrated that biases in empathic concern (i.e., one specific 
facet of empathy) arise in group contexts that are not simply defined by an ingroup-outgroup 
distinction, but vary according to how particular outgroups are perceived (Cikara & Fiske, 
2011). Study 2 extended those findings by demonstrating that outgroup-specific empathic 
biases also emerge in a task involving experience-sharing. Participants were shown target 
individuals experiencing painful events. The target’s identity was manipulated by their 
university affiliation and their occupation within that university. Consistent with previous 
research, self-reported empathy was greater when observing ingroup targets in pain compared 
to observing targets of some, but not all, outgroups in pain. Specifically, as expected, ingroup 
bias emerged when comparing empathy ratings for students from Exeter and students from 
Cardiff, Bath, or Plymouth, but not when compared to ratings for students from Bristol. 
Instead, participants actually reported feeling slightly (but not significantly) worse seeing a 
Bristol student in pain than an Exeter student. This was against my expectations. In Study 1, 
Bristol was perceived to be a significantly more competitive with the ingroup, compared to 
other outgroups. Given that competition is a key dimension of intergroup empathic bias, I 
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expected empathy for targets from this group to be lower compared to targets from groups 
that were seen as less competitive with the ingroup (e.g., Plymouth).  
The results of this study showed that self-reported empathy varied according to 
intersections between the target’s university affiliation and their perceived occupation within 
that university. Specifically, ratings of empathy were significantly higher towards targets who 
shared both group categorisations with the salient ingroup (i.e., Exeter students) relative to 
targets who differed in one of those dimensions (i.e., a Bath student or an Exeter worker). 
Interestingly, ratings of empathy for targets who differed in both dimensions (i.e., workers at 
outgroup universities) were not statistically different from empathy reported for ingroup 
targets.  
I demonstrate here that intergroup biases in empathy are driven by the context specific 
to a given ingroup-outgroup relation rather than simply an ingroup-outgroup distinction. This 
is consistent with previous research, but here, for the first time, I document that outgroup-
specific empathic biases also emerge in experience-sharing. While these results are consistent 
with findings from previous studies, they suffer from the limitations that are inherent to self-
report measures. Zhou, Valiente, and Eisenberg (2003) argue that self-report measures are a 
ubiquitous and robust method to study empathy-related responses, but that they can and often 
are vulnerable to strategic responding given that empathy is deemed to be socially 
desirable (Decety & Jackson, 2006). Indeed, significant disparities exist between the 
responses that participants consciously report (such as ratings on a Likert scale) and those 
that are uncontrollable and reflective of ‘gut reactions’ such as physiological responses 
(Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins, & Jeyaram, 2003). It is 
possible, in this case, that participants did not rate empathy with another’s (or others’) pain as 
they actually experienced it, but in line with their perceptions of what is socially desirable 
(i.e., to be empathic to all and not prejudiced by group boundaries). Therefore, in Study 3 
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(reported in the next chapter), I used techniques that capture responses that are not within a 
participant’s volitional control (brain imaging measures) in conjunction with self-reports to 
triangulate empathic responses to another’s pain. Brain activity, accessed through brain 
imaging, has been established to be an effective proxy to one’s own experiences of pain and 
has been regarded as a reliable way of indexing empathic responses when triangulated with 
self-assessments (Robinson, Staud, & Price, 2013).  
Feedback from this study indicated, overall, that this paradigm was a valid measure of 
experience-sharing: The stimuli appeared to genuinely depict pain (according to feedback 
from participants) and participants reported feeling bad or unpleasantness at the sight of it. 
Results also indicated ways in which I might improve the paradigm. For example, empathy-
related responses were significantly reduced to images of a syringe penetrating the other’s 
hand. While I did not include a measure to follow up on why this was, it may be intuitive 
given that a syringe is often used to reduce (rather than provoke) pain in medical contexts 
(i.e., delivering an anaesthetic). This is interesting when one considers the prevalence of this 
type of stimuli in the experience-sharing literature (for example, Xu et al., 2009). It is also 
consistent with previous suggestions that ‘flesh and bone’ penetration (such as, seeing a knife 
stab a hand) as opposed to light pinpricking (by a needle) leads to greater processing of 
another’s physical pain (Avenanti, Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006; Morrison, Lloyd, di 
Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004). For these reasons, I removed images of syringes from the 
paradigm used in Study 3. 
From the results of Study 1 and Study 2, I identified that participants rated two 
outgroups, in particular, as varying the most from each other in terms of competitive threat 
(i.e., a key dimension of intergroup empathic bias; Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 
2014). Those groups were students from the University of Bath and students from the 
University of Plymouth. In Study 1, participants consistently rated students from Bath as the 
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highest in terms of perceived competence and status; the most similar and the greatest rivals 
of students from the ingroup university. In contrast, students from Plymouth were rated as the 
lowest in every dimension when compared to the ingroup and other outgroups. In Study 2, 
there were no significant differences when comparing empathic towards targets from Bath 
and Plymouth, but it is possible that these biases would emerge when measuring responses 
without the filter of response control. Therefore, in Study 3, I investigated whether outgroup-
specific empathic biases emerge in responses that are not subject to social desirability (brain 
imaging measures). I expected that participants would exhibit less empathy-related brain 
activity in response to targets whose group is perceived as more competitive with the ingroup 
(i.e., students from the University of Bath) compared targets whose group is seen as less 
competitive (i.e., students from the University of Plymouth).  
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined how I developed a paradigm to test the hypothesis that 
empathic biases arise as a result of how an outgroup is perceived in relation to the ingroup 
rather than simply on the basis of an ingroup-outgroup distinction. I have outlined the issues 
in the literature, as I see them, and highlighted how I accounted for these issues in my 
approach. I then presented two studies in which I measured responses to a selection of target 
groups on a range of attributes that have been shown as key dimensions of intergroup 
empathic bias (Study 1). I also tested the appropriateness of the selected intergroup contexts 
to examine empathic biases (Study 2). With these studies, I demonstrated that some of the 
outgroups were not perceived to be equal to the ingroup and the outgroups themselves were 
not all rated as equal to each other (Study 1). This suggests that university affiliation could be 
used to produce a context in which to elicit and study intergroup empathic bias. I then 
demonstrated that self-reported empathy was greater when observing ingroup targets in pain 
compared to observing targets of some, but not all, outgroups in pain (Study 2). This supports 
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the notion that biases in empathy are driven by the context specific to a given ingroup-
outgroup relation rather than simply an ingroup-outgroup distinction. 
In Chapter 4, I report two studies in which participants were given a task involving 
experience-sharing for members of different groups while their neural responses were 
recorded via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  
             
4 The Neural Correlates of Context-Specific Empathic Biases 
  The goal of Chapter 3 was to demonstrate that intergroup biases influence empathy at 
a self-report empathy level and that these biases are driven by the context specific to a given 
ingroup-outgroup relation (such as the beliefs about a group) rather than simply an ingroup-
outgroup distinction. The goal of Chapter 4 was to show that the same context-specific biases 
influence empathy at a neurological level, where the filter of response control is removed and 
where intergroup biases are thus more prominently exhibited.   
 Individuals feel more empathy for those in their group (i.e., ingroup members) and less 
for those who are not (i.e., outgroup members)—this is referred to as empathic bias. Using 
self-report ratings, researchers have shown that empathic bias can manifest at varying degrees 
from ambivalence when presented with the suffering of an outgroup member (Stürmer et al., 
2005; Tarrant et al., 2009) to malicious pleasure (i.e., Schadenfreude; Cikara, Botvinick, & 
Fiske, 2011; Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). Empathic bias can also manifest 
at the level of neural activity: Xu, Zuo, Wang, and Han (2009) found that participants 
exhibited stronger blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses associated with 
empathy when viewing same-race, compared to other-race, targets in physical pain. But 
empathy is not merely selective to the other’s group, rather it fluctuates according to how the 
other’s group is perceived by the individual.  
 At the self-report level, the extent to which we feel ambivalence or joy to an outgroup 
member’s pain is determined by whether or not we perceive the outgroup as a possible rival 
to the ingroup (Chang et al., 2016; Cikara et al., 2014).  Likewise, the BOLD responses 
associated with empathy also depend on how the outgroup is evaluated by the participant: 
Cikara and Fiske (2011) found that the insula (a region that is strongly associated with 
empathy; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011) was more active when reading about enivable 
targets experiencing positive events than if the event was negative or if the target was 
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typically pitied, admired, or contemptible. Given the insula’s involvement in processing the 
sensory-discriminative aspects of pain (Peyron et al., 2000), the authors interpreted this 
activation as indicative of a counter-empathic response (i.e., that seeing envied targets 
experiencing positive events was in some way painful for the participant). With these results, 
Cikara and Fiske showed for the first time that BOLD responses associated with empathy are 
not simply modulated by ingroup-outgroup distinctions, but rather vary as a function of how 
the outgroup is evaluated by the individual.  
 Consistent with the findings from Cikara and Fiske (2011), recent research has 
demonstrated that BOLD responses are modulated by beliefs about the outgroup that relate to 
intergroup relations, such as whether or not the outgroup is perceived to be a rival to the 
ingroup (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010) 
or is higher status than the ingroup (Feng et al., 2016). However, one of the key limitations of 
this research is that empathy is measured in relation to an ingroup and single outgroup (i.e., 
‘us’ vs. ‘them’), not multiple outgroups to which the ingroup might relate differently (i.e., 
‘us’ vs. competitive ‘them’ vs. non-competitive ‘them’). To determine whether or not 
empathic bias emerges according to how relevant a threat an outgroup is to the ingroup, it is 
necessary to compare empathic responses not only between the ingroup and an outgroup but 
also between different outgroups.  
  The goal of Study 3 was to determine whether beliefs about an outgroup can drive 
biases in the BOLD responses associated with empathy. Cikara and Fiske (2011) showed that 
beliefs about another’s group influenced BOLD responses associated with one specific facet 
of empathy, empathic concern, but it is unclear whether this effect would also influence 
activation associated with other facets of empathy, such as experience sharing. Brain 
activation is not only interesting in itself—as it can shed light on the mechanisms through 
which group biases emerge—but it also allows us to access responses that respondents cannot 
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control, which is especially important when examining morally loaded responses, such as 
empathy. In Study 3, I asked participants to observe targets from either the ingroup university 
or one of two neighbouring outgroup universities as they experienced physically painful or 
innocuous events. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt empathy 
towards the targets while their BOLD responses were recorded via functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Based on a recent meta-analysis, I expected that observing 
pictures of other’s pain would lead to increased activation in regions that process the sensory-
discriminative aspects of pain, such as the anterior insula (AI), and primary and secondary 
somatosensory cortices (SI and SII); the felt unpleasantness of physical pain, such as the 
anterior cingulate (ACC); and areas engaged in the inference and representation of mental 
states, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Lamm 
et al., 2011).  
 I expected activity in these regions would be modulated by the group identity of the 
target, but more specifically by the participant’s beliefs about the target’s group. In support of 
these predictions, a recent study by Feng et al. (2016) demonstrated that participants 
exhibited more activity in the AI and anterior medial cingulate cortex (aMCC) when the 
target in pain was a member of a low, compared to a high status, outgroup. Contrary to this, 
Molenberghs et al. (2014) found that group membership had no effect on activation in the 
ACC or AI. However,  these researchers did not measure how the outgroup was perceived by 
the participants; therefore it is not possible to rule out whether participants perceived the 
outgroup as a relevant rival to the ingroup—which is crucial for the emergence of intergroup 
empathic bias (Cikara et al., 2014). 
 In Study 3, I included items to measure participants’ perceptions of the groups on a 
range of attributes that have been shown to be important for intergroup relations and as key 
drivers of intergroup empathic bias including stereotype content (Cikara & Fiske, 2011) and 
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competitive threat (Cikara et al., 2014). I expected that activation in regions associated with 
empathy for pain (ACC and AI) and other processes related to empathy (i.e., mentalising; 
mPFC) would be attenuated while observing outgroup targets in pain compared to ingroup 
targets in pain. Crucially, however, I expected that this effect would be qualified by the extent 
to which the outgroup is perceived to be a rival to the ingroup, such that there would be less 
empathy-related activity in response to targets from the relatively more competitive outgroup 
than to targets from the relatively less competitive outgroup. 
4.1 Study 3 
4.1.1 Method 
Design. The study followed a 2 (event: painful vs. neutral) x 3 (target identity: Exeter 
vs. Bath vs. Plymouth)4 repeated measures design, with both factors varied within 
participants.  
Participants. An a-priori power analysis (G* Power [Version 3.1], Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) demonstrated that to reach a minimum of 80% estimated power, 
under a two-tailed hypothesis and a confidence level of 5%, would require a sample of at 
least 40 participants in total for a repeated measures design. We therefore aimed to collect 
data from 40 participants for this study. A total of 40 healthy volunteers—with no reported 
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, and no current use of any psychoactive 
medications—were recruited from the University of Exeter and remunerated with £10 for 
their time. Data from one participant was excluded from the analysis due to artefacts during 
co-registration of the anatomical scans to a standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space, leaving 39 participants (M age = 19.25, SD = 1.24, 26 female, all right-handed). The 
                                                          
4 The ingroup was the university where the study was conducted (University of Exeter).The two outgroups were 
expected to differ in terms of perceived similarity to and rivalry with the ingroup: University of Bath perceived 
as more similar/competitive towards the ingroup than University of Plymouth (which at the time of testing was 
ranked 71st in the UK overall, compared to Exeter at 10th and Bath at 9th; CUG, 2014). 
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study was approved by both the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, University of 
Exeter, and the UK Ministry of Defence Ethics Committee. Participant consent was obtained 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013).  
Stimuli. Details of the stimuli and paradigm can be found in Chapter 3 (under Study 
2, Stimuli). The duration of the fixation was randomly jittered (between 1000-1500 ms) and 
inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) were placed on either side of the animation, given a random 
duration between 250-1750 ms (with the second ISI occupying the remaining time to amount 
2000 ms for both ISIs overall per trial), thus equating a ‘stochastic’ design (K. Friston, 
Zarahn, Josephs, Henson, & Dale, 1999). A total of 96 trials, 50% depicting painful events 
(48), and 33% per university (32), each lasting 10 seconds, were presented in a single run. A 
new sequence of trials and timings was randomly generated for each participant. All stimuli 
were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on 
an 800x600 LCD monitor.  
 Measures. Participants completed self-report measures of perceived group 
competence (all alphas > .90), sociability (all alphas > .90), status (all alphas > .80), rivalry 
(all alphas > .80), and similarity (all alphas > .90), in relation to all three groups (universities) 
included in the study. Participants also completed the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI; 
Davis, 1980).5 
Procedure. After providing written informed consent and observing safety protocols 
(see Appendix C), participants were guided to the scanner and read standardised instructions 
via the digital projector system (Epson EMP-74). Participants completed 15 practice trials 
during the structural scan. In the task itself, participants observed individuals experiencing 
neutral or painful events. At the onset of each trial, participants were required to memorise 
                                                          
5 This data is discussed in Chapter 6 as part of a broader secondary analysis on dispositional empathy and 
individual differences and is thus not reported in this Chapter.  
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the target’s identity (i.e., a student from one of the target universities). Participants then 
observed the target experiencing either a neutral or painful event. Following this, participants 
were asked to recall the identity of the target in a simple 1-back task. Finally, participants 
were asked to respond to items gauging their other-focussed empathy towards the target of 
that event. Responses were made using a 100 point visual analogue scale (VAS) with a 
response button-box (4-channel bimanual). This VAS was anchored in the same way as a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much), but allowed participants to score 
anywhere between those 7 points. After this, participants left the scanner and were asked to 
provide their self-reported impressions of the groups on 7-point Likert scales. At completion, 
participants were debriefed on the background and purpose of the study and given the 
opportunity to ask questions.  
fMRI image acquisition. Scanning was performed on a 1.5T Philips Gyroscan 
(SENSE-Head-8 coil) magnet at the University of Exeter MR centre, UK. Images sensitive to 
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast were acquired using a T2* weighted 
gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 3000ms, TE = 45, flip angle = 90°, 
matrix = 80 x 80m, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3mm, 25mm min slice gap, ascending acquisition) 
and 520 volumes were acquired per participant. For each participant, functional data were 
overlaid on a high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image for registration into standard 
space and functional localisation (3D T1 FFE, TR = 252 ms, TE = 4.2 ms, voxel size = 
0.9mm3, slices = 160, FOV = 230 mm, Flip angle = 30º).    
fMRI data analysis. Pre-processing and statistical analysis of functional images was 
performed using FMRIBs Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT; FMRIB Software Library, release 
5.0, 2012). For each individual participant, standard pre-processing steps were performed. 
These were: Motion correction (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002), removal of 
non-brain tissue (S. M. Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing (using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 
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5mm), normalisation based on grand-mean intensity, and high-pass temporal filtering 
(Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma=50.0s). Registration of 
functional data to high-resolution T1 structural images and subsequently to Montreal 
Neurological Institute standardised space was carried out using FMRIB's Linear Image 
Registration Tool (MCFLIRT; Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Anatomical locations were 
determined in the first instance by the Harvard-Oxford anatomical atlas provided with FSL 
and, in the case of ambiguity, a more detailed paper and digital brain atlas (Mai, Voss, & 
Paxinos, 2008). 
First level, single-participant analyses were performed using a general linear model 
with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001). Each trial 
was modelled from the onset of the first frame of the animation for a duration of 2 seconds 
(i.e., until the end of the animation). A design matrix was fitted for each participant with 6 
task-related regressors, one for each condition of the 2 x 3 factorial design as well as a 
regressor for the motion parameters of each orthogonal axis (i.e., to control for head 
movement; Jenkinson et al., 2002). Main effects of event (PainExeter + PainPlymouth + 
PainBath > NeutralExeter + NeutralPlymouth + NeutralBath) were evaluated to demonstrate 
whether or not the task engaged empathy-related brain areas. I tested the main effect of target 
identity (PainExeter + NeutralExeter > PainPlymouth + NeutralPlymouth > PainBath + 
NeutralBath) and interaction effects between event and target identity. Specifically, I 
constrained the linear model to test the a priori hypothesis (which was derived from the 
pattern of results from Study 2, Chapter 3) that empathy-related activations would be larger 
while observing targets from the ingroup and the relatively less competitive outgroup in pain, 
than targets from the relatively more competitive outgroup in pain [(PainExeter > 
PainPlymouth > PainBath) + (NeutralBath > NeutralPlymouth > NeutralExeter)]. Higher 
level analyses were carried out using FLAME stage 1 (Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2003; 
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Woolrich, Behrens, Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004). Corrections for multiple 
comparisons were conducted at the cluster level using Gaussian Random field theory (z > 
2.3, p < .05, corrected) (Worsley, 2001).  
Region of interest analysis. Initially, I examined the effects of target identity across 
the brain by running the main and interaction contrasts at the whole-brain level. I tested my 
a-priori hypotheses regarding activation in the AI, ACC, and mPFC, by conducting planned 
analyses using functionally defined regions of interests (ROIs). Functional ROIs were defined 
using the painful > neutral events contrast, collapsed across target identity. To look at 
differences in activation between the target identities, I extracted the mean percentage signal 
change in BOLD by expanding a 10 mm radial sphere from the peak voxel of each significant 
region in the pain > neutral contrast image. To avoid issues of non-independence, I extracted 
data from the individual regressors from the first level analysis (and not from contrasts 
between target identities) using the Featquery tool in FSL. With these, I used SPSS (IBM 
SPSS Statistics for Windows, version 22.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp) to conduct within-
group analyses comparing the mean percentage signal change between the target identities.  
4.1.2 Results 
Self-report ratings. I have reported the results of the group perception measures first 
in order to serve as a manipulation check and to establish the context in which participants 
responded to the different target groups—although during testing the group perception 
measures were completed last.  
Competence and sociability. There was a significant main effect of target identity in 
perceived competence, F (2, 78) = 109.91, MSE = 25.49, p <.001, = .74. Participants rated 
students from the ingroup as significantly more competent (M = 5.86, SD = .67) than students 
at Plymouth (M = 4.35, SD = .88), t (39) = 13.23, p <.001, 95% CI [1.22, 1.79], d = 1.93, and 
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Bath (M = 5.56, SD = .59), t (39) = 3.26, p = .007, 95% CI [.07, .53], d = .48. Students at 
Bath were perceived to be significantly more competent than students at Plymouth t (39) = 
10.50, p <.001, 95% CI [.92, 1.49], d = 1.62. There was no difference in the perceived 
sociability of the target groups, F (2, 78) = 1.98, MSE = .407, p= .144, = .048 (Figure 4.6).  
Status. Participants rated the perceived status of the target groups in a manner similar 
to their ratings of perceived group competence, F (2, 78) = 80.68, MSE = .687, p < .001,= 
.67: While participants rated students from Exeter (M = 5.59, SD =.79) and Bath (M = 5.66, 
SD = .92) as equal in status, t (39) = -.42, p =.69, 95% CI [-.44, .31], d = .08, they rated 
students at Plymouth (M = 3.59, SD = 1.06) to be significantly lower in status compared to 
Exeter, t (39) = -9.12, p <.001, 95% CI [-2.46, -1.56], d = 2.14, and Bath, t (39) = -9.40, p 
<.001, 95% CI [-2.62, -1.52], d = 2.09. 
Similarity and rivalry. Students from Bath (M = 5.40, SD = 1.17) were perceived to 
be significantly more similar to the ingroup, compared to students from Plymouth (M = 3.34, 
SD = 1.05), t (39) = 8.23, p <.001, 95% CI [1.55, 2.56], d = 1.85. Students from Bath (M = 
4.74, SD = .96) were also perceived to be significantly more competitive with the ingroup, 
compared to students from Plymouth (M = 4.13, SD = 1.17), t (39) = 2.68, p =.011, 95% CI 
[.15, 1.08], d = .57.  
  
 
 
 
 
65                                          CHAPTER 4. NEURAL CORRELATES OF EMPATHIC BIAS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-reported empathy. A repeated measures analysis of variance revealed a 
significant main effect of the perceived event on ratings of other-focussed empathy, F (1, 39) 
= 523.89, MSE = 598.42, p <.001,  =.93. Participants reported feeling worse for targets 
who experienced a painful event (M = 78.53, SD = 2.91) compared to a neutral event (M = 
6.24, SD = 1.30), t (39) = 22.89, p < .001, 95% CI [65.89, 78.67], d = 32.08. There was a 
marginally significant main effect of target identity, F (2, 78) = 3.06, MSE = 12.39, p 
=.053, = .07. Participants reported significantly more empathy for ingroup targets (M = 
79.65, SD = 18.52) compared to students from Bath (M = 77.95, SD = 19.07), t (39) = 2.69, p 
= .03, 95% CI [.13, 3.28], d = .09, but not more compared to students from Plymouth (M = 
77.98, SD = 18.28), t (39) = 1.95, p = .176, 95% CI [-.48, 3.81], d = .09. There was no 
difference in self-reported empathy between the two outgroups, t (39) = -0.41, p =.97, 95% 
Figure 4.6. Mean ratings of sociability and competence per target group from Chapter 4, Study 3. Error 
bars depict the 95% confidence intervals 
Exeter
Bath
Plymouth
Exeter
Bath
Plymouth
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
6.00
6.50
M
ea
n
 a
n
d
 9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
 f
o
r 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
o
f 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 s
te
re
o
ty
p
e 
co
n
te
n
t
Sociability Competence
66                                          CHAPTER 4. NEURAL CORRELATES OF EMPATHIC BIAS 
 
  
CI [-2.17, 2.09], d = .001. There was no significant interaction between the event and the 
target identity, F (2, 78) = 1.64, MSE = 15.08, p =.20, = .04. 
fMRI results. At the whole brain level, participants exhibited greater activation in the 
peak clusters of the medial prefrontal cortex (Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates: 2, 
60, 18) and the anterior insula (MNI coordinates = 48, 24, -16) while observing painful, 
compared to neutral, events (see Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1). There was also a main effect of 
target identity in the bilateral AI (MNI coordinates = -52, 30, 6 and 28, 16, -2) and the 
temporal gyri (MNI coordinates = -58, -36, 2) but these clusters did not survive significance 
thresholding. Likewise, the interaction between event and group showed a tendency for 
activations in the mPFC (MNI coordinates = -4, 48, -6) and TPJ (MNI coordinates s= -54, 0, -
12), but these were not significant when controlling for family-wise error.  
The main effect of the perceived event in activation of the functionally defined mPFC 
(as shown in the whole brain analysis, Table 4.1) was qualified by a significant interaction 
between the perceived event and the target identity, F (2, 78) = 3.42, MSE = .36, p =.038,  
=.08: The mPFC was more active during trials where an ingroup member was depicted 
experiencing a painful (M = .11, SD = .23) compared to neutral event (M = -.07, SD = .27), t 
(39) = 4.37, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .26], d = .72. There was, however, no difference in painful 
(M = .03, SD = .21) compared neutral events (M = .001, SD = .24) when the target was from 
Plymouth, t (39) = .081, p = .425, 95% CI [-.05, .11], d = .14. There was also no difference in 
painful (M = .05, SD = .23) compared neutral events (M = -.001, SD = .28) when the target 
was from Bath, t (39) = 1.32, p = .189, 95% CI [-.15, .03], d = .23 (Figure 4.8). There was no 
main effect of target identity on mPFC activity, F (2, 78) = .001, MSE = .035, p =.999, = 
.00.  
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While there was a main effect of the perceived event on activation of the AI (as 
shown in the whole brain analysis, Table 4.1), there was no main effect of target identity, F 
(2, 78) = .573, MSE = .112, p =.566,  =.014, and no interaction between event and target 
identity, F (2, 78) = .080, MSE = .086, p =.931,  =.023.   
Table 4.3. Summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations for scores on perceived competence, 
sociability, status, similarity with the ingroup, rivalry with the ingroup, and self-reported empathy from Chapter 
4, Study 3 
Exeter 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Competence 5.86 0.67 —      
2. Sociability 4.96 1.02 .45** —     
3. Status 5.59 0.79 .47** 0.27 —    
4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —   
5. Rivalry  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —  
6. Empathy  79.65 18.52 -.09 0.07 -0.07 N/A N/A — 
Plymouth                 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Competence 4.35 0.88 —      
2. Sociability 4.73 0.96 .71** —     
3. Status 3.59 1.06 .68** .32* —    
4. Similarity 3.34 1.05 .54** .35* .57** —   
5. Rivalry  4.13 1.17 .64** .49** .64** .56** —  
6. Empathy  77.98 18.28 -.07 -.03 -.03 -.16 .06 — 
Bath                 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Competence 5.56 0.59 —      
2. Sociability 4.98 0.89 .77** —     
3. Status 5.66 0.92 .52** -.02 —    
4. Similarity 5.4 1.17 .14 .01 .27 —   
5. Rivalry  4.74 0.96 .26 .19 .27 .09 —  
6. Empathy  77.95 19.07 -.04 -.06 .05 -.04 .08 — 
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)   
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Results from the full factorial analysis of variance from Chapter 4, Study 3.  
Region Side Extent Z   MNI   
    (k) (peak) X Y Z 
       
a) Main effect Perceived Event: Painful > Neutral    
       
Medial prefrontal cortex R 383 4.09 2 60 18 
Anterior insula R 195 3.41 48 24 -16 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L 135 3.26 -10 48 42 
  
     
b) Main effect Target Identity: Exeter > Plymouth > Bath   
  
     
Anterior insula L 26 2.91 -52 30 6 
Orbitofrontal gyrus L 22 3 -46 34 -14 
Superior temporal gyrus L 12 3.07 -58 -36 2 
Temporal pole R 12 2.77 46 8 -16 
Anterior insula R 11 2.85 28 16 -2 
  
     
c) Interaction: Perceived Event * Target Identity [(PE>PP>PB) + (NB>NP>NE)] 
  
     
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex L 44 3.14 -4 48 -6 
Superior temporal gyrus L 26 3.31 -54 0 -12 
Temporoparietal junction L 24 3.25 -26 -60 8 
Fusiform face area L 20 2.97 -36 -76 -2 
Note: The main effect of event (a) shows regions that survived a cluster-level threshold of z > 2.3, p <.05, 
FWE-corrected, whereas the main effect of target identity (b) and the interaction (c) show clusters from the 
uncorrected threshold image. A minimum voxel-level threshold of 10 mm was applied to all contrasts.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. Increased brain activity in the anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex in response to the observation 
of painful (vs neutral) events, p <.05 (FWE, cluster level) from Chapter 4, Study 3 
x = 48 x = 2 
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Figure 4.8. The mean percentage signal change in BOLD within the medial prefrontal cortex during 
painful and neutral trials per target identity (functional ROI defined by the painful > neutral event 
contrast) from Chapter 4, Study 3. Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 9.4. The mean percentage signal change in BOLD within the anterior insula during painful and 
neutral trials per target identity (functional ROI defined by the painful > neutral event contrast) from 
Chapter 4, Study 3. Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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4.1.3 Discussion 
  Previous research has demonstrated that participants exhibit lower empathy-related 
BOLD responses while observing other-race targets in pain (compared to when the 
participant and target are of the same race; Xu et al., 2009). However, the neural activations 
associated with empathy do not selectively respond towards the pain of an ingroup target.  
Different effects emerge depending on beliefs about the target’s group, such as whether or 
not the outgroup constitutes a threat to the ingroup (Cikara et al., 2014), is perceived as 
higher status than the ingroup (Feng et al., 2016), or typically elicits feelings of envy 
(compared to pity, admiration, or contempt; Cikara & Fiske, 2011). These findings converge 
on the notion that empathy is flexibly recruited according to how the individual perceives the 
other’s group, rather than simply to generic ingroup-outgroup distinctions.  
  Previous research is limited by the contexts in which researchers have primed 
intergroup comparisons. These intergroup contexts fall in to one of two categories: Contexts 
in which pre-existing beliefs about the other group do not exist (e.g., minimal group 
paradigms) or in which pre-existing beliefs are confounded with visually salient 
characteristics of the other’s group (e.g.,  physiognomy and skin colour). Cikara and Fiske 
(2011) report one of few studies to focus on the role that group-based beliefs play during 
intergroup empathy. However, to some extent, this study suffers from these visual confounds 
as well: The photographs used in the study vary largely in terms of configuration (e.g., 
dimension, perspective, and orientation), but also in terms of the target’s facial expressions. 
For example, in some pictures the target is smiling (which is known to enhance social 
evaluation; Guadagno, Swinth, & Blascovich, 2011) while in others the target is frowning (an 
expression which is detected and processed more quickly than others; Fox et al., 2000).  
  The goal of Study 3 was to determine whether beliefs can drive empathic bias in a 
multiple outgroup context and while controlling for visual cues to group categorisation. In 
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this thesis, I focus on a specific facet of empathy, experience-sharing, where previously 
researchers studied empathic-concern (i.e., Cikara & Fiske, 2011). In Study 3, participants 
exhibited an ingroup bias in self-reported empathy. However, this was only the case when 
comparing responses towards members of the ingroup and members of the more competitive 
outgroup: There was no difference in self-reported empathy comparing responses to members 
of the ingroup and the less competitive outgroup.  
  The fMRI results show that participants exhibited more activity in regions associated 
with empathy when viewing trials depicting a target in physical pain, compared to trials 
involving neutral events (Lamm et al., 2011). Interestingly, this was qualified by an 
interaction with the identity of the target individual. The mPFC was more active during trials 
where an ingroup member was depicted experiencing a painful, compared to a neutral, event 
whereas there was no reliable difference between event types if the target was from either of 
the outgroups. These findings are consistent with previous research demonstrating that 
empathy-related brain activation varies according to a target’s group membership (Xu et al., 
2009).  
  Prior research also suggests that bias does not simply arise as a function of ingroup-
outgroup categorisations, but rather fluctuates based on how specific outgroups are perceived 
in relation to the ingroup, for example, whether or not the outgroup is perceived to be higher 
status than the ingroup (Feng et al., 2016), as a rival of the ingroup (Cikara, Botvinick, & 
Fiske, 2011; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010), or is perceived to be enviable 
(Cikara & Fiske, 2011). Contrary to predictions, however, I found there was no effect of the 
target identity nor any interaction between the identity and the event type in activation of the 
AI. 
  There were, however, a number of limitations in this study that may suggest why the 
results were not in line with predictions.  First and foremost, there were a number of voxels 
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that did not surpass the threshold for significant activation, for example, in the main contrast 
of the group identity and in the interaction between the perceived event type and the group 
identity. This, I suggest, is likely because the manner in which I designed the task caused 
inefficiencies in the detection of the neurological signal that is captured by fMRI. The 
structure of the trials constituted a slow event-related design, that is, an ISI that is longer than 
the duration (10-12 s) of the hemodynamic response function (HRF; Buckner et al., 1996). A 
more rapid design (shorter than the duration of the HRF) would increase statistical power by 
allowing for more stimuli per time unit (K. J. Friston, Holmes, Price, Büchel, & Worsley, 
1999). However, rapid designs are more appropriately suited to the paradigms of classical 
neuropsychological experiments than to the paradigm presented here. For example, a number 
of participants reported that they struggled to complete the task with the time they were 
given. Given the complexity of the task, it is important that the participants have enough time 
to process pertinent details of the experiment (e.g., to process and memorise the target’s 
identity, watch the animated event, and to consider their responses to that event). Therefore, 
in Study 4, I gave priority to ensuring participants had the time they needed to understand and 
complete the task.  
  A further goal of Study 4 was to demonstrate the causal relationship between 
perceived competition and intergroup empathic bias. To do this, I presented participants with 
a bogus news article that described three universities: The ingroup university, an outgroup 
university with which the ingroup had a longstanding rivalry, and an outgroup university with 
which the ingroup had no rivalry. I manipulated the article between two groups of 
participants, presenting one outgroup as the salient rival in one version and the other 
outgroup as the salient rival in the other version—creating a mirrored contrast in the between 
groups analysis.  
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  The target universities described in the article, and presented in the main task, were 
Cardiff University and the University of Sussex. In Study 3, I presented students from either 
the University of Bath or the University of Plymouth, but pilot testing (N = 64) revealed that 
evaluations of the perceived rivalry of these groups to the ingroup were stable and resistant to 
experimental manipulation. In short, regardless of the information that was presented to 
participants, they always rated students from Bath as rivals, but in no situation did they ever 
rate students from Plymouth as rivals. On the other hand, I did have success at manipulating 
beliefs regarding the extent to which students from Cardiff and Sussex universities were seen 
as rivals to the ingroup. I expected that empathy would be reduced towards members of the 
outgroup that was presented as a rival to the ingroup, compared to members of the outgroup 
that was not presented as a rival to the ingroup. 
4.2 Study 4 
4.2.1 Method 
Design. This study followed a 2 (event: painful vs. neutral) x 3 (target identity: Exeter 
vs. Cardiff vs. Sussex)6 x 2 (salient rival: Cardiff vs. Sussex) mixed measures design with the 
perceived event and target identity varied within participants, and the salience of rivalry 
varied between participants.  
Participants. A total of 69 healthy volunteers—with no reported history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders, and no current use of any psychoactive medications—
were recruited from the University of Exeter and remunerated with £5 for their time. No 
participants had to be excluded from the analysis (from either self-report or fMRI data), 
leaving 69 participants in total (Mage = 20.57, SD = 3.04, 42 female, all right-handed). The 
study was approved by both the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, University of 
                                                          
6 At the time of testing the University of Sussex was ranked 21st in the UK overall, compared to Exeter at 10th 
and Cardiff at 31st; CUG, 2016). 
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Exeter, and the Ministry of Defence Ethics Committee. Participant consent was obtained 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013). 
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of those outlined in Study 2 with the exception that 
prior to entering the scanner, participants also read a bogus news article in which the 
outgroup was either described as a rival to the ingroup or not. The article itself discussed 
recent achievements of the ingroup university, but made salient an upwards, or unfavourable, 
comparison with one of the outgroups. Along the side of the article, was a graphic that 
depicted a ‘brief history’ of the rivalry between the ingroup and one of the outgroup 
universities (see Appendix C).  
Measures. Following the bogus article, participants were given three questions to 
ensure that they had read the text and to further prime the perception of a rivalry between the 
ingroup and outgroup (e.g., ‘According to this article, which of these three have a long-
standing feud with the University of Exeter?’). Other measures within this study were 
identical to those in Study 3 with the exception that participants in Study 4 responded to 
items gauging other-focussed empathy (‘how bad did you feel for the target?’), as well as 
self-focussed empathy (‘how painful did the event seem to you?’)  
fMRI data analysis. For fMRI acquisition, pre-processing, and lower-level analyses, 
I used the same approach as reported in Study 3. For higher level analyses, I divided the 
participants into two groups according to the salience manipulation. For both, higher level 
between-group analyses were carried out using the mixed-effects model FLAME 1 
(Beckmann et al., 2003; Woolrich et al., 2004).  
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4.2.2 Results  
 Self-reported responses. Participants’ self-reported responses were analysed in a 
mixed measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). All p values correspond to two-tailed tests, 
Bonferroni-corrected, unless noted otherwise.  
Competence and sociability. A mixed measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed a significant effect of target identity on perceived group competence, F (2, 134) = 
39.82, MSE = .385, p <.001,= .37. Participants rated students from the ingroup as 
significantly more competent (M = 5.93, SD = .73) than students at Cardiff (M = 5.40, SD = 
.94), t (68) = 6.19, p <.001, 95% CI [.32, .75], d = .63, and students at Sussex (M = 4.99, SD 
= 1.07), t (68) = 8.87, p <.001, 95% CI [.68, 1.19], d = 1.03. Participants also perceived 
students at Sussex to be less competent than students from Cardiff, t (68) = -3.32, p =.005, 
95% CI [-.70, -.10], d = .41. There was no overall main effect of the salience manipulation, F 
(1, 67) = .76, MSE = .589, p =.388,= .01, but this was qualified by a significant interaction 
between target identity and the salience manipulation, F (2, 134) = 3.66, p =.028, =.05: 
Participants rated the perceived competence of students from Sussex equally regardless of 
whether the salient rival to the ingroup was Sussex (M = 5.05, SD = 1.30) or Cardiff (M = 
4.94, SD = .79), t (67) = .413, p =.681, 95% CI [-.41, .62], d = .11. However, participants 
rated students from Cardiff as significantly more competent when Cardiff was presented as a 
rival to the ingroup (M = 5.63, SD = .80) compared to when Sussex was described as the 
salient rival to the ingroup (M = 5.17, SD = 1.02), t (67) = 2.09, p =.04, 95% CI [.02, .90], d 
=.46. The salience manipulation had no effect on ratings of perceived competence for 
members of the ingroup, t (67) = .718, p =.477, 95% CI [-.23, .48], d = .12.  
The perceived sociability of targets was not affected by the target’s identity, F (2, 
134) = .896, MSE = .422, p =.411,= .01, or the salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = .061, 
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MSE = 1.69, p =.805,= .001. There was no interaction between target identity or the 
manipulation, F (2, 134) = 1.21, p =.300,= .02.  
Status. There was a significant effect of target identity on ratings of status, F (2, 134) 
= 44.89, MSE = .598, p <.001,= .40. Participants rated students from the ingroup as 
significantly higher status (M = 5.80, SD = .67) than students at Cardiff (M = 4.98, SD = 
1.22), t (68) = 5.01, p <.001, 95% CI [.34, 1.01], d = .72, and students at Sussex (M = 4.63, 
SD = 1.14), t (68) = 9.06, p <.001, 95% CI [.91, 1.59], d = 1.33. Participants also rated 
students at Sussex as lower status than students from Cardiff, t (68) = -4.67, p <.001, 95% CI 
[-.88, -.27], d = .50. There was no main effect of the salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = .213, 
MSE = 1.74, p =.646,= .003, but this was qualified by a significant interaction between 
target identity and the salience manipulation, F (2, 134) = 5.20, p = .007,= .07: 
Participants rated students from Sussex as equal in status whether the salient rival was Sussex 
(M = 4.82, SD = 1.20) or Cardiff (M = 4.45, SD = 1.06), t (67) = 2.14, p =.175, 95% CI [-.17, 
.92], d = .33. However, participants rated students from Cardiff as marginally higher in status 
when Cardiff was presented as a rival to the ingroup (M = 5.44, SD = 1.01) compared to 
when Sussex was described as the salient rival to the ingroup (M = 4.98, SD = 1.22), t (67) = 
1.72, p =.08, 95% CI [-.07, 1.00], d = .41. The salience manipulation had no effect on ratings 
of perceived status of members of the ingroup, t (67) = 1.05, p =.297, 95% CI [-.47, .15], d = 
.14.  
Similarity. There was a marginal effect of target identity on ratings of similarity with 
the ingroup, F (1, 67) = 3.15, MSE = .704, p =.08,= .04. Students from Cardiff (M = 5.19, 
SD = 1.39) were rated as marginally more similar to the ingroup than students from Sussex 
(M = 4.93, SD = 1.20), t (67) = 1.73, p =.087, 95% CI [-.04, .53], d = .20. There was no main 
effect of the salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = .019, MSE = 2.68, p =.892,= .000, but a 
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significant interaction emerged between target identity and the salience manipulation, F (2, 
134) = 7.09, p = .01,= .09: This was explained by a tendency to rate students from Sussex 
as more similar to the ingroup when Sussex was presented as a salient rival, (M = 5.15, SD = 
1.23) than when Cardiff was presented as the salient rival, (M = 4.73, SD = 1.15), t (67) = 
1.46, p =.150, 95% CI [-.16, .99], d = .32, and students from Cardiff as more similar to the 
ingroup when Cardiff was presented as a salient rival (M = 5.36, SD = 1.17) than when 
Sussex was presented as the salient rival, (M = 5.01, SD = 1.59), t (67) = 1.01, p =.313, 95% 
CI [-.33, 1.02], d =.26.  
Rivalry. There was a significant effect of target identity on ratings of perceived 
rivalry, F (1, 67) = 20.63, MSE = 1.12, p <.001,= .24. Students from Cardiff (M = 4.70, 
SD = 1.56) were rated as significantly more of a rival to the ingroup compared to students 
from Sussex (M = 3.88, SD = 1.25), t (68) = 4.49, p <.001, 95% CI [.45, 1.17], d =.58. There 
was a main effect of the salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = 8.70, MSE = 2.33, p =.004,= 
.12, but this was qualified by a significant interaction between the target identity and the 
salience manipulation, F (2, 134) = 16.60, p < .001,= .19: Participants rated students from 
Sussex to be as much of a rival to the ingroup whether the salient rival was Sussex (M = 3.87, 
SD = 1.39) or Cardiff (M = 3.90, SD = 1.09), t (67) = .11, p =.915, 95% CI [-.64, .57], d = 
.01. However, participants rated students from Cardiff as significantly more of a rival to the 
ingroup when Cardiff was presented as a rival to the ingroup (M = 5.44, SD = 1.18), 
compared to when Sussex was presented as a rival to the ingroup (M = 3.94, SD = 1.54), t 
(67) = 4.55, p <.001, 95% CI [.843, 2.16], d = 1.06.  
 Self-focussed empathy. A repeated measures analysis of variance revealed a 
significant main effect of the event (painful vs. not) on ratings of self-focussed empathy, F (1, 
67) = 1175.37, MSE = 550.14, p <.001,  =.95. Participants perceived painful events as 
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more painful (M = 84.84, SD = 15.24) than neutral events (M = 5.79, SD = 1.35), t (68) = 
34.54, p <.001, 95% CI [74.48, 83.62], d = 7.31.  
There was a main effect of target identity, F (2, 134) = 25.62, MSE = 45.73, p <.001, 
 =.27. Participants indicated perceiving the pain of ingroup targets to appear more painful 
(M = 89.08, SD = 14.10) than the pain of students from Cardiff (M = 83.02, SD = 16.54), t 
(68) = 5.52, p <.001, 95% CI [3.63, 9.49], d =.39, or the pain of students from Sussex (M = 
81.99, SD = 14.87), t (68) = 7.31, p <.001, 95% CI [5.04, 10.15], d =.49. There was no 
significant difference in self-focussed empathy between targets from Cardiff and targets from 
Sussex t (68) = .850, p =.398, 95% CI [-1.94, 4.01]. Manipulating the salient rival had no 
effect on ratings of empathy measured in this self-focussed way, F (1, 67) = .987, MSE = 
603.38, p =.324,  =.015. There were also no interaction effects between the target identity 
and the salience manipulation on this measure, F (1, 67) = .157, p = .855,  =.002.  
Other-focussed empathy. There was a strong main effect of the perceived event on 
other-focussed empathy, F (1, 67) = 849.821, MSE = 671.21, p <.001,  =.93. Participants 
reported feeling worse for targets during painful (M = 82.82, SD = 18.67), relative to neutral, 
events (M = 8.57, SD = 1.56), t (68) = 29.37, p <.001, 95% CI [69.21, 79.29], d = 5.60.  
There was a main effect of target identity, F (2, 134) = 21.46, MSE = 48.92, p <.001, 
 =.24. Participants reported feeling worse observing ingroup targets experiencing pain (M = 
87.08, SD = 18.07) compared to when observing students from Cardiff (M = 82.04, SD = 
17.69), t (68) = 5.11, p <.001, 95% CI [2.62, 7.45], d =.28, and when observing students from 
Sussex (M = 79.41, SD = 19.30), t (68) = 5.85, p <.001, 95% CI [4.46, 10.89], d =.41. There 
was no difference in other-focussed empathy for students from Cardiff compared to students 
from Sussex t (68) = -2.11, p =.115, 95% CI [-5.72, .43], d = .14. There was no main effect of 
the salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = .708, MSE = 919.68, p =.403,  =.01, nor was there 
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any interaction between target identity and the salience manipulation on this measure, F (2, 
134) = .188, p =.829,  =.003.  
fMRI results. At the whole brain level, participants showed greater activation when 
observing painful (vs neutral) events in large clusters of bilateral fusiform gyrus (MNI: -44, -
56, -18; 48, -72, -10), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; MNI: 0, 56, 26), temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ; MNI: -2, -62, 34), dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC; MNI: 2, 24, 32), and the 
anterior insula (AI; MNI: -36, 6, 36; Figure 4.10 and Table 4.6). There was also a main effect 
of target identity in the activation of mPFC (MNI: 22, 60, 18), TPJ (MNI: -54, -56, 16), 
dACC (MNI: -26, 2, 44), IFG (MNI: 2, -42, -6), and AI (MNI: 28, 20, 4). In the interaction 
between the perceived event and target identity, significant clusters emerged in the right TPJ 
(MNI: 28, -48, 6), precuneus (MNI: 0, -54, 48), mPFC (MNI: -24, 40, 20), and AI (MNI: -40, 
-2, 6). There were no significant effects of the salience manipulation on regional activity.  
Analysing activity within the functionally defined mPFC (defined by the main effect 
of event; painful > neutral trials) demonstrated that the main effect of the perceived event in 
activation of the mPFC (as shown in the whole brain analysis, Table 4.6) was qualified by an 
interaction between event and identity, F (2, 134) = 23.09, MSE = .090, p <.001, = .26: 
The mPFC was more active during trials where an ingroup member was depicted 
experiencing a painful (M = .23, SD = .51) compared to neutral event (M = -.18, SD = .49), t 
(67) = 8.08, p < .001, 95% CI [.31, .51], d = 1.05, or where a target from Sussex experienced 
a painful (M = .09, SD = .42) compared to neutral event (M = -.12, SD = .37), t (67) = 4.02, p 
< .001, 95% CI [.10, .31], d = .54. However, the pattern of results approached significance in 
the opposite direction when targets from Cardiff were depicted as experiencing painful (M = -
.22, SD = .37) compared to neutral events (M = -.14, SD = .39), t (67) = -1.77, p = .084, 95% 
CI [-.01, .17], d = .18 (Figure 4.11). This interaction further qualified a main effect of 
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identity, F (2, 134) = 14.18, MSE = .121, p <.001, = .18: The mPFC was more active 
during trials depicting the pain of an ingroup target (M = .23, SD = .51) compared to a target 
from Sussex (M = .09, SD = .42), t (67) = 3.02, p = .01, 95% CI [.03, .27], d = .30, or Cardiff 
(M = -.22, SD = .37), t (67) = 6.45, p < .001, 95% CI [.28, .63], d = 1.01, or a target from 
Sussex compared to a target from Cardiff, t (67) = 6.08, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .44], d = .78. 
However, there was no difference in mPFC activity during trials depicting neutral events 
happening to ingroup targets (M = -.18, SD = .49) compared to targets from Sussex (M = -.12, 
SD = .37), t (67) = -.95, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-.21, .09], d = .14, or Cardiff (M = -.15, SD = .39), 
t (67) = .87, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-.13, .06], d = .07, or targets from Sussex compared to targets 
from Cardiff , t (67) = .45, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-.11, .16], d = .08. There was no effect of the 
salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = .794, MSE = .628, p =.376, = .012, nor any interaction 
between the manipulation and any other factor in the model.  
Regarding the AI, the main effect of the perceived event was qualified by a significant 
interaction between event and the target’s identity, F (2, 134) = 6.46, MSE = .051, p 
=.002, = .09: The AI was more active during trials where an ingroup member was depicted 
experiencing a painful (M = .09, SD = .27) compared to a neutral event (M = -.03, SD = .31), t 
(67) = 3.31, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, .19], d = .41, or where a target from Sussex experienced a 
painful (M = .08, SD = .29) compared to a neutral event (M = -.02, SD = .24), t (67) = 3.05, p 
= .003, 95% CI [.04, .18], d = .38. There was, however, no difference in AI activity when 
targets from Cardiff were depicted as experiencing painful (M = -.03, SD = .32) compared to 
neutral events (M = .02, SD = .33), t (67) = -1.32, p = .187, 95% CI [-.14, .03], d = .15 
(Figure 4.12).This interaction also qualified a significant main effect of target identity, F (2, 
134) = 7.52, MSE = .077, p =.001, = .10: The AI was equally active during trials depicting 
the pain of an ingroup target (M = .09, SD = .27) and the pain of a target from Sussex (M = 
.08, SD = .29), t (67) = .07, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-.072, .077], d = .008, but more active 
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compared to the pain of a target from Cardiff (M = -.03, SD = .32), t (67) = 3.22, p = .006, 
95% CI [.03, .21], d = .31, or a target from Sussex compared to a target from Cardiff, t (67) = 
3.14, p = .008, 95% CI [.02, .21], d = .29. However, there was no difference in AI activity 
during trials depicting neutral events happening to ingroup targets (M = -.03, SD = .32) 
compared to targets from Sussex (M = -.02, SD = .24), t (67) = -.14, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-.11, 
.09], d = .18 or Cardiff (M = .02, SD = .33), t (67) = -1.72, p = .276, 95% CI [-.13, .02], d = 
.15, or targets from Sussex compared to targets from Cardiff, t (67) = -1.23, p = .679, 95% CI 
[-.15, .05], d = .14. There was no main effect of the salience manipulation, F (1, 67) = .062, 
MSE = .304, p =.804, = .001, nor any interaction between the manipulation and any other 
factor in the model. 
With regard to activation of the dACC the main effect of the perceived event was 
qualified by a significant interaction between event and identity, F (2, 134) = 9.72, MSE = 
.065, p <.001, = .13: The dACC was more active during trials where an ingroup member 
was depicted experiencing a painful (M = .03, SD = .32) compared to a neutral event (M = -
.11, SD = .31), t (67) = 4.08, p < .001, 95% CI [.08, .22], d = .44, or where a target from 
Sussex experienced a painful (M = .11, SD = .44) compared to a neutral event (M = -.11, SD 
= .29), t (67) = 4.51, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .31], d = .59. There was, however, no difference 
in dACC activity when targets from Cardiff were depicted as experiencing painful (M = -.14, 
SD = .36) compared to neutral events (M = -.08, SD = .39), t (67) = -1.11, p = .267, 95% CI [-
.14, .04], d = .16 (Figure 4.13). This interaction also qualified a significant main effect of 
target identity, F (2, 134) = 7.15, MSE = .066, p =.001, = .09: The dACC was equally 
active during trials depicting the pain of an ingroup target (M = .03, SD = .32) and the pain of 
a target from Sussex (M = .11, SD = .44), t (67) = -1.80, p = .227, 95% CI [-.17, .03], d = .21, 
but more active compared to the pain of a target from Cardiff (M = -.14, SD = .36), t (67) = 
4.12, p > .001, 95% CI [.07, .28], d = .49, or a target from Sussex compared to a target from 
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Cardiff, t (67) = 5.00, p < .001, 95% CI [.13, .37], d = .62. However, there was no difference 
in dACC activity during trials depicting neutral events happening to ingroup targets (M = -
.11, SD = .31) compared to targets from Sussex (M = -.11, SD = .29), t (67) = -.16, p = 1.00, 
95% CI [-.12, .10], d = .00, or Cardiff (M = -.09, SD = .39), t (67) = -.66, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-
.11, .06], d = .06, or targets from Sussex compared to targets from Cardiff, t (67) = -.33, p = 
1.00, 95% CI [-.13, .10], d = .06. There was no main effect of the salience manipulation, F (1, 
67) = .062, MSE = .304, p =.804, = .001, nor any interaction between the manipulation and 
any other factor in the model. 
Item-wise analysis. There was a significant difference in how participants responded 
to the two self-reported empathy items, F (1, 68) = 4.23, p =.044, = .06: Participants 
reported significantly lower empathy ratings in response to other-focussed items (i.e., ‘how 
bad did you feel for the target?’; M = 82.84, SD = 17.47) relative to self-focussed items (i.e., 
‘how painful did the event seem for you?’; M = 84.87, SD = 14.18), t (68) = -2.06, p =.044, 
95% CI [-3.99, -.06], d = .13.   
There were also significant differences in how participants responded to these items at 
the level of neural activation. There was significantly more activity in the AI, t (68) = 3.88, p 
< .001, 95% CI [.26, .80], d = .86, and dACC, t (68) = 2.11, p = .039, 95% CI [.03, 1.21], d = 
.48, when participants responded to self-focussed, compared to other-focussed, items. In 
contrast, there was significantly more activation of the mPFC, t (68) = 5.52, p < .001, 95% CI 
[.21, .44], d = .45, when participants responded to other-focussed, compared to self-focussed, 
items (Figure 4.14 and Table 4.6d).  
83                                          CHAPTER 4. NEURAL CORRELATES OF EMPATHIC BIAS 
 
Table 4.5. Summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations for scores on perceived competence, sociability, status, similarity with the ingroup, rivalry with the 
ingroup, and self-reported empathy split by the between groups manipulation of the salient rival from Chapter 4, Study 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Competence 5.87 0.79 — 1. Competence 5.99 0.68 —
2. Sociability 5.13 0.86 .74** — 2. Sociability 5.20 0.89 .63** —
3. Status 5.80 0.67 .45** .51** — 3. Status 5.96 0.62 .59** .40* —
4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A — 4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —
5. Rivalry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A — 5. Rivalry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —
6. Other-focussed 85.41 18.67 .05 .11 -.14 N/A N/A — 6. Other-focussed 88.70 17.59 -.05 -.13 -.22 N/A N/A —
7. Self-focussed 88.05 15.24 .12 .03 -.14 N/A N/A .88** — 7. Self-focussed 91.08 12.95 .09 -.03 -.16 N/A N/A .87** —
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Competence 5.05 1.30 — 1. Competence 4.94 0.79 —
2. Sociability 5.16 1.24 .84** — 2. Sociability 4.91 0.85 .65** —
3. Status 4.82 1.20 .84** .69** — 3. Status 4.45 1.06 .53** .23 —
4. Similarity 5.15 1.23 .47** .19 .53** — 4. Similarity 4.73 1.15 .40* .22 .67** —
5. Rivalry 3.87 1.39 .04 -.003 .19 -.06 — 5. Rivalry 3.90 1.09 -.02 -.02 .39* .45** —
6. Other-focussed 77.19 20.63 .46** .26 .36* .42* .05 — 6. Other-focussed 81.56 17.95 -.28 -.36* .26 .05 .32 —
7. Self-focussed 79.89 16.84 .19 .08 .04 .24 .08 .86** — 7. Self-focussed 84.04 12.59 -.09 -.27 .21 .11 .16 .75** —
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Competence 5.17 1.02 — 1. Competence 5.63 0.80 —
2. Sociability 5.15 0.84 .70** — 2. Sociability 5.18 0.77 .21 —
3. Status 4.98 1.22 .55** .34 — 3. Status 5.44 1.01 .85** .15 —
4. Similarity 5.01 1.59 .51** .28 .76** — 4. Similarity 5.36 1.17 .67** .14 .66** —
5. Rivalry 3.94 1.54 .61** .36* .68** .48** — 5. Rivalry 5.44 1.18 .41* .11 .63** .44** —
6. Other-focussed 80.53 17.16 .23 .10 .03 .13 .03 — 6. Other-focussed 83.51 18.32 -.12 -.43** .03 -.03 .12 —
7. Self-focussed 81.49 18.07 .35* .24 .32 .41* .25 .84** — 7. Self-focussed 84.51 15.01 -.007 -.18 .12 -.08 .14 .75** —
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
Sussex as rivals Cardiff as rivals
Exeter
Sussex
Cardiff
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6. Results from the full factorial analysis of variance from Chapter 4, Study 4. 
Region Side Extent Z   MNI   
    (k) (peak) X Y Z 
       
a) Main effect Perceived Event: Painful > Neutral     
       
Fusiform gyrus L 10034 6.06 -44 -56 -18 
Fusiform gyrus R 9679 5.71 48 -72 -10 
Medial prefrontal cortex L 6280 5.45 0 56 26 
Temporo-parietal junction L 686 5.11 -2 -62 34 
Posterior cingulate L 472 4.04 -14 -30 16 
Superior parietal lobule R 155 4.58 28 -56 34 
Dorsal anterior cingulate  R 102 3.30 2 24 32 
Middle cingulate R 61 3.38 4 -28 24 
Cerebellum R 22 3.11 6 -74 -20 
Primary motor cortex R 14 3.66 10 4 70 
Temporal pole R 12 2.93 40 6 -28 
Anterior insula  L 10 2.95 -36 6 36 
       
b) Main effect Target Group: Exeter > Sussex > Cardiff    
       
Medial prefrontal cortex R 9242 5.01 22 60 18 
Superior temporal gyrus R 2570 4.70 58 -18 -8 
Middle temporal L 598 4.03 -52 -14 -10 
Orbitofrontal cortex L 421 4.17 -30 54 -12 
Caudate nucleus R 385 3.92 20 -26 18 
Inferior frontal gyrus L 339 3.77 -50 32 14 
x = -41 x = 3 
Anterior Insula 
Medial Prefrontal cortex 
2 5 
Dorsal anterior 
cingulate 
Figure 4.10. Increased brain activity in the anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex in 
response to the observation of painful (vs neutral) events, p <.05 (FWE, cluster level) from Chapter 4, Study 4. 
 
 Temporo-parietal junction L 214 3.52 -54 -56 16 
Inferior frontal gyrus R 203 4.15 2 -42 -6 
Inferior frontal gyrus L 167 3.65 -54 16 24 
Dorsal anterior cingulate L 149 3.44 -26 2 44 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L 146 3.78 -32 46 26 
Lateral occipital L 94 3.28 -54 -66 4 
Orbitofrontal cortex R 86 3.92 20 60 -18 
Anterior cingulate cortex L 81 3.39 -14 22 30 
Lateral occipital R 76 3.98 46 -66 -8 
Posterior occipital R 58 3.11 46 -68 18 
Anterior superior temporal 
gyrus 
L 45 
3.26 
-56 -2 -16 
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L 39 3.18 -40 42 6 
Anterior insula R 29 3.19 28 20 4 
Temporal pole R 29 3.01 46 16 -28 
Ventral premotor cortex L 15 2.73 -54 8 36 
Premotor cortex L 11 2.96 -12 22 44 
Amygdala L 10 3.00 -36 0 -20 
       
c) Interaction: Perceived Event * Target Group [(PE>PS>PC) > (NC>NS>NE)]  
       
Temporo-parietal junction R 32337 5.44 28 -48 6 
Precuneus L 644 3.88 0 -54 48 
Intraparietal sulcus R 413 4.80 40 -48 54 
Amygdala R 299 3.94 28 -10 -18 
Superior parietal cortex L 97 3.88 -28 -82 40 
Inferior parietal cortex L 59 3.13 -22 -66 36 
Temporal pole R 57 3.11 44 16 -30 
Temporo-parietal junction L 41 3.10 -24 -66 16 
Posterior cingulate L 37 3.06 0 -70 22 
Orbitofrontal cortex L 36 3.10 -20 36 -16 
Medial prefrontal cortex L 32 3.27 -24 40 20 
Precuneus L 29 3.29 -14 -56 34 
Angular gyrus L 27 3.16 -60 -48 24 
Inferior temporal gyrus R 23 3.18 42 -16 -34 
Posterior parietal cortex R 22 2.99 38 -80 32 
Lingual gyrus R 21 3.07 6 -74 6 
Posterior cingulate R 20 3.02 4 -38 42 
Fusiform face area L 16 3.03 -22 -102 -8 
Anterior insula cortex L 14 3.05 -40 -2 6 
 Basal ganglia R 14 3.40 18 -24 4 
Orbitofrontal cortex R 14 3.11 24 54 -8 
Nucleus accumbens R 10 2.83 14 4 -6 
       
d) Main-effect Other-focussed > Self-focussed 
Item     
       
Medial prefrontal 
cortex L 
77073 6.55 0 54 22 
Fusiform face area R 138 4.40 38 -62 -10 
Postcentral gyrus R 97 3.76 28 -26 62 
Thalamus R 23 3.06 20 -24 -2 
Intraparietal sulcus L 19 2.90 -44 -32 42 
Amygdala R 19 3.11 12 6 -24 
Secondary 
somatosensory cortex 
R 16 2.92 54 -32 22 
Posterior temporal 
cortex R 
11 3.02 66 -42 -12 
Fusiform face area L 10 3.02 -40 -46 -22 
Note: Regions surviving a cluster-level threshold of z > 2.3, p <.05, FWE-corrected are reported. A minimum 
voxel-level threshold of 10 mm was applied to all contrasts. 
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Figure 4.11. The mean percentage signal change in BOLD within the medial prefrontal cortex during 
painful and neutral trials per target identity (functional ROI defined by the painful > neutral event 
contrast) from Chapter 4, Study 4. Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 4.12. The mean percentage signal change in BOLD within the anterior insula during painful and 
neutral trials per target identity (functional ROI defined by the painful > neutral event contrast) from 
Chapter 4, Study 4. Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 4.13. The mean percentage signal change in BOLD within the dorsal anterior cingulate during 
painful and neutral trials per target identity (functional ROI defined by the painful > neutral event 
contrast) from Chapter 4, Study 4. Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals.  
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4.2.3 Discussion 
 The goal of Study 4 was to demonstrate the causal relationship between perceived 
intergroup competition and empathic bias. The between groups manipulation was designed to 
make salient a rivalry between the ingroup and one of the outgroups. The manipulation 
significantly influenced ratings of the perceived status and rivalry with targets from one of 
the outgroups, Cardiff University. Specifically, participants who were told that the ingroup 
had a longstanding rivalry with Cardiff University rated students from Cardiff as higher 
status and more of a rival to the ingroup compared to participants who were told that the 
University of Sussex was a rival. The salience manipulation had no effect on how students 
from the University of Sussex were rated in terms of status and rivalry. Participants always 
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Figure 4.14. The mean percentage signal change in BOLD within the anterior insula, dorsal anterior 
cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex in response to self-report items designed to gauge other- and 
self-focussed empathy (functional ROI defined by the painful > neutral event contrast) from Chapter 4, 
Study 4. Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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rated students from Cardiff as more competent, higher status, and greater rivals to the ingroup 
than students from Sussex—even when measurement followed information to the contrary. It 
is possible that students from Cardiff were seen as more of a threat to the ingroup due to their 
closer proximity than Sussex. Xiao and Van Bavel (2012) found that when a particular 
outgroup was portrayed as threatening to the salient ingroup, they were estimated to be closer 
in physical distance than an outgroup portrayed as non-threatening. It seems equally possible 
that the reverse is also true, that if one outgroup (such as Cardiff) is physically closer to the 
salient ingroup than another (such as Sussex) then they would be perceived as more of a 
threat.  
Previous research has shown that there is a causal relationship between intergroup 
rivalry and empathic bias (Cikara, Bruneau, et al., 2011). It was expected therefore that 
manipulating the perceived rivalry between the ingroup and a target outgroup would impact 
empathic responses when observing members of that outgroup in pain. Increasing the 
perceived rivalry between the ingroup and Cardiff did not, however, have any significant 
effect on empathy for targets from Cardiff (either in self-reports or neural activations). This is 
unlikely to be because participants had simply forgotten the information from the bogus 
article: The manipulation and the self-reported perceptions took place at either end of the 
study (before and after the main task, respectively) and the manipulation did appear to affect 
some measures, such as ratings of perceived rivalry between the ingroup and Cardiff. It also 
does not seem likely that the manipulation was not strong enough: Statistically, there was a 
very strong effect on the extent to which students from Cardiff were seen as rivals of the 
ingroup. However, it is possible that the manipulation had no effect on empathy because the 
intergroup rivalry was presented as somewhat indirect (through status positions rather than in 
terms of a realistic conflict e.g., for resources)—as was used in previous studies (Cikara, 
Bruneau, et al., 2011; Hein et al., 2010). It is also possible that the manipulation did not affect 
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empathy because the events were unambiguously negative whereas in previous studies the 
negative events were merely of a misfortunate nature (e.g., stepping in chewing gum; Cikara 
& Fiske, 2011). In this case, it may be that individuals may not feel so strongly opposed to a 
rival outgroup as to wish permanent damage upon them, but may not feel as bad wishing 
inconvenience upon them.  
 While there were no effects of the salience manipulation on empathy, I found there was a 
consistent effect of the target’s identity. Regions that process the sensory-discriminative 
aspects of pain (AI; Peyron, Laurent, & García-Larrea, 2000), the felt unpleasantness of 
physical pain (ACC; Rainville, Duncan, Price, & Bushnell, 2011; Singer et al., 2004), and 
those that support mentalising processes (mPFC; Frith & Frith, 2006) were all more active 
during trials depicting a painful event compared to a neutral event, but only if the target was 
from the ingroup or from Sussex—when the target was from Cardiff the difference was not 
only non-significant but it was also in the opposite direction (i.e., less activation to painful 
events compared to neutral events). Said another way, seeing targets being stabbed by an 
object that is physically painful (such as a knife) led to more activation of regions that 
process pain compared to seeing a target be lightly touched by an innocuous object (such as a 
spoon). Crucially, this was not the case if the recipient of pain was from the outgroup that 
was perceived overall to be more of a rival to the ingroup.  
I found that regardless of whether or not Cardiff University was presented as a salient 
rival to the ingroup, participants exhibited less empathy towards targets from Cardiff (who 
were always rated as more of a rival to the ingroup than the other outgroup) compared to 
targets from either the ingroup university or from Sussex (who were always rated as less of a 
rival to the ingroup than the other outgroup). There was no difference in empathic responses 
to targets from the ingroup university and targets from Sussex. This revealed that empathy 
was not simply attenuated to outgroup, compared to ingroup, targets but rather empathy 
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varied according to relations between the ingroup and the outgroup, such as whether or not 
they were perceived to be in competition with another. This was not apparent in the self-
report responses, but was clear at the level of neural activations—which are not subject to 
social desirability.  
These findings are consistent with previous research but also differ in a number of 
ways. Cikara and Fiske (2011) found that participants exhibit biases in empathic concern to 
specific outgroups and these biases emerged based on how those groups were perceived by 
the individual. Cikara, Bruneau, and Saxe (2011) likewise found that empathy was 
significantly reduced—to the point of feeling joy or Schadenfreude—while observing 
competitors in pain. However, unlike them, I found that empathy was not switched off 
altogether nor did participants exhibit joy or reward-related neural activity. In my studies, 
participants reported feeling some empathy for a competitor’s pain and they exhibited 
empathy at the neural level, it was merely relatively lower than the empathy 
reported/exhibited for the ingroup and less competitive outgroup. It is not entirely clear 
whether this relative difference was due to a dampening of empathy to a rival’s pain (as 
Cikara and colleagues suggest) or whether it reflects an extraordinary amount of empathy for 
the ingroup (as suggested by Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010). What is clear, however, 
is that empathy does not simply switch on and off to an ingroup or outgroup’s pain, it waxes 
and wanes according to our group memberships and more specifically the relations between 
those groups.  
The results from Study 4, I believe, reveals something about empathy but more 
broadly they demonstrate how contextual cues (like a social group membership) can trigger 
expectations (like a particular group is competing with yours for certain resources) that exert 
a top-down influence on ostensibly automatic perceptual processing (such as pain perception; 
Decety & Lamm, 2006; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Indeed, social identity processes can 
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penetrate automatic processing at the earliest components of perception (Ratner & Amodio, 
2013). And, in the context of pain, this can have potentially disastrous consequences for 
certain groups in society. For example, researchers have identified that individuals from 
racial minority groups typically receive less pain relief treatment than white individuals in 
emergency room settings (Pletcher, Kertesz, Kohn, & Gonzales, 2008) and this appears to be 
tied to the inaccurate beliefs that medical practitioners have over the biological differences 
between whites and racial minorities (Hoffman et al., 2016). Although a thorough discussion 
is beyond the scope of the current thesis, the results from these studies point towards a 
growing body of work that suggests that even seemingly automatic or bottom-up neural 
processes are modulated by top-down motivational goals.  
In addition to the main analyses, I ran an item-wise analysis to delineate whether the 
different self-reported items of empathy were supported by activations in distinct brain 
regions. There was a dissociation between regional activations and self-reported empathy: 
Regions associated with experience-sharing (dACC and AI) were significantly more active 
while participants responded to self-focussed items during the response phase, but those 
associated with understanding other’s mental states (i.e., mentalising; mPFC) were 
significantly more active when answering other-focussed items. Kanske and colleagues 
(2016) support such a distinction, describing experience-sharing as broadly ‘feeling with’ 
another (what I designate as self-focussed) (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006), compared to 
empathic concern as ‘feeling for’ another (other-focussed) (C. D. Batson et al., 1987). This 
also supports previous work demonstrating that different facets of empathy rely upon distinct 
neural architecture in the brain (Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, Lesemann, & Singer, 2016a; 
Lamm et al., 2011; Ochsner et al., 2008; Zaki, Ochsner, Hanelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007). 
Taken together, my analyses suggest that the task engaged the sharing, mentalising, and 
concern components of empathy, but also that what we as researchers ask participants at the 
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self-report level has implications for responses that are outside of a participant’s volitional 
control.  
4.3 Conclusion 
In Chapter 4, I have presented novel evidence that beliefs about outgroups, and not 
merely an ingroup-outgroup distinction, modulate a specific facet of empathy, experience-
sharing. In Study 3, participants reported feeling significantly worse for targets in pain when 
they were said to be members of the salient ingroup than a member of a rival outgroup—
participants felt as bad if the target was a member of the relatively less competitive outgroup. 
At the neurological level, I replicated the results of previous studies showing that participants 
exhibited an ingroup bias in empathy-related BOLD activity, compared to either of the two 
outgroups. While there was no difference in empathic responses to the two outgroups, I have 
suggested how particular limitations in the design made it so.  
In Study 4, I corrected some limitations in the design of the paradigm and showed that 
while participants reported only an ingroup bias at the self-report level, they exhibited more 
nuanced empathic biases at the level of neural activation. Specifically, participants exhibited 
more empathy-related activation while observing painful, compared to neutral, trials but only 
when the target was a member of the ingroup or the relatively less competitive outgroup. This 
difference was not only non-significant while observing targets of the rival outgroup, it was 
in the opposite direction. Finally, I also revealed that the self-report responses corresponded 
to activation in discrete regions of the brain. In sum, I have demonstrated that, during 
empathy, individuals not only process the group membership of the other (i.e., ‘us’ vs. 
‘them’) but also process what that group means to them: They are not merely different from 
me, they are also a group with whom I am competing.  
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 In this chapter I have demonstrated that threat by competition and social devaluation 
through upward comparisons can attenuate one’s empathy towards another’s pain. In Chapter 
5, I discuss the role of threat that is incidental to the intergroup context plays during 
intergroup relations and the extent to which it influences empathy. I present two studies in 
which participants were asked to complete a task involving empathy for members of different 
groups while simultaneously receiving cues to induce fear.  
 
 5 The Role of Incidental Fear in Intergroup Empathic Bias 
‘Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to 
think sanely under the influence of great fear’ (Russell, 1952, p. 106). 
 
  Following a string of attacks in the US and across Europe, in Orlando, Nice, 
Berlin, Paris, and Brussels (Dorell, 2016), fears of terrorism are at record heights (J. 
Jones & Saad, 2016). One of the greatest fears for Americans in 2016 was falling victim 
to a terrorist attack, whereas in previous years their greatest fear of was natural threats , 
such as snakes and spiders (The GfK Group, 2014, 2016). In a sample of over 1500 
Americans, 61% feared that the US would imminently experience a large-scale terrorist 
event such as 9/11. This belief motivated an increase in Islamophobia and support for 
discriminatory practices such as increased police presence in Muslim neighbourhoods 
and total cessation of all Muslim immigration to the US (The GfK Group, 2016).  
  Events that threaten our safety, like a terrorist attack, often foreshadow periods 
when a hard line is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’; they highlight how ‘we’ are similar 
to each other, but ‘they’ are different from us (Rothgerber, 1997). Indeed, simply being 
exposed to news of a terrorist attack causes individuals to express more prejudicial 
attitudes (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009) and reduces their 
prosocial intentions towards outgroup others (Tamborini et al., 2017). When people are 
scared they target certain groups, unfairly labelling them as perpetrators. For example, 
terrorist threats within Europe are overwhelmingly not from strangers overseas (as is 
often believed) but from fellow Europeans (Taub, 2016). However, nations increasingly 
endorse calls for tighter border control and closer scrutiny of immigrants and refugees.  
  Fear therefore drives a wedge in society and reshapes the polit ical landscape—in 
fact, fear is often even leveraged with that purpose (Boyd, 2012). At the Nuremberg 
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Trials, Herman Goering said that to bring people to ‘the bidding of leaders’ you need 
only expose them ‘to great danger’ and tell them ‘they are being attacked’ (Gilbert, 
1995, p.278-279). It’s unsurprising, then, that fear features so prominently in political 
rhetoric (Gore, 2004). Harnessing the fears of a nation can provide the traction to pave 
the way for political movements, allowing candidates who stoke ethnic or cultural 
tensions to mobilise a populace towards right-wing nationalism (Valentino, Hutchings, & 
White, 2002). These are some of the reasons why researchers have become increasingly 
interested in how fear influences relations at the individual, collective, and national 
levels.  
5.1 What Is Fear? 
  While threat refers to a broad set of scenarios, for example, as a response to 
challenges to one’s status position, worldview, or self-impression (Stephan & Mealy, 
2011), fear refers to a more specific focus on danger. Fear is a circumscribed area of 
threat and has the quality of an emergency (Rachman, 2004). When faced with life 
threatening events a set of biological mechanisms are triggered that aid in behavioural 
attempts to avoid or escape from threatening situations. This begins with the activation 
of the sympathetic nervous system, primarily by a release of adrenaline and 
norepinephrine (Cannon, 1932), as well as a hierarchical neural network including the 
amygdala and midbrain (Misslin, 2003). Together, these systems facilitate physical 
reactions to a threatening event, such as increased heart rate and breathing, to provoke 
responses that aid our evasion of specific survival-type emergencies (Rachman, 2004). 
From this perspective, the purpose of fear is to protect the self at all costs. But fear does 
not lead to a pathological need to ensure our survival while forsaking others.  
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5.2 Fear Leads to Group, Not Individual, Survival  
  Recently, researchers in crowd behaviour have documented that during large 
scale emergencies (e.g., the 2005 London bombings) victims didn’t resort to mass panic 
and trample each other to save themselves (as previous accounts suggest; Dynes, 2003). 
Instead, the instinct for personal survival was overridden by a pro-social response, that 
is, people stopped to help each other out. Drury, Cocking, and Reicher (2009) suggested 
that, for the victims of those attacks, the threatening situation activated a sense of shared 
common fate. They perceived themselves as part of a psychological group, the function 
of which was to provide aid to its members and thereby increase everyone’s chances of 
survival. This notion is derived from Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987), 
which posits that individuals can cognitively represent their sense of self as overlapping 
with others based on dimensions relevant to a given context (such as by gender, race, or 
political ideologies). In other words, if a group is important to us its members are 
incorporated into how we perceive ourselves (Brewer & Hewstone, 2004), leading to a 
psychological shift from ‘me’ as an individual to ‘us’ as a group.  
5.3 Intergroup Bias: Ingroup Love 
  Humans have evolved to think in mental shortcuts, to form impressions of others 
on the basis of minimal social information such as their group membership (Macrae, 
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). These shortcuts, while energy-saving and efficient, lead 
to a pervasive and often pernicious tendency to carve the social world into ‘us’ and 
‘them’.  
 When we share a group identity with another person (an ingroup member), we exhibit 
a preference towards them over those with whom we don’t share an identity (an outgroup 
member), that is, ‘ingroup favouritism’ (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). This 
preference takes a variety of forms, for example, if a person is a member of our ingroup 
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we perceive them to be more human (Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012) and we 
make fewer stereotypical judgments about them (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Wang, Ku, 
Tai, & Galinsky, 2014) than if they were a member of an outgroup. We also feel more 
empathy for their suffering (for a review, see Vanman, 2016) and as a result we are more 
likely to act prosocially towards one of ‘us’ than one of ‘them’ through acts of self-sacrifice 
(Prapavessis & Carron, 1997), moral-based decisions (Greene, 2013), and even in immoral 
behaviours, if the act results in net ingroup gains (Cadsby, Du, & Song, 2016; Prinz, 2011). 
There are a number of reasons why we tend to show favour to fellow members of a group.  
 The group is a source of benefit. Indeed, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggested that 
helping the ingroup is a ticket to reciprocal living, a generalised exchange system in which 
one contributes to the group and in return receives the benefits of group membership. These 
benefits range from nourishment, resource sharing, and protection to basic psychological 
needs such as boosts to self-esteem, provision of status, and a sense of distinctiveness 
(Bowles, 2006; Brewer, 1991; Kelly & Spoor, 2005; Parrish, 1999; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  
 The belief that the ingroup is a source of support is one that we develop from a young age 
(Kinzler & Spelke, 2011) and it is present among many species of the animal kingdom. For 
non-human animals, the benefits of group living are not only in hunting and foraging but also 
in providing a ‘collective vigilance’. That is, groups provide better detection and warning of 
threats compared to individuals living on their own (R. S. Olson, Haley, Dyer, & Adami, 
2015). This is particularly true when the members of our group are motivated to form 
attachments to each other (Ein-Dor & Hirschberger, 2016). But there are costs to group 
living: While there is ‘us’ there is also ‘them’, the other tribes that may constitute a threat to 
us and ours.  
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5.4 Intergroup Bias: Outgroup Hate 
Around the same age when we learn to trust the ingroup we also develop the 
belief that the outgroup is more likely to be hostile than friendly towards us (Hamlin, 
Mahajan, Liberman, & Wynn, 2013; Rheingold & Eckerman, 1974). It is this belief that 
motivates our tendency to derogate the outgroup, that is, ‘outgroup hate’ (Hewstone et al., 
2002). When interacting with ‘them’, it is difficult to predict how the exchange will go and 
what the outcomes of an interaction will be. The unexpected nature of this interaction can be 
a source of anxiety and dread (i.e., intergroup anxiety; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 
2002; Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1985) and this can 
lead to increased prejudicial attitudes towards outgroup members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).  
To a large extent, our negative perception of the outgroup is not within our conscious 
control. Neuroimaging research has revealed that humans process the faces of outgroup 
targets within the first 300ms of perception (Ito & Bartholow, 2009), typically 
represented by a positive peak at 200ms (thus named the P200). This peak is associated 
with observing an outgroup face, but also with vigilant perception (Bar-Haim, Lamy, & 
Glickman, 2005), indicating that our rapid and increased attention to an outgroup face is 
driven by automatic systems that monitor threat (Bartholow & Dickter, 2007). 
Supporting this notion, while we typically remember ingroup faces more accurately than 
outgroup faces (Ackerman et al., 2006) the effect reverses when the outgroup displays a 
threatening expression (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2011). This is likely because 
expressions of threat signify possible danger (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Lundqvist & 
Dimberg, 1995), which is particularly likely when the target belongs to a group the 
behaviour of whom we struggle to predict (i.e., the outgroup).  
Fearing the outgroup serves an adaptive function as often outgroups have 
interests incompatible with the ingroup’s and therefore represent a threat to ingroup 
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resources and survival (Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). Researchers 
have identified that individuals exhibit a prepared fear response to outgroup targets in a 
manner similar to natural hazards such as snakes (Navarrete et al., 2012; Olsson, Ebert, 
Banaji, & Phelps, 2005). But this fear need not be existential in nature. Symbolic threats 
to one’s culture, social identity, or relative status can exacerbate conflict between groups 
(Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Indeed, anti-immigrant attitudes drastically rise during 
periods of slow economic growth and recession. The fear of losing income and status 
precedes a surge in public popularity for nationalist movements (Quillian, 1995). 
Moreover, social psychologists have demonstrated that opposition to immigration is 
highest for groups that have more to lose in unstable than stable economic climates; that 
the ‘fear of falling’ focuses attention towards the capacity for ‘them’ to encroach on ‘us’ 
(Jetten, Mols, Healy, & Spears, 2017).  
5.5 The Role of Integral Fear During Intergroup Conflict  
When two groups are in conflict, fear exacerbates group polarisation in a number 
of different ways, increasing the psychological distance between the ingroup and outgroup 
(‘boundary activation’), the level of blame levelled at the outgroup (‘outgroup negativity’), 
the perception of outgroup members as de-individuated (‘homogenisation’), and the demand 
for loyalty to the ingroup (‘ingroup solidarity’; Kuperman, 2013). Fear harnesses a deeply 
encoded belief that the social world consists of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and frames the context 
more specifically in terms of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’; that they are in some way out to get us.  
Our identities become more salient during times of fear and anxiety, and this 
provokes motivations towards aggression (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007; 
Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). Scholars have highlighted fear’s role in 
producing ‘near-genocidal behaviour towards neighbouring groups’ (Ross, 2007, p. 37) and 
documented its influence in historical cases of genocide such as in Rwanda (McGarty & 
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McGarty, 2014), Darfur (Livingstone-Smith, 2011), and during the Holocaust (Newman 
& Erber, 2002). The victims of these group-based atrocities were often perceived as 
belonging to a threatening outgroup where in reality the groups were both a minority and 
defenceless. Depicting them as a threat and as less human (as insects or rats), however, 
expedited their persecution (Harris & Fiske, 2011; Haslam, 2006). Indeed seeing a group 
as less than human allows rapid defensive tendencies to guide behaviour against them 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975).  
5.6 The Role of Incidental Fear During Intergroup Conflict  
Aside from examining the role of fear that is inherent to an intergroup relation, 
researchers have also considered how fear that is incidental—unrelated to the specific 
group relation—might affect group processes. Fear distorts rational thought, it triggers 
knee-jerk reactions that distract from the truth of a situation—what economists call 
‘probability neglect’ (Sunstein & Zeckhauser, 2010). When people are afraid, they 
become defensive and close-minded. Researchers have shown this in the lab. For 
example, reminding participants that one day they will die encourages them to vote for far-
right political candidates, to support aggressive counter-terrorism policies (Landau et al., 
2004), and to endorse harming those with a different worldview (McGregor et al., 1998), 
or culture (Pyszczynski et al., 2006).  
Research has however revealed that fear alone is not sufficient to encourage 
intolerance towards others, rather, it is the combination of fear with uncertainty (Haas & 
Cunningham, 2014). Indeed, people use their group memberships to restore a sense of 
global control when personal control is questioned (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013). But 
people also respond harshly to others in situations where they feel both threatened and 
uncertain—particularly when that uncertainty is of a personal, existential, or meaning-
related nature (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). For example, individuals will seek to 
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increase their sense of control by leaning towards right-wing authoritarian ideologies 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). This is likely because an authoritarian 
ideology serves to restore structure and order to our perception of society (Duckitt, 
2001). Crucially, however, fear moderates the effect of feelings of uncertainty on 
intolerance towards others, causing otherwise liberal thinkers to adopt more conservative 
and authoritarian perspectives (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 
2009). 
Regardless of whether the other is truly responsible for our feelings of fear, we 
exhibit prejudice towards them as if they are (Cain, 2012; Choma, Hodson, & Costello, 
2012; Hodson et al., 2013). Researchers are, however, vague on the underlying 
mechanisms that connect incidental emotion to intergroup bias. DeSteno and colleagues 
(2004) studied the role of incidental anger in prejudice, finding that simply asking 
participants to recall a time in which they were angry was sufficient to produce bias 
against members of a minimal outgroup. The researchers stated that the ‘exact 
mechanism… remains unknown’ (p. 323). They speculated however that in case o f 
incidental anger, its association with intergroup competition evoked a ‘psychological 
readiness’ to derogate the outgroup (DeSteno et al., 2004). That, essentially, even though 
the outgroup was not the source of anger they were associated with it, as its recipients or 
source, more so than members of the ingroup.  
There is little evidence to determine whether incidental fear has a casual role in 
intergroup bias and even fewer studies exist testing exactly in which direction fear 
(incidental or not) influences intergroup bias. For example, some have documented that 
other negative emotions like anger increase negativity towards the outgroup where fear 
exclusively enhances positivity towards the ingroup (Bukowski & Dragon, 2014). But 
this does not square with previous accounts that suggest fear of the other precedes 
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outgroup derogation (Quillian, 1995). The question remains, does fear operate only to 
push regard of the outgroup from indifference to hostility? Or does fear also strengthen 
solidarity with those whom we are already familiar? I have previously demonstrated that 
threat by competition and social devaluation can lead to attenuated empathy towards 
members of an outgroup, but does threat from other sources (i.e., that are incidental to 
the intergroup context) also affect empathy in the same way? 
5.7 This Study  
  To answer these questions, I conducted two studies in which I measured self-
reported empathy in a minimal group context, following inductions of fear or not. 
Empathy predicts prosocial behaviour and altruism (Batson, 2011; Christov-Moore, 
Sugiyama, Grigaityte, & Iacoboni, 2016; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2007) and reduces 
negative attitudes towards stigmatised groups (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). 
Therefore, studying empathy when it may be externally constrained (i.e., during fear) 
helps us understand the role that distinct emotions play during processes that are crucial 
for fostering cooperation between groups.  
  Based on previous research on intergroup empathic bias (see Vanman, 2016, for 
an overview), including my own prior research, I expected 1) overall lower ratings of 
empathy towards the suffering of outgroup targets compared to the suffering of ingroup 
targets and 2) based on the findings that incidental emotions increase negativity towards 
others (Cain, 2012; DeSteno et al., 2004), that fear would exacerbate intergroup bias. It 
is unclear, however, at this point whether fear would only increase empathy towards the 
ingroup or only decrease empathy towards the outgroup, or whether it would affect bias 
in both directions. 
  To determine how incidental fear affects the direction of intergroup bias, I employed 
the inclusion of other in the self scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). I predicted that 
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the effect of fear exacerbating intergroup bias would be predicted by an increase of ‘othering’ 
the outgroup, that is, participants who feel afraid would report less overlap between their 
sense of self and members of the outgroup.  
  In this study, I used a minimal group context. Minimal groups are, by nature, devoid 
of identity content; however, I was keen to determine and control for the possibility that a 
manipulation of incidental fear might prime group perceptions. Therefore, participants were 
asked to rate the target groups on a range of attributes that are relevant to intergroup relations 
and have been shown as key dimensions in intergroup empathic bias (Cikara et al., 2014; 
Cikara & Fiske, 2011).  
  Finally, I asked participants to complete implicit measures of fear (IAT; adapted from 
Greenwald et al., 1998). There are two reasons for this: First, there are a number of social 
influences that may obscure the accurate expression of fear. For example, in student 
populations, the admission of fear is deemed socially undesirable by men (Rachman, 
2004). Second, outgroups are perceived as inherently threatening (Hewstone et al., 2002) and 
as a source of anxiety (Dovidio et al., 2002; Mendes et al., 2002; Walter G. Stephan & 
Stephan, 1985), therefore I wanted to rule out any effect that integral fear might have on 
empathy, ensuring that the only effects observed in the analyses would be those driven by 
incidental fear.  
5.8 Study 5 
5.8.1 Method 
Design. The study followed a 2 (event: painful vs. neutral) x 2 (target identity: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (induced fear: fear vs. control) design, with event and perceived 
identity varied within participants and fear induction varied between participants.  
Participants. An a-priori power analysis (G* Power [Version 3.1], Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) demonstrated that to reach a minimum of 80% estimated power, 
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under a two-tailed hypothesis and a confidence level of 5%, would require a sample of at 
least 40 participants in total for a repeated measures design. We therefore aimed to collect 
data from 80 participants for this study. A total of 80 healthy volunteers were recruited from 
the University of Exeter and remunerated with £3 or 0.5 course credits for their time. 
However, two participants withdrew from the study leaving a total sample of 78 participants 
(M age = 19.42, SD = 2.99, 66 female). The study was approved by both the Ethics Committee 
of the School of Psychology, University of Exeter, and the Ministry of Defence Ethics 
Committee. Participant consent was obtained according to the Declaration of Helsinki (World 
Medical Association, 2013).  
Stimuli. In each trial of the main task, participants were presented with individuals 
from one of two groups who were depicted as experiencing either a neutral or painful event 
(the full details of this paradigm may be found in the Stimuli subsection in Chapter 2, Study 
2). To induce fear or not, participants were shown an image that appeared at random during 
the trials of the main task. To induce fear, half of participants were shown images from the 
Set of Fear Inducing Pictures database (SFIP; Michałowski et al., 2016) of objects that 
constitute the most common phobias (e.g., spiders, snakes; described in Appendix E). As a 
control, the other half of the participants were shown images with a non-fearful, but content-
matched, object (e.g., a knitted toy spider). In both conditions, images appeared with a rapid 
onset and for a brief duration (1000ms). The images were randomly dispersed among trials of 
the main task with a new sequence generated for each participant. 
Measures.  To measure the effect of the fear-induction, participants were asked to 
indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much) the extent to which they agreed 
with statements that referred explicitly to their feelings of fear (adapted from Lerner, Small, 
& Loewenstein, 2013). For example: ‘To what extent do you currently feel afraid?’ The fear 
subscale consisted of how nervous, anxious, and afraid the participant felt (α = .77) whereas 
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the positive subscale consisted of how relaxed, peaceful, and calm the participant felt (α = 
.86). The fear manipulation checks were randomly dispersed amongst the trials.  
The fear IAT consisted of 4 blocks. For two blocks, participants were asked to 
distinguish between ingroup members and outgroup members followed by fear-related words 
(fear, terror, horror, and panic) and positive-related words (calm, relax, peace, and rest). For a 
further two blocks, participants were asked to pair ingroup targets with positive-related words 
and outgroup targets with fear-related words, followed by ingroup targets with fear-related 
words and outgroup targets with positive-related words. The order of the latter two blocks 
was counterbalanced between participants.  
In the final part of the study, participants were asked to complete measures of the 
inclusion of other in the self  (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) as well as measures of 
perceived group competence (both alphas > .80), sociability (both alphas > .70), and status 
(both alphas > .70) in relation to both groups and rivalry (α = .87) and similarity (α = .84) in 
relation to the outgroup only. Participants also completed the interpersonal reactivity index 
(IRI; Davis, 1980) as part of a broader secondary analysis (see Chapter 6 for further details). 
Procedure. After providing written consent, participants were asked to complete a 
bogus personality test in which they estimated the amount of dots on the screen (Diehl, 
1990). The computer then ostensibly analysed the participant’s responses and placed them 
with others according to the similarity of their responses, forming two groups. In reality, 
group allocation was randomised and counterbalanced between participants. At this point, the 
researcher re-entered the lab and presented the participant with a coloured bracelet—the 
colour explicitly referring to the group allocation.  
In the main task, participants were asked to observe and respond to photographs of 
individuals from the two groups, some that depicted people experiencing negative events 
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(e.g., an injection) others that depicted people experiencing neutral events (e.g., touched by a 
Q-tip). At the onset of each trial, participants were required to memorise the target’s identity 
(i.e., a member of the red or blue group), observe the event, and then asked to recall the 
target’s group membership in a simple one-back task. Participants were asked to rate the 
perceived event using one of two self-report items gauging either other-focussed empathy 
i.e., ‘how bad did you feel for the target?’ or self-focussed empathy i.e., ‘how painful did it 
seem to you?’ (varied within participants, across trials). 
At random intervals, throughout the main task, an image would appear that was 
intended to induce fear, in the fear condition, or not, in the control condition. Also at random, 
participants were required to answer items that explicitly measured their feelings. Empathy 
was also measured during the main task, so it was embedded with the fear stimuli. Once 
participants completed the main task, they were asked to complete a fear IAT, which no 
longer included the stimuli used to induce fear. In the final section of the study, participants 
were asked to complete self-report measures referring to their relation to the target groups 
(IOS) as well as their perception of the target groups, as a whole.  
5.8.2 Results  
 Manipulation check. The fear induction procedure was successful in producing the 
expected 2 (fear vs. control) x 2 (scale: fear-related vs. positive feelings) interaction, F (1, 76) 
= 13.38, p < .001, = .15. That is, participants in the fear condition reported more fear (M = 
36.01, SD = 24.91) than participants in the control condition (M = 19.22, SD = 19.84), t (76) 
= 3.28, p = .002, 95% CI [6.59, 26.98], d =.75, and they reported lower positive feelings (M = 
41.08, SD = 23.93) than those in the control condition (M = 57.07, SD = 20.63), t (76) = -
3.15, p = .002, 95% CI [5.90, 26.09], d =.72. Of all the items in the fear subscale, the largest 
difference between the groups was in the extent to which they reported feeling afraid, t (76) = 
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3.41, p = .001, 95% CI [9.77, 37.26], d = .77, compared to anxious, t (76) = 2.42, p = .018, 
95% CI [2.54, 26.29], d = .55, and nervous, t (76) = 2.08, p = .04, 95% CI [.55, 24.33], d = 
.55.  
Recall task. Induced fear did not influence the accuracy, F (1, 76) = .195, p = .660, 
= .003, or speed, F (1, 76) = .803, p = .373, = .010, with which participants identified 
the target’s group membership. Participants were marginally more accurate at identifying 
ingroup (M = .96, SD = .06) compared to outgroup (M = .95, SD = .06) targets overall, t (77) 
= 1.79, p = .077, 95% CI [-.001, .020], d = .17, but there was no difference in the time taken 
to do so, t (77) = .382, p = .704, 95% CI [-44.65, 65.82], d = .03.  
Self-focussed empathy. A 2 (fear) x 2 (target) mixed ANOVA revealed a marginal 
effect of target identity, F (1, 76) = 3.29, p = .073, = .04. Participants reported ingroup 
targets (M = 81.58, SD = 18.61) as seeming to be in marginally more pain than outgroup 
targets (M = 79.42, SD = 18.36), t (77) = 1.82, p = .07, 95% CI [-.21, 4.52], d = .12. There 
was no main effect of induced fear on self-focussed empathy, F (1, 76) = .070, p = .792, = 
.001, nor any interaction between target identity and induced fear, F (1, 76) = .129, p = .72, 
= .002.  
Other-focussed empathy. There was a significant main effect of target identity on 
reports of other-focussed empathy, F (1, 76) = 8.00, p = .006, = .09. Participants reported 
feeling less bad for outgroup targets in pain (M = 72.60, SD = 17.88) compared to ingroup 
others in pain (M = 79.04, SD = 14.75), t (77) = -2.83, p = .006, 95% CI [-10.76, -1.88], d = 
.39.  However, this was qualified by a significant interaction between target identity and 
induced fear, F (1, 76) = 4.52, p = .037, = .06: Participants in the fear condition reported 
significantly less empathy for outgroup targets (M = 70.19, SD = 17.34) than ingroup targets 
(M = 81.25, SD = 13.39), t (77) = -3.55, p = .001, 95% CI [-17.26, -4.85], d = .71, whereas 
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there was no difference in reports from participants in the control condition, t (77) = -.489, p 
= .626, 95% CI [-7.93, 4.80], d = .10, (Figure 5.15). There was no main effect of induced fear 
on other-focussed empathy, F (1, 76) = .004, p = .947, = .00. 
Automatic attitudes towards social groups. The D score was computed using the 
improved algorithm from Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). I computed the mean of 
correct latencies for each block and the difference between the blocks, then divided them by a 
pooled standard deviation, and finally averaged the results. A higher D score reflects a 
stronger bias in favour of the ingroup. There was no difference in automatic attitudes between 
participants in the fear (M = .53, SD = 1.44) and control (M = .24, SD = 1.21) conditions, t 
(76) = -.939, p = .350, 95% CI [-.88, .32] on this task, which was completed after (but not 
during) fear induction.  
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Figure 5.15. Mean self-reported ratings of other-focussed empathy in response to the pain of ingroup 
and outgroup targets, while receiving cues to induce fear vs. control from Chapter 5, Study 5. Error 
bars depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Inclusion of other in the self. A 2 (fear) x 2 (target) mixed ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of target identity on self-other overlap, F (1, 76) = 36.08, p < .001, = .32. 
Participants reported feeling more overlap with their ingroup (M = 4.13, SD = 1.54) 
compared to the outgroup (M = 3.00, SD = .93), t (77) = 5.94, p < .001, 95% CI [.75, 1.51], d 
= .89. However, this was qualified by a significant interaction between target identity and 
induced fear, F (1, 76) = 4.20, p = .044, = .05. Participants in the fear condition perceived 
less overlap with outgroup others (M = 2.68, SD = .79) compared to non-scared participants 
(M = 3.34, SD = .94), t(76) = -3.39, p = .001, 95% CI [-1.06, -.28], d = .76, whereas there was 
no effect of fear on overlap with the ingroup, t (76) = -.27, p = .785, 95% CI [-.79, .60], d = 
.06. There was no main effect of induced fear on overlap ratings, F (1, 76) = 1.76, p = .189, 
= .02. 
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Figure 5.16. Mean self-reported ratings of self-other overlap in response to ingroup and 
outgroup targets, while receiving cues to induce fear vs. control from Chapter 5, Study 5. 
Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Group perceptions. Competence and sociability. A 2 (fear) x 2 (target) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed there was no main effect of target group on ratings 
of competence, F (1, 76) = 2.80, p = .098, = .04. There was a significant main effect of 
induced fear, F (1, 76) = 4.49, p = .037, = .06. Participants in the fear condition rated 
targets’ competence as lower than those in the control condition, t (77) = -2.12, p = .037, 95% 
CI [-15.31, -.48], d = .48. There was no interaction between the target identity and induced 
fear, F (1, 76) = .301, p = .585, = .004.  
There was a main effect of target identity on ratings of perceived sociability, F (1, 76) 
= 17.99, p < .001, = .19. Participants rated their ingroup (M = 74.30, SD = 18.04) as 
significantly more sociable than the outgroup (M = 64.77, SD = 23.21), t (77) = 4.27, p < 
.001, 95% CI [5.09, 13.99], d = .46. There was also a main effect of induced fear on reports 
of perceived sociability, F (1, 76) = 5.04, p = .028, = .06. Participants in the fear condition 
rated targets sociability as lower than those in the control condition, t (77) = -2.25, p = .028, 
95% CI [-17.11, -1.02], d = .55. There was no interaction between target identity and induced 
fear, F (1, 76) = 1.23, p = .271, = .016. 
Status. There was no main effect of target identity on ratings of perceived status, F (1, 
76) = .586, p = .446, = .016. Participants rated the ingroup (M = 31.36, SD = 27.71) and 
outgroup (M = 29.36, SD = 25.38), as equal in status, t (77) = .771, p = .443, 95% CI [-3.17, 
7.17], d = .08. There was no main effect of induced fear on ratings of perceived status, F (1, 
76) = .046, p = .831, = .001, and no interaction between target identity and induced fear, F 
(1, 76) = .026, p = .992 = .00.  
Similarity and rivalry. There was no effect of induced fear on reports of the perceived 
similarity between the ingroup and the outgroup, t (76) = .438, p = .662, 95% CI [-6.93, 
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10.91], d = .09, nor ratings of perceived rivalry, t (76) = -1.46, p = .148, 95% CI [-22.63, 
3.47], d = .33. 
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Table 5.7. Summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations for scores on perceived competence, sociability, status, similarity with the ingroup, rivalry with the 
ingroup, self-reported empathy, self-other overlap, and implicit bias score split by the between groups manipulation of the presence of fear stimuli from Chapter 5, Study 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Competence 70.20 17.31 — 1. Competence 77.25 16.12 —
2. Sociability 71.09 18.73 .77** — 2. Sociability 77.68 16.88 .84** —
3. Status 30.78 27.88 -.36* -.25 — 3. Status 31.97 27.89 -.13 -.14 —
4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A — 4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —
5. Rivalry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A — 5. Rivalry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —
6. Other-focussed 81.25 13.39 .29 .33* -.02 N/A N/A — 6. Other-focussed 76.70 15.90 .23 .25 -.15 N/A N/A —
7. Self-focussed 80.85 17.29 .17 .26 -.04 N/A N/A .87** — 7. Self-focussed 82.35 20.12 .15 .11 -.17 N/A N/A .42** —
8. IOS 4.18 1.55 .009 .06 .19 N/A N/A .21 .26 — 8. IOS 4.08 1.55 .009 .04 .13 N/A N/A -.12 -.23 —
9. D .53 1.44 .09 .11 .14 N/A N/A .05 -.02 0.19 — 9. D .24 1.21 .12 .32* -.03 N/A N/A .04 .20 -.04 —
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Competence 66.77 18.77 — 1. Competence 75.51 18.81 —
2. Sociability 59.14 24.12 .73** — 2. Sociability 70.68 20.92 .73** —
3. Status 28.80 25.84 -.35* - — 3. Status 29.95 25.22 -.23 -.32 —
4. Similarity 66.14 18.09 .58** .68**-.49** — 4. Similarity 68.11 21.49 .26 .35* -.16 —
5. Rivalry 32.48 28.34 -.32* -.37* .41** -.37* — 5. Rivalry 22.89 29.52 -.22 -.41* .45** -.21 —
6. Other-focussed 70.19 17.34 .13 .19 .09 .14 .09 — 6. Other-focussed 75.14 18.33 .002 .17 -.14 .24 -.43** —
7. Self-focussed 79.11 17.64 -.003 .03 -.09 .16 .03 .71** — 7. Self-focussed 79.75 19.33 .10 .26 -.19 .02 -.29 .60** —
8. IOS 2.68 0.79 -.02 .001 .27 .07 -.07 .20 .12 — 8. IOS 3.34 0.94 .02 -.06 -.02 -.30 -.04 -.09 .02 —
9. D .53 1.44 -.06 .11 -.05 -.08 .18 .07 -.02 .31 — 9. D .24 1.21 .14 .17 .04 .15 -.13 .21 .09 0.21 —
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
Ingroup
Outgroup
Fear No fear
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5.8.3 Discussion  
Previous work has shown that fear of a particular group has a moderating effect on the 
degree to which bias is exhibited against them (Choma et al., 2012; Hodson et al., 2013). 
Researchers have also demonstrated that negative emotions, such as anger, are sufficient to 
produce bias against outgroup targets (DeSteno et al., 2004)—that is, when the emotion is 
incidental to the intergroup context and not directly elicited by the outgroup. The goal of the 
current study was, first, to determine whether priming incidental feelings of fear would be 
sufficient to elicit intergroup bias in empathy and, second, to delineate exactly in which 
direction fear might influence this intergroup bias: whether exclusively in favour of the 
ingroup or against the outgroup, or towards both at once.  
The results of Study 5 show that the manipulation was effective in producing fear. 
Given the documented link between fear and uncertainty in predicting intolerance (Haas & 
Cunningham, 2014), I controlled for feelings of uncertainty by having images in the control 
condition appear randomly and in the same fashion as images in the fear condition. 
Therefore, I am also confident that the differences between the conditions is only that one 
induced fear more so than the other, and not that one group also felt more uncertain than the 
other.  Likewise, I measured a variety of fear-related emotions (including nervousness and 
anxiety) and found that the largest difference between the groups of participants was in how 
they responded to self-report items of how afraid they felt during the study—producing a 
stronger effect size than reports of anxiety or nervousness. I note however that fear is closely 
related to anxiety, and in fact partly overlapping. Where these two emotions differ is in 
the object of arousal, namely, in whether or not there is a specific object (Rachman, 
2004). Fear often describes a reaction to a specific danger (such as a snake) but it 
dissipates when that source of danger is removed. Anxiety, on the other hand, is more 
diffuse and does not require a specific object. The source can be objectless and 
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uncontrollable but often more pervasive (Rachman, 2004). In this case, I am confident 
that the emotion induced by my procedure is primarily one of fear, while I acknowledge 
that this might go along with some anxiety as well.   
The results of the self-report data show that while there was no effect of induced fear 
on self-focused empathy (the extent to which participants felt the other’s pain) fear exerted a 
functional influence on empathic-concern (the extent to which participants felt bad for the 
other in pain). Participants exhibited a bias towards the ingroup, expressing more other-
focussed empathy in response to an ingroup target’s pain than to an outgroup target’s pain. 
However, the participants who were induced to feel fear exhibited stronger intergroup bias 
than participants in the control condition. This was driven by a decrease in empathic 
responses to outgroup targets—as shown by the significant interaction in Figure 5.15. 
Descriptively, there was a tendency for fear to increase empathy in response to the pain of 
ingroup members and to decrease empathy towards the pain of outgroup members, but the 
simple effects reveals that the overall difference between those in the fear condition and those 
in the control condition was not significant.  
To shed further light on the effects of incidental fear, I also explored whether or not 
the manipulation of fear affected group perceptions. To do so, participants completed 
measures that have been shown as relevant to intergroup relations and empathic bias (Cikara 
& Fiske, 2011). Analyses revealed that participants in the fear condition rated outgroup 
targets as significantly less sociable, less competent, and more of an outgroup (i.e., less 
overlap with the self) compared to participants in the control condition. The mood induction 
procedure, however, had no effect on how the ingroup was rated. Where some research 
suggests that fear operates to enhance positivity towards the ingroup (Bukowski & 
Dragon, 2014), taken together these findings instead suggest that when we feel afraid we 
navigate our social world primarily by increasing our distance from the outgroup.  
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In previous research, incidental negative emotions (i.e., anger) exerted a significant 
influence on automatic attitudes towards others (DeSteno et al., 2004). I found no evidence 
that fear had any such influence in Study 5. However, this may be because the mood 
induction procedure was only present during the main task and did not persist through the 
explicit or implicit measures of group perceptions. If we consider that fear was induced only 
during the main block, and that we have no way of determining whether or not it persisted 
after that, then it is not possible from these results to determine whether or not incidental fear 
influences implicit attitudes towards outgroup targets.  
In Study 6, I sought to replicate the finding that fear exacerbates intergroup bias 
specifically against the outgroup. I altered minor features of the experimental paradigm, this 
time ensuring that the mood induction procedure persisted throughout the study. In order to 
determine whether the effects observed in Study 5 are primarily driven by fear and not by 
other negative-related emotions, such as disgust—which has been shown to be a significant 
predictor of negative social evaluations (Choma et al., 2012; Hodson et al., 2013)—I 
removed any images from the mood induction procedure that may elicit disgust as well as 
fear (e.g., a fear of spiders is a common phobia not simply because spiders elicit fear but also 
because they elicit disgust; Davey, 1994).  
5.9 Study 6 
5.9.1 Method  
Design. The study followed a 2 (event: painful vs. neutral) x 2 (target identity: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (induced fear: fear vs. control) design, with the event and perceived 
identity varied within participants and induced fear varied between participants. 
Participants. Using the effect sizes from Study 5, an a-priori power analysis (G* 
Power [Version 3.1], Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) demonstrated that replicating 
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the interaction between target identity and fear manipulation, and to reach a minimum of 80% 
estimated power, would require a sample of at least 34 participants per cell in a mixed 
measures design. We therefore aimed to collect data from 68 participants in total for this 
study.  
A total of 68 healthy volunteers were recruited from the University of Exeter and 
remunerated with £3 or 0.5 course credits for their time. However, three participants 
withdrew from the study leaving a total sample of 65 participants (M age = 19.57, SD = 3.24, 
53 female). The study was approved by both the Ethics Committee of the School of 
Psychology, University of Exeter, and the Ministry of Defence Ethics Committee. Participant 
consent was obtained according to the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 
2013).  
Stimuli. The content and format of the stimuli were the same as those used in Study 
5, with the exception that I removed images that may induce disgust (e.g., spiders).   
Measures. The same measures were used as those in Study 5. To determine whether 
incidental fear had any effect on real-world outcomes such as political ideologies (as has 
been previously shown using a mortality salience manipulation, Nail, McGregor, 
Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009) or behavioural outcomes, I included a shortened 
version of the right-wing authoritarianism scale (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010) and an 
optional donation game.7  
5.9.2 Results 
Manipulation check. The mood induction procedure was successful in producing the 
expected 2 (fear vs. control) x 2 (scale: fear-related vs. positive feelings) interaction, F (1, 63) 
                                                          
7 The donation game included an entirely voluntary choice of whether or not to donate any money to charity. 
Not enough of the participants took part in this task to allow for reasonable statistical inferences, therefore these 
data were not analysed.   
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= 7.15, p = .01, = .10. That is, participants in the fear condition reported more fear-related 
feelings (M = 31.01, SD = 26.34) than participants in the control condition (M = 16.95, SD = 
18.36), t (63) = 2.50, p = .015, 95% CI [2.84, 25.29], d =.65,  whereas they reported lower 
positive feelings (M = 41.69, SD = 24.28) than those in the control condition (M = 54.66, SD 
= 27.11), t (63) = -2.03, p = .047, 95% CI [-25.74, -.20], d =.50. Of all the items in the fear 
subscale, the largest difference between the groups was in the extent to which they reported 
feeling afraid, t (63) = 2.73, p = .008, 95% CI [4.72, 30.52], d = .68, compared to anxious, t 
(63) = 2.46, p = .017, 95% CI [3.18, 30.54], d = .61, and nervous, t (63) = 1.14, p = .258, 
95% CI [-5.77, 21.18], d = .28.  
Recall task. The induction procedure did not influence the accuracy, F (1, 63) = 1.39, 
p = .243, = .02, or speed, F (1, 63) = .336, p = .564, = .005, with which participants 
identified the target’s group membership. Participants were marginally more accurate at 
identifying ingroup (M = .95, SD = .09) compared to outgroup (M = .93, SD = .10) targets, t 
(77) = 1.63, p = .099, 95% CI [-.003, .029], d = .21, and were significantly quicker at 
identifying ingroup (M = 925.87, SD = 331.430) compared to outgroup (M = 1003.80, SD = 
351.423) targets, t (63) = 4.40, p < .001, 95% CI [-113.56, -42.66], d = .23.  
Self-focussed empathy. A 2 (event) x 2 (fear) x 2 (target) mixed ANOVA revealed a 
strong main effect of event, F (1, 63) = 689.82, p <.001, ηp2 = .92: Participants reported the 
painful events to seem more painful (M = 79.62, SD = 20.36) than neutral events (M = 7.18, 
SD = 11.84), t (63) = 26.27, p < .001, 95% CI [66.94, 77.96], d = 4.35.  A main effect of 
target identity also emerged, F (1, 63) = 49.62, p < .001, = .44. Participants reported 
ingroup targets (M = 83.55, SD = 19.00) as seeming to be in more pain than outgroup targets 
(M = 75.67, SD = 20.36), t (63) = 7.05, p < .001, 95% CI [5.66, 10.14], d = .40. As in Study 
5, there was no main effect of induced fear on self-focussed empathy, F (1, 63) = .148, p = 
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.702, = .002, nor any interaction between target identity and induced fear, F (1, 63) = .921, 
p = .341, = .014.  
Other-focussed empathy. There was a strong main effect of event on other-focussed 
empathy, F (1, 63) = 484.42, p <.001, ηp2 = .89: Participants reported the painful events to 
seem more painful (M = 70.83, SD = 7.18) than neutral events (M = 9.86, SD = 14.22), t (63) 
= 22.01, p < .001, 95% CI [55.44, 66.51], d = 5.41. There was a significant main effect of 
target identity on reports of other-focussed empathy, F (1, 63) = 9.66, p = .003, = .13. 
Participants reported feeling less bad for outgroup targets in pain (M = 68.86, SD = 20.88) 
compared to ingroup others in pain (M = 72.92, SD = 17.94), t (63) = -3.11, p = .003, 95% CI 
[-6.74, -1.46], d = .21. This was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between 
target identity and induced fear, F (1, 63) = 3.31, p = .074, = .05. Participants in the fear 
condition reported significantly less empathy for outgroup targets (M = 63.84, SD = 7.23) 
than ingroup targets (M = 70.34, SD = 7.18), t (63) = -3.46, p = .001, 95% CI [-10.26, -2.74], 
d = .90, whereas there was no difference in reports from participants in the control condition, 
t (63) = -.918, p = .362, 95% CI [-5.40, 1.99], d = .07. There was no main effect of induced 
fear on other-focussed empathy, F (1, 63) = 2.67, p = .108, = .04.  
Automatic attitudes towards social groups. There was no difference in automatic 
attitudes between participants in the fear (M = .56, SD = 1.06) and control (M = .57, SD = 
1.31) conditions, t (63) = -.031, p = .975, 95% CI [-.60, .58].  
Inclusion of other in the self. There was a main effect of target group on self-other 
overlap, F (1, 63) = 21.10, p < .001, = .25. Participants reported feeling more overlap with 
their ingroup (M = 3.33, SD = 1.87) compared to the outgroup (M = 2.48, SD = 1.72), t (63) = 
4.58, p < .001, 95% CI [.48, 1.22], d = .47. There was a marginal main effect of induced fear 
on overlap ratings, F (1, 63) = 3.88, p = .053, = .06, participants in the fear condition 
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perceived more overlap with others (M = 3.29, SD = 1.99) compared to participants in the 
control condition (M = 2.52, SD = 1.65), t (63) = 1.97, p = .053, 95% CI [-.01, 1.58, d = .42. 
There was no interaction between target identity and induced fear, F (1, 63) = .428, p = .515, 
= .007.  
Group perceptions. Competence and sociability. There was no main effect of target 
group on ratings of competence, F (1, 63) = 2.33, p = .132, = .04. There was also no effect 
of induced fear, F (1, 63) = .223, p = .638, = .004, nor an interaction between the target 
identity and induced fear, F (1, 63) = .078, p = .781, = .001.  
There was a main effect of target identity on ratings of perceived sociability, F (1, 63) 
= 5.12, p = .027, = .08. Participants rated their ingroup (M = 63.76, SD = 15.81) as 
significantly more sociable than the outgroup (M = 58.23, SD = 19.39), t (63) = 2.26, p = 
.027, 95% CI [.63, 10.09], d = .31. There was no main effect of induced fear on reports of 
perceived sociability, F (1, 63) = .035, p = .852, = .001, nor was there an interaction 
between target identity and induced fear, F (1, 63) = .030, p = .863, = .00.  
Status. There was a main effect of target identity on ratings of perceived status, F (1, 
63) = 10.64, p = .002, = .15. Participants rated the outgroup (M = 61.26, SD = 27.66) as 
significantly higher in status than the ingroup (M = 38.74, SD = 27.65), t (63) = 3.26, p = 
.002, 95% CI [8.74, 36.36], d = .81. There was no main effect of induced fear on ratings of 
perceived status, F (1, 63) = .001, p = .998, = .000, and no interaction between target 
identity and induced fear, F (1, 63) = .065, p = .800 = .001. 
Similarity and rivalry. There was no effect of induced fear on reports of the perceived 
similarity between the ingroup and the outgroup, t (63) = -1.19, p = .240, 95% CI [--18.99, 
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4.84], d = .29, nor ratings of perceived rivalry, t (63) = -.354, p = .724, 95% CI [-18.35, 
12.82], d = .09.  
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Figure 5.177. Mean self-reported ratings of self-other overlap in response to ingroup and 
outgroup targets, while receiving cues to induce fear vs. control from Chapter 5, Study 6. 
Error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 4.8. Summary of means, standard deviations, and correlations for scores on perceived competence, sociability, status, similarity with the ingroup, rivalry with the 
ingroup, self-reported empathy, self-other overlap, and implicit bias score split by the between groups manipulation of the presence of fear stimuli from Chapter 5, Study 6 
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Competence 63.59 23.51 — 1. Competence 66.30 19.91 —
2. Sociability 63.76 15.81 .24 — 2. Sociability 63.43 18.86 .75** —
3. Status 37.84 23.90 .25 .12 — 3. Status 39.61 31.22 .22 .18 —
4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A — 4. Similarity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —
5. Rivalry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A — 5. Rivalry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A —
6. Other-focussed 70.34 17.18 .03 -.22 -.004 N/A N/A — 6. Other-focussed 75.32 24.11 -.03 .23 -.22 N/A N/A —
7. Self-focussed 85.03 12.59 .56** .26 -.10 N/A N/A .06 — 7. Self-focussed 82.12 23.75 -.16 .13 -.21 N/A N/A .95** —
8. IOS 3.78 1.99 .07 .31 .28 N/A N/A -.31 .04 — 8. IOS 2.88 1.65 .35* .52** .34 N/A N/A .25 .12 —
9. D .56 1.06 -.14 .08 .03 N/A N/A -.45* -.09 .29 — 9. D .57 1.31 -.04 -.06 -.13 N/A N/A -.04 -.05 .03 —
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Competence 59.97 20.15 — 1. Competence 61.06 15.80 —
2. Sociability 58.81 16.93 .86** — 2. Sociability 57.67 21.77 .76** —
3. Status 62.16 23.90 .31 .23 — 3. Status 60.39 31.22 .19 .09 —
4. Similarity 60.53 26.25 .27 .36* .23 — 4. Similarity 67.61 21.67 .21 .15 .52** —
5. Rivalry 35.81 31.44 .14 .04 -.27 -.37* — 5. Rivalry 38.58 31.43 -.39* -.39* -.69**-.55** —
6. Other-focussed 63.84 7.23 .29 .20 .11 .12 .06 — 6. Other-focussed 73.72 27.78 .29 .38* .39* .22 -.34 —
7. Self-focussed 76.06 13.01 .190 .26 .14 .05 -.15 .21 — 7. Self-focussed 75.29 25.79 .30 .29 .33 .22 -.29 .93** —
8. IOS 2.81 1.96 .37* .21 -.11 .15 .06 .13 .08 — 8. IOS 2.15 1.39 -.09 -.08 -.03 -.26 .29 .12 .16 —
9. D .56 1.06 .10 .11 -.03 .12 -.09 -.13 .008 .30 — 9. D .57 1.31 .20 .33 .13 .17 -.16 .02 -.05 .08 —
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
Outgroup
Ingroup
Fear No fear
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5.9.3 Discussion  
The goal of the current study was to replicate the finding that fear exacerbates 
intergroup bias specifically against the outgroup, while controlling for other factors that can 
drive negativity towards outgroups (i.e., disgust). The results revealed that, as in Study 5, 
participants felt worse while viewing ingroup members in pain than viewing outgroup 
members in pain. There was also an interaction between the identity of the target and induced 
fear on self-reported empathy for the other, although this time it was only marginally 
significant. Specifically, participants felt less empathy towards the pain of an outgroup 
member than an ingroup member, but only if they were exposed to images designed to prime 
fear.  
Participants rated the ingroup as more sociable than the outgroup, and the outgroup as 
higher status than the ingroup, regardless of the fear induction procedure. Participants felt 
more overlap with the ingroup than the outgroup, but when primed to feel fear they reported 
more general overlap with others (regardless of the target’s group membership). In Study 5, 
there was a clear tendency for fear to drive negative evaluations of the outgroup (less 
sociable, less competent, and less overlap with the self) but in Study 6 fear had no such 
effect. The largest difference between Study 5 and Study 6 is that in Study 6, the induction 
procedure persisted throughout measures of group perceptions and I controlled for the 
possibility that the induction procedure might elicit feelings of disgust. In this case, it is 
possible that in Study 5 negative evaluations of the outgroup were driven by feelings of 
disgust. This is consistent with research that demonstrates the moderating effect disgust has 
in predicting negative social evaluations (Choma et al., 2012; Hodson et al., 2013).  
5.9 Conclusion 
Across two studies I show, for the first time, that priming incidental feelings of fear is 
sufficient to elicit intergroup bias in empathy, specifically against the outgroup (i.e., reduced 
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empathy for outgroup targets), rather than increased empathy for ingroup targets. This is 
consistent with previous research showing that whether or not the outgroup is truly 
responsible for our feelings of fear, we exhibit prejudice towards them as if they are 
(Cain, 2012; Choma et al., 2012; Hodson et al., 2013). It is also consistent with previous 
accounts that show that fear of the outgroup’s encroachment on ‘us’ precedes increases 
in derogation and prejudicial practices against ‘them’ (Quillian, 1995).  
Interestingly, these findings speak to recent documented cases where, following a 
terrorist attack, communities and nations come together and exhibit extraordinary 
solidarity with one another. For example, following the 2017 attack in Manchester 
(England) tributes were held across Europe, Asia, Australia, Canada, and America, in a 
coming together in ‘solidarity with the people of Manchester’ (Yarwood, 2017). This 
highlights a re-categorisation from ‘us’ as individual nations to ‘us’ as possible victims 
to terrorism. But, that shift in solidarity is wedded to an up-rise in a collective opposition 
to ‘them’. For example, following the attack in the UK national leaders expressed a 
strengthened resolve to work together against those who ‘execute such inhuman acts’ 
(Henley, 2017). Together with my findings, this demonstrates that beneath an exterior of 
ingroup love and solidarity is a pernicious prejudice towards the groups associated with 
the perpetrators of terror attacks. The notion of a group, however, is a moving target. 
When people are afraid they perceive the world not in terms of one’s racial, cultural, or 
national group memberships but simply in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
 
 6 The Role of Individual Differences in Intergroup Empathy 
Empathy is an important social glue that helps personal relationships and social bonds 
to form and endure in a variety of contexts (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). But 
individuals vary markedly in their ability to empathise with another’s suffering. Indeed, one 
scholar suggests that an individual’s capacity for empathy may be represented along a bell 
curve starting at ‘level 0,’ where the individual has no empathy at all, to ‘level 6,’ where the 
individual is hypervigilant of another’s emotions (Baron-Cohen, 2011). Empathy also appears 
to ebb and flow according to a variety of contextual factors, such as when sharing another’s 
burden comes with a cost (Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994) or when it interferes in competing 
during intergroup conflict (Cikara & Paluck, 2013). But what determines our capacity for 
empathy? And to what extent do individual differences affect our tendency to exhibit 
empathy towards some people more than others? In this chapter, I consider two perspectives, 
one that suggests empathy is fixed, a hardwired product of our biology and genetics; the 
other, that empathy is fluidly determined by our goals and motivations. I present a ‘mini 
meta-analysis’, using data from the studies outlined in this thesis, to demonstrate that 
regardless of individual differences people respond to another’s pain on the basis of a shared 
group membership, empathising more with the pain of an ingroup member than an outgroup 
member.   
6.1 Empathy Is Hard-wired 
To some extent, our capacity for empathy is determined by factors that are not within 
our control. For example, individuals with a clinical diagnosis of psychopathy or autistic 
spectrum disorder commonly suffer deficits in specific facets of empathy (perspective-taking 
and empathic concern, respectively; Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010). 
Likewise, Marsh and colleagues (2014) identified that one’s biological make-up determines 
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why a certain minority of people seem to be drawn to helping others when it seems to come 
at a significant cost to themselves. Using structural and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), researchers scanned the brains of people who had previously donated a 
kidney to a stranger (people whom the researchers termed ‘extraordinary altruists’). 
Researchers found that they could distinguish the brains of extraordinary altruists from 
control participants by the enhanced volume of a particular region of the limbic system (a 
system that is thought to have evolved in early mammals), the right amygdala. Correlative 
evidence demonstrates that the amygdala is most commonly associated with emotional 
processing and is generally smaller in individuals who have a disorder that is characterised by 
low empathy (i.e., psychopathy; Pardini, Raine, Erickson, & Loeber, 2014). Marsh and 
colleagues concluded that extraordinary altruism (i.e., acts of self-sacrifice that have no 
conceivable gains) is indeed a product of our biology, that caring for other’s welfare is 
determined by rigid ancient mammalian neural architectures that promote evolutionary 
processes such as kin selection and reciprocity. Enhanced volume within these neural 
structures also relates to how we rate our own capacity for empathy, at a trait level (Banissy, 
Kanai, Walsh, & Rees, 2012).  
The interpersonal reactivity index (IRI; Davis, 1980) is a well-known measure of trait 
empathy that consists of several subscales. These are Personal Distress (PD; the degree to 
which people feel anxiety while observing other’s negative experiences), Empathic-Concern 
(EC; the tendency to have sympathetic feelings towards others), Perspective-Taking (PT; the 
ability to take the perspective of others), and Fantasy (FS; the tendency to identify with 
fictional characters). People who typically score high on the IRI are more likely to behave 
pro-socially towards others (e.g., by helping victims of bullying) compared to those who 
score low on it, who behave more antisocially towards others (e.g., by perpetrating bullying; 
Gini, Albiero, Benelli, & Altoe, 2007). Crucially, researchers found that scores on this scale 
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relate to one’s physiological responses to another’s pain. Specifically, individuals who score 
higher on the EC subscale of the IRI exhibit more muscular activity associated with 
grimacing (Sun, Wang, Wang, & Luo, 2015) and activity in brain regions associated with 
empathy (Singer et al., 2004) when viewing another person in pain, than an individual who 
scores lower on the IRI. People who score higher on the IRI also have structurally larger 
volume in brain regions associated with empathy, compared to those who score lower on the 
IRI (Banissy et al., 2012). Specifically, scores on the PD and EC subscales correlate 
positively with grey matter volume in the insula cortex whereas scores on the PT subscale 
correlate with volume in the anterior cingulate, and scores on the FS subscale with volume in 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that our propensity to empathise 
with another’s pain is determined by the development of our underlying biology, and to a 
certain extent, this is passed down in our genetic makeup.  
In a recent and large-scale meta-analysis researchers sought to demonstrate the extent 
to which one’s genetic inheritance can predict performance on a test of cognitive empathy 
(Warrier et al., 2017). Participants were asked to complete the ‘Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes’ task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). This task involves 
identifying the emotions or mental states of another person using photographs that show only 
the other’s eyes. In a sample of over 88,000 individuals, researchers found that women 
performed slightly better than men in the ‘Eyes test,’ but there was no significant difference 
between men and women in the extent to which this was explained by genetic inheritance. 
Furthermore, using a separate sample of twin individuals (N = 749), researchers found that 
roughly 28% of the variance in performance on the Eyes test was inherited through genetics. 
This suggests that to some extent one’s capacity for empathy is handed down through 
genetics: Roughly a third of one’s ability to infer emotions from another’s expressions is 
inherited through our biological make-up and being female appears to provide an advantage 
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over males. However, given that there was no difference in heritability between men and 
women and, in twins, only a third of variance in cognitive empathy was explained by genetic 
inheritance, it seems likely that cognitive empathy is also influenced by experiences 
encountered in the social world. Indeed, there is newly emerging evidence that empathy can 
be trained (Teding van Berkhout & Malouff, 2016) and ample evidence that empathy can be 
flexibly recruited according to the situational needs and motivations of the individual, such as 
the expectations or demands about how we should behave towards others.  
6.2 Empathy Is Socially Constructed 
Women are perceived to be more empathic than men (Pinker, 2009). As previously 
highlighted, women outperform men in cognitive measures of empathy, respond more to 
others’ distress (Davis, 1983), exhibit more sensitivity to others’ facial expressions (Hall & 
Matsumoto, 2004), and attend more towards others’ thoughts than men do (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). However, these differences do not necessarily 
reflect a greater innate capacity for empathy in women compared to men, they can also reflect 
differences in their social motivations. One team showed that the only occasions when men 
and women differed in empathy ratings was when measurement followed gender-role 
priming (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000; Klein & Hodges, 1993; Laurent & Hodges, 2009). 
Indeed, women routinely self-report being more empathic than men, but when you remove 
the filter of response control, and measure empathy using implicit measures, the difference 
between men and women disappears (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). In terms of the biological 
architecture that supports cognitive processes such as empathy, there is always overlap 
between males and females ‘confirming that the human brain cannot…be described as 
sexually dimorphic’ (Ritchie et al., 2017, p. 8). Differences between men and women emerge 
only when gender-based expectations are made salient that women should be empathic and 
men should not (Cross & Madson, 1997). 
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Consistent with a motivational account of gender-based differences in empathy, 
Thomas and Maio (2008) found they were able to eliminate the empathy-gender gap by 
persuading male participants of the value of empathy-relevant aspects of a traditional 
feminine gender role. The researchers suggested to heterosexual male participants that a man 
who is in touch with his feminine side is more attractive to women—thereby making empathy 
more compatible with male identity. Participants who received this message were more 
accurate in a task that involved perspective-taking than participants who were either 
challenged to debunk the stereotype that men are less empathic or were given no message at 
all. This suggests that rather than being hard-wired, empathy can at least temporarily be 
altered according to a situation.  
One’s capacity for empathy can also be changed more permanently, at a trait level. 
Individuals who dedicate their lives to the caring of others, for example as physicians, have a 
natural gift for tuning into how others are feeling (characterised as ‘level 6’ on Baron-
Cohen’s empathy curve, 2012). But at some point during training to become physicians that 
appears to change drastically. In a 3-year longitudinal study, researchers found that while 
naturally high levels of empathy may draw individuals to begin training in medicine, they 
suffer a substantial decline in empathy in their final year (Hojat et al., 2009). Intuitively, one 
can see why that might happen: Whether during surgery, drawing blood, or delivering news 
of terminal illness, the job of being a physician requires inflicting pain on others. The last 
thing you want to do in those circumstances is to feel suffering with the patient (i.e., 
experience-sharing); to wince when cutting into them with a scalpel.  Likewise, it would be 
detrimental for physicians to always feel for their patients (i.e., empathic concern). Doing so 
leads to what healthcare workers refer to as ‘burnout’ or compassion fatigue (Abendroth, 
2006; Lombardo & Eyre, 2010; Mathieu, 2007; Sabo, 2006). Of course, a physician needs to 
be in tune with their patient’s suffering (to assess how much pain their patients are in) and 
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they need to exhibit a caring bedside manner, but being too empathic in these ways can 
hamper a physician’s ability to treat their patient. To curtail the stress that accompanies 
persistent empathy, healthcare workers dehumanise their patients and assess their pain only in 
terms of primary emotions (Vaes & Muratore, 2013). This, however, denies patients of their 
humanity and can result in the treatment of others as cold, unfeeling machines (Haslam, 
2006) and can give rise to acts that would otherwise be considered harmful (Bandura, 2002; 
Bandura et al., 1975). 
The above research points to the notion that empathy is not necessarily the product of 
innate differences between individuals but a product of our motivations. Zaki (2014) makes a 
compelling case for this, suggesting that empathy is not a static phenomenon but one to that 
we may approach or avoid according to the features of our situation, our experiences, and our 
relationships to others. This can include whether the situation is perceived to be costly either 
in terms of affective burden (such as in the case of the physician and their suffering patient) 
or when empathy is expected or desired (such as in the case of women being stereotyped as 
caring and maternal). But regardless of who we are, or who we perceive ourselves to be, we 
all adapt our empathic processing from time to time. 
6.3 Approaching and Avoiding Empathy  
There are many reasons for why we might approach or avoid empathy; for example, 
we might want to broadcast our understanding while consoling a grieving friend. On the other 
hand, we might want to avoid the negative affect that we might catch while interacting with 
someone in dire straits, for example, someone who lives on the street. Empathy is a fluid 
emotion—sometimes it’s a useful tool to understand others, other times it can get in our way.  
Empathy reduces the chance of achieving success in negotiations (Galinsky, Maddux, 
Gilin, & White, 2008). For people who score highly on trait narcissism, it’s particularly easy 
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to avoid feeling bad for opponents because getting ahead is more important to them than 
getting along (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). Empathy can also reduce our chance of success 
during intergroup competitions (Cikara & Paluck, 2013). Feeling what one’s opponent feels 
is not motivationally congruent with the desire to get ahead of them, particularly when 
getting ahead means having to inflict harm upon the other for example, throwing a punch in a 
boxing match or delivering a brutal tackle in rugby or football.  
In a competitive context, members of our team help us achieve success but members 
of the other team stand in our way, therefore we feel more empathy for ‘us’ (the ingroup) 
than we do for ‘them’ (the outgroup)—this is referred to as ‘empathic bias’ (for a review see 
Vanman, 2016). Empathic bias can take a variety of forms from simply feeling disregard 
when a member of an outgroup suffers a negative event (Stürmer et al., 2006, 2005) to 
feeling joy at the sight of it (i.e., Schadenfreude; Cikara, Botvinick, et al., 2011; Hein et al., 
2010; Leach et al., 2003).  
6.4 Intergroup Empathy 
The tendency to show preference towards members of our group over members of 
other groups is explained by notions from the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). This theory suggests that behaviour can be represented in terms of a bipolar 
continuum. At the interpersonal pole, behaviour is determined by the character and 
motivations of the individual, as an individual, and at the opposite intergroup pole behaviour 
is determined by an individual’s group memberships. Social identity becomes an integral 
aspect of an individual’s sense of ‘who they are.’ As a consequence, individuals perceive 
themselves not in terms of individual characteristics but as members of a group (‘us’), which 
they are motivated to perceive as different from, and as better than, other groups (‘them’). 
SIT asserts that we must do more than study the psychology of individuals as individuals, but 
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must understand how, when, and why individuals define themselves in terms of their group 
memberships and how these memberships affect behaviour. In line with these notions, I am 
interested in how differences in empathy at the individual level influence the biases in 
empathy that we exhibit at the collective level. Does the manner by which we construct a 
personal identity through interpersonal processes, such as empathy, interact with our 
behaviour in an intergroup context? 
Some research points towards the importance of individual attitudes in shaping 
collective level affect, such as one’s commitment (Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell, Kellett, 
Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998) and identification with the group (Tanghe, Wisse, & van der 
Flier, 2010). Likewise, scores on the emotional contagion scale (Doherty, 1997), which has 
items such as ‘Being with a happy person picks me up when I’m down,’ have a moderating 
effect on individual capacity to share state affect with fellow members of a team (Ilies, 
Wagner, & Morgeson, 2007). In one unpublished study, Pearson and Dovidio (2008) found 
that participants who scored higher in the EC subscale of the IRI showed less empathy 
towards the perpetrator of a physical assault, compared to participants who scored low in EC. 
However, this was only the case when the perpetrator was a member of an outgroup (a fan of 
a rival sports team) and not a member of the salient ingroup (a fan of the team that the 
participant supported).  
Intuitively, one might expect that being more empathic at a personal level means one 
should be more resonant with others’ pain and suffering, regardless of who the other is and 
which groups they belong to. However, interpersonal and intergroup behaviour is guided by 
slightly different motives. Indeed, one can pursue the individual goal of living and treating 
others without prejudice, but this can interfere with a collective goal of achieving success in 
intergroup competition. It is likely, then, that the manner by which we construct a personal 
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self will drive our overall levels of empathy but will have little or no effect on the biases we 
exhibit at the collective level.  
6.5 This Study 
Very little research has been conducted that focuses on the role of individual 
differences in intergroup empathy. The studies that do include a measure of trait empathy 
often do so only as a side note (e.g., see Azevedo et al., 2013; Mathur et al., 2010; Montalan 
et al., 2012; Singer et al., 2004) and the findings are inconsistent with regards to which 
subscale relates with behavioural empathy. For example, Montalan, Lelard, Godefroy, and 
Mouras (2012) found the degree of behavioural empathy bias in favour of one’s ingroup was 
related to scores on the EC subscale, whereas Mathur and colleagues (2010) found it was 
related to scores on PT subscale. It is unclear whether and how trait empathy influences 
behavioural responses to the pain of an ingroup and outgroup member.  
To determine whether scores on measures of trait empathy have any bearing on 
intergroup empathic bias, I asked participants to complete the IRI (Davis, 1980) following a 
task involving self-reported empathy towards ingroup and outgroup targets. I collected 
responses across six separate studies (reported in full in the preceding chapters of this thesis) 
and present the data here in a set of ‘mini’ meta-analyses. ‘Mini-metas’ use the same 
statistical approach as any meta-analysis but can be run on as few as two datasets. The goal of 
a mini-meta is to draw attention towards effect sizes and away from p-values, highlighting 
the ‘bottom line’ of a set of studies within a manuscript (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). 
Using the approach described in the primer by Goh and colleagues (2016), I used mini-metas 
to demonstrate support for the hypothesis that, regardless of how participants self-report their 
own trait empathy, a shared group membership will confer an empathic advantage when 
responding to another’s pain. Specifically, I expected that there would be a positive 
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relationship between ratings of trait empathy and empathic responding to other’s pain overall, 
but I expected that there would be no significant relationship between ratings of trait empathy 
and scores of empathic bias. I also present a mini meta-analysis to show that, over the course 
of six studies, gender had no predictive effects on the extent to which participants expressed 
empathy towards another’s suffering.  
6.5.1 Results 
Gender. Gender differences were calculated using independent t-tests. Gender was 
coded as 0 = male and 1 = female, and any effect size with positive value would therefore 
indicate that women self-reported more empathy than men, and any effect size with negative 
value would indicate that men self-reported more empathy than women.  
To produce a summary effect size for the effect of gender on self-reported empathy 
for each study, I calculated Cohen’s d using Formula 2 from Goh et al. (2016) for non-equal 
group sizes: 
𝑑 =  
𝑡 (𝑛1 + 𝑛2)
√𝑑𝑓  √𝑛1 𝑛2
 
I converted d scores to r using Formula 4 from Goh et al. (2016), where P refers to the 
proportion of the sample in one group (e.g., number of females divided by the total sample 
size) and Q refers to the proportion of the sample in the other group (e.g., number of men 
divided by the total sample size):  
𝑟 =  √
𝑑2 
𝑑2 +  
1
𝑃 ∗ 𝑄
 
I then used Formula 5 to create a single weighted mean from the r scores:  
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𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟?̅? =  
∑([𝑁 − 3] 𝑟𝑧)
∑(𝑁 − 3)
 
Finally, to create a summary Z-score for all of the studies in each analysis I used Stouffer’s 
formula (Mosteller & Bush, 1954) where k refers to the number of independent Z scores 
being combined: 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑍 =  
∑ 𝑍
√𝑘
 
The results revealed that there were no differences between female and male 
participants in self-reported empathy in any of the studies, across the studies combined, or for 
any of the targets.  
Table 6.1. Summary of results from the meta-analysis on participant sex outlined in Chapter 6 
 
Summary of participant demographics in each study 
    Gender Age 
 N f : m M SD 
Study 1 41 30 : 11 19.68 0.81 
Study 2 64 46 : 18 19.89 2.42 
Study 3 39 26 : 13 19.25 1.24 
Study 4 69 42 : 27 20.57 3.04 
Study 5 78 66 : 12 19.42 2.99 
Study 6 65 53 : 12 19.57 3.24 
         
Gender differences in empathy towards others (ingroup + outgroup targets) 
   N t df p  Cohen’s d r 
Study 1 41 -0.353 39 .726 -0.11 .06 
Study 2 64 -0.079 62 .938 -0.02 .01 
Study 3 39 0.014 37 .989 0.00 .00 
Study 4 69 0.191 67 .849 0.05 .02 
Study 5 78 -0.664 76 .509 -0.15 .08 
Study 6 65 0.321 63 .749 0.08 .04 
M r
z
      .03 
M r      .03 
Combined Z     0.68  
 Gender differences in empathy towards ingroup targets 
Study 1 41  0.516 39   .609  0.17 .08 
Study 2 64 -0.453 62   .652 -0.12 .06 
Study 3 39  0.116 37   .909  0.04 .02 
Study 4 69  0.581 67   .563  0.14 .07 
Study 5 78 -0.631 76 .530 -0.14 .07 
Study 6 65 0.609 63 .544 0.15 .08 
M r
z
 
     .06 
M r      .06 
Combined Z     1.21 
Gender differences in empathy towards outgroup targets 
Study 1 41  -0.567 39 .574 -0.18 .09 
Study 2 64 0.14 62 .889  0.04 .02 
Study 3 39  -0.245 37 .808 -0.08 .04 
Study 4 69 -1.37 67 .174 -0.33 .17 
Study 5 78  -0.581 76 .563 -0.13 .07 
Study 6 65 .053 63 .958 0.01 .01 
M r
z
 
     .04 
M r      .04 
Combined Z     1.26  
Gender differences in intergroup empathic bias (ingroup – outgroup) 
Study 1 41  1.08 39 .287  0.35 .17 
Study 2 64 -1.22 62 .226 -0.31 .15 
Study 3 39    0.117 37 .908  0.04 .02 
Study 4 69  1.07 67 .291  0.26 .13 
Study 5 78 -0.06 76 .954 -0.01 .01 
Study 6 65 .912 63 .365 0.23 .11 
M r
z
 
     .08 
M r      .08 
Combined Z     1.82
+
 
Note: In all analyses, men were coded as 0 and women as 1Correlations in the last column were calculated from 
t values using Formula 3. M r
z
 = weighted mean correlation (Fisher’s z transformed). M r = weighted mean 
correlation (converted from r
z 
to r). Positive Cohen’s d and positive correlation coefficients indicate that more 
empathy is shown for ingroup, compared to the outgroup, pain. 
+
p =.06, two-tailed. 
 
Trait empathy. The steps outlined above were also used to analyse the relationship 
between scores on measures of trait empathy and behavioural ratings, with the exception that 
the scores were already correlations, therefore the conversion between d and r was not 
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necessary. The results revealed that there was a significantly positive relationship between 
scores on three subscales of the IRI (Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy) and 
self-reported empathy for targets from the ingroup and the outgroup. There was no however 
no relationship between scores on any subscale of the IRI and scores of empathic bias (i.e., 
ingroup – outgroup). 
Table 6.2. Summary of results from the meta-analysis on trait empathy outlined in Chapter 6 
Correlations between empathy towards others (collapsed responses to both ingroup and 
outgroup targets) and scores on the IRI 
  
N 
Empathic 
Concern 
Perspective 
Taking 
Personal 
Distress 
Fantasy 
Study 2 64 -.11 .04 .06 .03 
Study 4 69 .54 .08 .27 .44 
Study 5 78 .43 .12 .27 .38 
Study 6 65 .17 .19 .15 -.07 
M rz 
 
.36 .09 .23 .33 
M r 
 
.35 .09 .23 .32 
Combined Z      4.39*** 1.79*     3.16***       3.34*** 
 
Correlations between ratings of empathy towards ingroup targets and scores on the IRI 
Study 2 64 -.09 -.03 .09 .02 
Study 4 69 .50 -.01 .26 .42 
Study 5 78 .49 .19 .19 .41 
Study 6 65 .15 .24 .13 -.08 
M r
z
 
 
.39 .09 .19 .34 
M r  .37 .09 .19 .33 
Combined Z     4.49*** 1.64    2.80**     3.31*** 
Correlations between ratings of empathy towards outgroup targets and scores on the IRI 
Study 2 64 .03 .08 .04 .03 
Study 4 69 .54 .12 .26 .43 
Study 5 78 .38 .15 .21 .37 
Study 6 65 .17 .14 .17 -.06 
M r
z
  .37 .13 .19 .32 
M r  .35 .13 .19 .31 
Combined Z     4.73*** 2.05    2.85**     3.30*** 
 
 Correlations between empathic bias (ingroup – outgroup) and scores on the IRI  
Study 2 64  .03 -.21  .14 -.01 
Study 4 69 -.14 -.32  .06 -.09 
Study 5 78  .26  .20 -.13  .14 
Study 6 65 -.08 .14 -.11 -.02 
M r
z
 
 
 .11 -.03 -.02  .05 
M r   .11 -.03 -.02  .05 
Combined Z 0.36 -.72 -.21 0.12 
Note: M rz = weighted mean correlation (Fisher’s z transformed). M r = weighted mean correlation (converted 
from rz to r). **p <.01, two-tailed. ***p <.001, two-tailed. 
 
6.5.2 Discussion  
 The goal of the above analysis was to demonstrate that individual differences would 
have little or no predictive effects on intergroup empathic bias. I expected that regardless of 
the participant’s gender or how participants scored on measures of trait empathy, having a 
shared group membership with the target would confer an empathic advantage when 
responding to their pain. The results demonstrate that over the course of six studies, gender 
had no significant effects on self-reported empathy overall or when responding specifically to 
the pain of an ingroup or outgroup target. The effect of gender on ingroup bias, however, 
approached statistical significance such that female participants were marginally more likely 
to exhibit an ingroup bias than male participants.  
Analysing the effect of trait empathy on behavioural ratings, I observed that scores on 
three subscales of the IRI had a positive relationship with self-reported ratings of empathy in 
response to another’s pain. Specifically, scoring higher on EC, PD, and FS correlated with 
higher self-reported ratings of empathy when responding to the pain of an ingroup or 
outgroup target. Interestingly, the only subscale that did not significantly correlate with 
behavioural empathy was PT. This is contrary to the idea that ‘walking a mile in another’s 
shoes’ can promote positive outcomes between individuals (Galinsky et al., 2008). But it is 
consistent with a recent study showing that adopting another’s perspective can result in 
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negative intergroup consequences when the other is perceived as too different from the self or 
when doing so elicits unfavourable or upwards comparisons (Sassenrath, Hodges, & 
Pfattheicher, 2016). In line with my predictions, there was no relationship between scores on 
any subscale of the IRI and empathic bias. That is, participants’ ratings of their own trait 
empathy had no relationship with their behaviour towards others in an intergroup context.   
There are a number of limitations in the scales that are typically used to measure trait 
empathy, including those used here.  First and foremost, responses to these scales are highly 
susceptible to social desirability. Because empathy is viewed as a positive trait (Schumann, 
Zaki, & Dweck, 2014) people tend to rate themselves as reliably above average on 
qualities related to empathy and those related to it, such as generosity (Epley & Dunning, 
2000). This positive image of the self confers psychological benefits to the individual 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988) thus, given the opportunity, individuals will confirm an identity 
that presents them as highly empathic. 
Specifically with regard to the IRI, Jordan, Amir, and Bloom (2016) have discussed 
how this scale neglects aspects of empathy that refer to the more experience-sharing 
quality that emerges when observing the suffering of another, as opposed to feelings of 
compassion or sympathy. Some items of the PD subscale do point to notions of affect 
sharing, for example, ‘When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go 
to pieces.’ However, the majority of items reflect more an individual’s feelings of 
personal anxiety that arise in response to tense situations rather than in response to other 
people’s anxiety per se, for example, ‘In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and 
ill-at-ease.’ In other scales, such as the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004) some items more accurately reflect experience-sharing such as ‘seeing people cry 
doesn’t really upset me’ but other items in that scale confound this with other processes 
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involved in social interaction such as ‘I find it hard to know what to do in a social 
situation’, therefore scores on this scale reflect a variety of interpersonal processes that 
extend past empathy.  
The findings from this meta-analysis show that trait empathy, as it is most commonly 
assessed in the literature, reliably predicts behavioural responses to another’s pain. For 
the first time, however, I demonstrate that trait empathy has no predictive value over an 
individual’s tendency to express more empathy towards an ingroup target, compared to 
an outgroup target. I also demonstrate that despite the expectation that women are more 
empathic than men, there was no reliable effect of the participant’s sex on self -reported 
empathy. These results are consistent with the notion that empathy is not purely 
determined by our biology or individual differences, but rather depending on situational 
and motivational factors.  
6.6 Conclusion  
 Research on the role of individual differences in empathy suggest that the more 
one perceives oneself as empathic, the more one exhibits pro-social behaviours towards 
others. However, notions from SIT suggest that in an intergroup context, individual goals  
(such as treating others without prejudice) can interfere with collective goals (such as 
taking part in intergroup competition). Thus, no matter how someone constructs a 
personal sense of who they are, they behave towards others according to salient group 
memberships. With regard to empathy, a shared group membership confers an empathic 
advantage when responding to another’s pain and suffering, therefore it was expected 
that there would be no relationship between self-reported ratings of trait empathy and 
empathic bias in favour of ‘us’ over ‘them.’ In the meta-analysis outlined in this chapter, 
I provide evidence that participant gender had no predictive effects on behavioural 
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responding to another’s pain, regardless of whether the other was a member of the 
ingroup or an outgroup. I also presented evidence that while scores on three subscales of 
the IRI (EC, PD, and FS, but not PT) had a positive relationship with behavioural 
empathy, scoring highly in trait empathy in no way buffered or negated the tendency to 
show favour towards members of the salient ingroup over members of an outgroup.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 7 General Discussion 
The research presented in this thesis has focussed on the importance of intergroup 
relations when empathising with members of the ingroup and specific outgroups. Converging 
evidence suggests that empathy is not strictly reserved only for ingroup members and not for 
outgroup members. Rather, empathy is influenced by our expectations about a person based 
on their group membership, such as the extent to which we expect them to be warm or 
competent (Cikara & Fiske, 2011) and the extent to which we believe they are a relevant 
competitor to us (Chang et al., 2016; Cikara et al., 2014). The impetus for my research is 
derived from limitations in this literature regarding the intergroup contexts that are typically 
used. Specifically 1) often this research uses contexts that prime intergroup biases in 
empathy, such as minimal group paradigms in a context where there are no beliefs about the 
target group and where empathy is measured in relation to an ingroup and a single outgroup 
(i.e., ‘us’ vs. ‘them’), not multiple outgroups to which the ingroup might relate differently 
(i.e., ‘us’ vs. high-status ‘them’ and vs. low-status ‘them’), and 2) other times, research on 
this topic focuses on racial group contexts that tap into pre-existing beliefs that are 
confounded by visually salient cues to categorisation (such as different skin colours and 
physiognomies). My goal with this thesis was to determine whether or not empathic biases 
emerge specifically according to beliefs about an outgroup, separate from any cues that might 
mark difference. At a broader level, I investigated whether and how empathy is influenced by 
a number of different contextual factors.  
7.1 Summary of findings 
In Chapter 1, I gave a broad introduction to the topic of this thesis, framed the 
research within its historical context, and highlighted the empirical perspectives through 
which I conducted my research.  
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In Chapter 2, I gave a detailed review of the extant literature and in doing so raised 
key questions and laid down important arguments for how we interpret the findings on 
intergroup empathy. These include not only the need to recognise the importance of identity 
content, but also to account for confounding variables present in studies of intergroup 
empathy. The aim of the present thesis was to begin rectifying these oversights.  
In Chapter 3, I outlined my own approach to answering my research question in light 
of the identified limitations. In Study 1, I sought to establish a context in which I could 
measure empathy towards targets from different groups, groups that differed in how they 
related to the salient ingroup, but in relation to which categorisation is not visually marked. 
The results demonstrated that there was a bias in favour of the salient ingroup on several 
measures of group perception important to intergroup relations. Results also showed that 
some of the outgroups were not perceived to be equal to the ingroup and that the outgroups 
themselves were not all rated as equal to each other. In Study 2, I investigated whether self-
reported empathy for targets in pain would differ according to their ostensible membership in 
one of the social groups examined in Study 1. With the results of Study 2, I presented initial 
evidence that intergroup biases in self-reports of empathy were driven by the context specific 
to a given ingroup-outgroup relation (such as beliefs about a group) rather than simply an 
ingroup-outgroup distinction. Ratings of empathy were significantly higher towards targets 
who shared both group categorisations with the salient ingroup (i.e., both a student and from 
Exeter) relative to targets who differed in one of those dimensions (i.e., a worker from Exeter 
or a student from elsewhere). At the same time, there was no difference in the degree of 
empathy given to targets from the ingroup and the outgroup that differed in both dimensions 
of categorisation (i.e., a worker from elsewhere).  
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In Chapter 4, I presented evidence from two neuroimaging studies to show that 
context-specific biases also influence empathy at a (non-controllable) neurological level. 
Participants exhibited more empathy-related brain activity while observing targets 
experiencing painful, compared to neutral, events but not when the target was a member of 
the relatively more competitive outgroup. Participants also exhibited more overall empathy-
related brain activation when directly comparing responses to targets from the ingroup or the 
relatively less competitive outgroup to targets from the relatively more competitive outgroup. 
That is, empathy biases at the level of brain activation to a target’s pain were observed only 
in relation to one of the two outgroups examined—the outgroup perceived as a rival to the 
ingroup.  
  The two studies presented in Chapter 5 investigated whether empathic bias is 
influenced by another type of threat (i.e., fear that is incidental to an intergroup context). 
These studies tested the hypothesis that fear would exacerbate empathic bias specifically in 
the direction of outgroup hate. That is, using a minimal group paradigm, I expected that, 
at baseline, participants would report more empathy towards members of the salient 
ingroup than towards members of the outgroup, replicating prior research. However, I 
expected this distance to increase when participants were induced to feel fear, compared 
to when they were not induced to feel fear. It was unclear whether fear would lead to 
increased empathy towards the ingroup or decreased empathy towards the outgroup. 
Results revealed that participants reported an increase in outgroup distancing and decrease 
in empathy for the outgroup’s pain, following inductions to feel fear. Empathy for targets 
from the ingroup was unaffected by the fear manipulation. 
 Finally in Chapter 6, I presented meta-analyses of the role of individual differences in 
intergroup empathy. I provided evidence that neither the participant’s gender nor their 
scores on a widely used and reliable measure of trait empathy had any relationship with 
145                                                                           CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
  
empathic bias, despite the latter’s direct relationship to absolute levels of empathy. This 
suggested that—consistent with principles from Social Identity Theory—in an intergroup 
context sharing a group membership with a target conferred an empathic advantage when 
responding to their pain (i.e., participants reliably reported more empathy for targets from the 
ingroup than any outgroup). This occurred regardless of one’s gender or chronic tendency to 
empathise with others.   
7.2 Contributions of the Present Thesis 
 When considering the contributions of the present thesis, it is clear that the results are 
not shocking; they confirm what you might expect. First, and very broadly speaking, these 
results support the idea that empathy is context dependent. Consistent with previous accounts, 
my research supports the notion that empathy fluctuates according to a number of factors, 
including our emotions and motivations (Zaki, 2014). Second, and more specifically, this 
thesis demonstrates that empathy within an intergroup context is more nuanced than simply 
being attenuated to outgroup targets. Indeed, when we feel less empathy for ‘them’ it’s not 
simply because ‘they’ are not one of ‘us’ but because ‘they’ represent something specific to 
me and to ‘us’.  
 These findings speak to one of the issues that originally motivated this research. 
Reports suggest that healthcare inequality is a growing crisis; that certain groups in society 
receive a far poorer quality of healthcare than others (Hayward et al., 2000). For example 
minority status groups receive less pain relief treatment than others in emergency room 
settings (Pletcher et al., 2008). What particularly interested me about this issue was that the 
neglect in treatment to minority groups did not seem to be driven by a lack of empathic 
concern from their physicians. Rather it seemed to result from the physician’s inability to 
assess their patient’s pain accurately. Delving deeper into this literature revealed that this 
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inability stemmed from false beliefs that physicians had about those groups like that Black 
people experience pain less than White people (Hoffman et al., 2016).  
In my research I have found that, indeed, how we respond to another’s physical pain 
is related to the beliefs we have about the target’s group. Interestingly, however, empathic 
responses appeared to be differentially influenced depending on whether they were more 
directed towards the other or the self. In measurements of empathic concern (an other-
focussed response) participants exhibited a bias against a threatening outgroup target (while 
leaving empathy towards the ingroup and a non-threatening outgroup relatively intact). In 
this, both self-reports and the underlying physiology were congruent. On the other hand, 
when asking participants how painful the event seemed to them (a more self-focussed 
response) no bias emerged; everyone appeared to feel the other’s pain to the same extent. It 
was only when analysing the underlying physiology that bias was revealed. This suggests that 
participants were reasonably aware of their biases in empathic concern but perhaps were not 
so aware when it came to accurately assessing how much pain the threatening outgroup was 
in.  
These findings make an important contribution in our understanding of how 
inequalities in healthcare persist. According to a recent systematic review, healthcare 
providers appear to have moderate to good accuracy in assessing other’s pain (Ruben, van 
Osch, & Blanch-Hartigan, 2015) but this heavily relies on a patient’s self-report or, where 
verbal reports are not possible, from assessing nonverbal cues like facial grimacing (Fink, 
2000). What this thesis reveals is that the greater social distance there is between the observer 
and the target, the less accurate pain assessment is. Moving forwards, I would like this thesis 
to stand at the very least as a reminder that biases in pain perception exist and these very 
likely contribute to the growing disparities in healthcare quality—there is nothing ground-
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breaking in that statement but continuing to highlight this literature is a step towards 
addressing the problem.   
I will however go one step further than simply reminding the reader of the existence 
of bias, I offer one possible strategy to tackling it. Whatever the underlying motivations, 
participants’ explicit assessment of others’ pain significantly departs from their implicit 
understanding of it. It suggests that to get an accurate understanding of another’s pain we 
cannot merely rely upon our own perception. Some researchers have had success in 
improving pain assessment by triangulating self-reports with brain imaging technology 
(Robinson et al., 2013). Using MRI to scan every possible patient is a daunting and 
impractical solution; the methodology is time-consuming and expensive but 
electroencephalography (EEG), a far cheaper alternative to MRI, could certainly be (and 
indeed has been) used to more objectively assess an individual’s experience of pain (Brown, 
Chatterjee, Younger, & Mackey, 2011).  
This thesis has also contributed to a firmer, richer understanding of empathy, 
demonstrating that empathy is not necessary biased to the extent that it is ‘switched on or off’ 
to someone’s pain—No, the reality is more pernicious. Across six studies, I found that 
participants reliably exhibited empathic bias, but only ever as a relative difference between 
responses to ‘our’ vs. ‘their’ pain. Ratings of empathy were always above the midpoint of a 
scale and never appeared to reflect what researchers have previously reported to be malicious 
pleasure or Schadenfreude when observing an outgroup target’s pain (Cikara, Botvinick, et 
al., 2011; Leach et al., 2003). This could be for a number of reasons. Perhaps this emerged 
because the participants in my studies shared some level of categorisation with the targets 
(they were all students within the southwest of the UK). Perhaps because even when 
competition was made salient it was somewhat indirect, through upwards comparisons of 
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status, rather than a competition with a conceivable victory or defeat. It is also possible that 
this was because the observed events were clearly and intensely negative—there is very little 
ambiguity to seeing someone being stabbed. I expect the likelihood of Schadenfreude 
emerging would increase if the events I presented did not seem to involve lasting damage or 
bodily harm to the target, but instead constituted only mild discomfort or misfortune. That is 
not to say that participants definitely did not feel some sense of joy at the other’s pain, only 
that they did not report it. Indeed, the results of the neuroimaging studies demonstrated that 
empathic bias manifested far more prominently when removing the filter of response control.  
At the self-report level, I observed only small biases in favour of the ingroup 
compared to any of the outgroups. But at the level of neural activation it was clear that this 
was not the full picture. First, the degree of empathic bias was far larger than in the self-
reported data and, second, empathic biases emerged more in line with participants’ 
perceptions of the target groups. This could be for a few different reasons: Because empathy 
is socially desirable (Decety & Jackson, 2006), because blatant group-based prejudices are 
socially undesirable (Rattazzi & Volpato, 2003), or maybe because empathic bias operates 
outside of conscious awareness. Whatever the case, the nature of these effects is important 
given how subtle forms of interpersonal discrimination have been documented to be as, if not 
more, damaging than overt discrimination (Barreto & Ellemers, 2015; K. P. Jones, Peddie, 
Gilrane, King, & Gray, 2016)—influencing a variety of downstream processes such as 
employment opportunities (Rowe, 1990) and provision of healthcare (Malat, 2001). 
Therefore, one of the important contributions this work is revealing that empathic bias is not 
always a blatant reduction in empathy; it can be subtle, such that its influence on decision 
making can go unnoticed and unchecked.    
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A further contribution of this work is how it highlights the importance of specific 
relations between groups and how the content of an identity can drive intergroup biases. Prior 
research has shown that individuals exhibit less empathy towards lower status groups 
following denials to humanity (Fiske, 2009). In my research, I found that participants felt as 
much empathy for members of the lower status group as they did for members of their 
ingroup. But, it is important to consider that the lower status groups in my studies were rated 
as warm and sociable, not cold like the dehumanised groups used in previous research (e.g., 
Cikara & Fiske, 2011). Likewise, the group was only rated as relatively lower in status, not 
low in absolute terms. This highlights one of the important distinctions that I have tried to 
make through this thesis: That we need to avoid being overly general about key concepts and 
pay attention to the importance of content and the specificity of intergroup relations. 
Broadly, this research highlights possible routes to prejudice reduction and intergroup 
harmony. Participants in my studies showed equal favour to the targets from a relatively 
disadvantaged group and their ingroup. One could interpret this finding to as outwardly 
selfish and strategic. Showing concern for a disadvantaged group reconciles with us showing 
less empathy elsewhere; towards another more advantaged group. This allows us to confirm a 
positive and empathic personal identity while still being a good group member and 
derogating against our group’s competitors. This behaviour might also have a status-
management component to it. Feeling concern or sympathy for the disadvantaged group may 
be an indicator of paternalistic helping as it maintains existing forms of social relations, 
highlighting that they need our help and we are in a position to give it (Nadler, Harpaz-
Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009). However, helping the disadvantaged outgroup also draws 
attention away from group inequality (the so-called “irony of harmony”) reducing the 
likelihood for social change to occur (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). While this 
may be driven by self-serving motives, positive contact improves attitudes and blurs the 
150                                                                           CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
  
boundaries between groups. It may undermine collective action but this commonality 
promotes understanding and brings members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
together (Saguy, Dovidio, Pratto, 2008).  From a methodological perspective, the disparity I 
observed between self-reported and neural responses is, in itself, also an important 
contribution to the literature. In Chapter 4, I reported an item-wise analysis demonstrating 
that the language of the self-report item was associated with the activation of discrete neural 
networks. Specifically, brain regions associated with experience-sharing (dACC and AI) were 
significantly more active while participants responded to self-focussed items (feeling with the 
other’s pain) during the response phase, while those associated with understanding other’s 
mental states (i.e., mentalising; mPFC) were significantly more active when answering other-
focussed items (feeling for the other’s pain). This finding is consistent with previous work 
demonstrating that different facets of empathy rely upon distinct neural architecture in the 
brain (Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, Lesemann, & Singer, 2016a; Lamm et al., 2011; Ochsner 
et al., 2008; Zaki, Ochsner, Hanelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007), but it is also crucial for 
researchers who use self-report measures—it demonstrates that how we construct self-report 
items can be critical for engaging the processes we seek to measure with it.  
The results of this thesis also contribute to a more fine grained understanding of the 
role that threat plays during intergroup bias. Threat arises from a broad set of triggers, but 
it may not always operate or affect bias in the same way. Threat from competition, for 
example, may dampen empathy because we actively avoid feeling bad for those we’re 
competing against. Fear, on the other hand, appears to have the same effect on empathy 
but may instead be as a result of drawing to the ingroup and dissociating away from the 
outgroup. Looking at fear in isolation of competition allowed me to clarify that in reality 
the findings suggest very similar patterns for both types of threat: Competition inherent 
to the intergroup context and fear that is incidental to it had similar effects on empathy. 
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An avenue for future research would be to investigate whether other types of threat, such 
as challenges to one’s status position, worldview, or self-impression, also influence 
empathy and bias in the same manner.  
7.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
 The results of the studies outlined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 offer new insights into when 
and why people empathise with another’s pain. However, there are also limitations in these 
studies that need to be addressed and that may provide directions for future research.  
  My findings differ from those of previous research in the role that mentalising plays 
during interactions with competitive others. Previous research identified that the medial 
prefrontal cortices were selectively associated with monitoring other’s actions in a 
competitive context (Decety, Jackson, Sommerville, Chaminade, & Meltzoff, 2004). I found, 
however, that the prefrontal cortex was more associated with monitoring members of the 
ingroup and relatively less competitive outgroup. The reason for this, I would suggest, lies in 
the specifics of the context. In the study by Decety and colleagues, the participant and target 
were playing a game with one another where the target could support or block the 
participant’s moves, thus making it necessary to try and predict the other’s intentions. In my 
study, however, the target had no capacity to do anything to the participant—events happened 
to the target and the participant merely observed. Therefore there was no need to try and ‘get 
inside the other’s head’. In fact, it seems more likely one would actively avoid thinking about 
the competitive target’s experiences in this case—thinking about their pain risks feeling 
empathy for them and this would be incongruent with our motivation to compete. This would 
point to a key difference between wanting to empathise with another and needing to 
empathise with another—people may be unmotivated to do so, by default, when the target 
belongs to a rival group, but this motivation might kick at times when doing so can provide 
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the ingroup with competitive advantage. Some of these conclusions are drawn in the absence 
of direct empirical evidence, but with an eye toward guiding future research to resolve 
inconsistencies in the role of mentalizing during intergroup competition.  
A criticism of the neuroimaging studies is the reliance of some of the effects on 
traditional univariate analyses, in particular, the use of subtractive methodology. This 
methodology involves identifying the contributions of a particular brain region in a specific 
task (i.e., responding to another’s pain) on the basis of enhanced hemodynamic signals during 
trials of interest (i.e., involving a painful event) as compared to control trials (i.e., involving a 
neutral event). This approach has several limitations; It assumes that each cognitive process 
relies upon a single brain region, it ignores the interconnected nature of the brain and the fact 
that a given area can participate in a variety of different processes. A specific concern for this 
thesis is that some of the regions that I reported on (the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex) play an important role in empathy, but also in a wider range of 
psychological functions including executive processing, working memory, inhibitory control, 
conflict monitoring, emotion, consciousness, and salience detection (Lieberman & 
Eisenberger, 2015). Therefore, it is important to be open to alternative explanations 
concerning the involvement of those pain-related brain regions during empathic experience. It 
could be said that the results of the neuroimaging studies would be more compelling given a 
report on the statistical relationships between the ratings of group-based perceptions and the 
neural indices of empathy—including also the process through which one influences the other 
via path analyses. The reason against doing this was that the size of the samples in these 
studies precluded any reasonable inferences that could be made from such an analysis (see 
Yarkoni, 2009). However, future research might focus on gathering larger sample sizes with 
the specific focus of examining these interconnections.  
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With regards to the studies reported in Chapter 5, it is important to consider the 
specificity of the findings to fear. In my investigation, I included checks of the success of the 
fear manipulation, including measures on fear but also anxiety and nervousness. With these, I 
found that participants reported feeling more fear, following inductions to fear, than other 
negatively-related emotions. However, the difference is only a matter of degree—participants 
reported feeling almost as anxious as they did afraid. While anxiety and fear are very much 
wedded, it will be important for future research to try and control for other negative-emotions 
such as anxiety (it is unlikely that one could elicit fear without anxiety, but one might elicit 
anxiety without fear) when determining the role of fear in intergroup relations.  
One might suggest that the task outlined in Chapter 5 closely resembles that of a 
mortality salience manipulation and that the effects do not contribute anything unique to the 
literature. I would argue, first of all, that the task does not trigger any sense of existential 
threat. Of course, an image of a rabid dog or a shark is scary because it refers to a survival 
type emergency; however, first, these are quite clearly only images on a screen and, second, 
were not designed to trigger reminders of one’s mortality—the stimuli depicted things that 
would harm or hurt more so than kill. The images also appear so rapidly and for so short a 
time that they act more as a brief aversive stimulus—as a ‘virtual shock’. One potentially 
interesting avenue of future research would be to examine whether fear-enhanced biases 
influence not only empathic responses but also harm-related behaviours towards others, for 
example, in the likelihood of shooting others in the police officer’s dilemma (Mekawi et al., 
2015). Additionally, future researchers might investigate whether fear-enhanced biases 
encourage derogation against all outgroups or only against those that have fear-related 
stereotypes, such as the stereotype of Muslims as terrorists.  
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Finally, in Chapter 6, I provide an analysis of the role of individual differences in 
intergroup empathy. This was a secondary analysis of studies that were not primarily 
focussed on assessing individual differences, therefore the conclusions that can be drawn are 
limited to only identifying associations among variables. Researchers in the field of empathy 
seem keen to consider the role of individual differences—almost always including some 
measure of trait empathy alongside their main dependent variables—therefore, future 
researchers would do well to conduct a wider scale investigation with this as a specific focus.   
My thesis highlights the many ways in which empathy is attenuated to others; on the 
basis of their group memberships, how we perceive those groups, and by our own expressions 
of fear. But to end on a more positive note, these findings highlight just how malleable 
empathy is and how easily we might encourage others to feel empathy and to foster 
intergroup harmony. We might consider the automatic nature of pain perception to be stable 
and unchangeable but as I have shown here, and as researchers have shown previously, one’s 
empathy changes following even very subtle cues. Schumann and colleagues (2014), for 
example, found that inducing a malleable theory of empathy improved a participant’s 
willingness to listen to an outgroup target’s story and even engage in empathy when it was 
expected to be painful. Getting participants to meditate on a regular basis can also foster 
compassion for another’s distress, increasing psychological (Jazaieri et al., 2015), 
behavioural (Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & DeSteno, 2013), and physiological (Klimecki, 
Leiberg, Lamm, & Singer, 2013) responses. Likewise, altering the social value of empathy 
(e.g., by convincing participant’s that it is attractive to the opposite sex) not only makes 
participants more sympathetic to others’ plight but it actually makes them better at 
recognising another’s emotions using only limited information (Thomas & Maio, 2008).  
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My research does not serve as direct evidence that empathy can be improved nor do I 
lay out advice as to how to go about improving it. But my research provides further clout to 
the notion that empathy in response to another’s pain is a product of our motivations, even 
when pain is physical and our response appears to be automatic. It is within our power to 
improve empathy by altering our motives. Changing our representation of the self to be more 
inclusive, refocusing our perception of other groups, and interpreting situations in a different 
light substantially changes how we understand, share, and care about each other’s lives.  
7.4 Conclusion 
 My goal with this thesis has been to underline the need to think about intergroup 
contexts in more specific terms rather than simply as ‘us’ vs ‘them’. In particular, this thesis 
has helped to expand on previous research by elucidating some of the ways in which empathy 
can be reduced to others for different reasons. The contribution of this thesis is therefore best 
summarised by recognising the importance of meaning in the relations between groups 
because it is in that meaning that the specific aspects of intergroup existence is lived out. 
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Appendices 
 
 Appendix A: Full Account of the Self-Report Group Perception Measures Used in 
Studies 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
 
 To what extent do you think that students of University of Exeter are generally 
perceived as competent within British society? 
 To what extent do you think that students of University of Exeter are generally 
perceived as capable within British society? 
 To what extent do you think that students of University of Exeter are generally 
perceived as intelligent within British society? 
 To what extent do you think that students of University of Exeter are generally 
perceived as friendly within British society? 
 To what extent do you think that students of University of Exeter are generally 
perceived as warm within British society? 
 To what extent do you think that students of University of Exeter are generally 
perceived as trustworthy within British society? 
 To what extent do you think that the students of University of Exeter are competitive 
when applying for prestigious jobs? 
 To what extent do you think that the status of students at University of Exeter is high 
compared to students at other universities?  
 To what extent do you think that Exeter is a prestigious university? 
 To what extent do you think that the status of University of Exeter is high within the 
UK? 
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 To what extent do you think students of <Outgroup University> University are similar 
to students of Exeter? 
 To what extent do you think students of <Outgroup University> are comparable to 
students of Exeter? 
 To what extent do you see <Outgroup University> students as rivals of Exeter 
students? 
 To what extent do you see students of <Outgroup University> as competitors in the 
job market? 
 To what extent do you believe you would have trouble getting a job for which a 
student of the <Outgroup University> would also have applied? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix B:  Materials Used in Studies 3 and 4 
Participant Information Sheet 
Study title 
Understanding emotions in others  
Invitation to take part 
 
We seek participants for a study that will take approximately 1 hour. Before you decide whether 
or not to participate, it is important for you to understand what participation will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully. Please feel free to ask us if there is anything 
that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
What is the purpose of the research? 
This research will examine the perceptions of social situations to better understand the conditions 
favouring optimal human performance in tasks involving social interaction. 
Who is doing this research? 
The researcher is Matthew Richins, MSc, a PhD candidate at the University of Exeter, supervised 
by Professor Manuela Barreto, Dr. Anke Karl, and Dr. Natalia Lawrence from the School of 
Psychology, University of Exeter. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
We are looking for healthy participants without known psychological or medical impairments 
(including heart problems, brain tumours, hypertension, and health issues resulting in an 
incompatibility with MRI scanning), and that have not taken illicit drugs within 48 hours of the 
study, to complete a task on emotional processing.  
Do I have to take part? 
Participation is completely voluntary. Even if you agree to participate, you have the right to 
terminate participation at any moment, and for any reason, without the need to disclose your 
reasons and without penalty. 
What will I be asked to do? 
   The study is a computer-based task where you will be asked to observe photographs, some that 
will depict people who are experiencing unambiguously negative events e.g., touching broken 
glass. These images will not be highly graphic or considered to cause more distress than you 
might see during a news report or TV drama shown after the 9 p.m. watershed.  You will also be 
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asked to make judgments about the individuals portrayed in those photos. Once it has been 
determined that it is safe for you to take part, you will be asked to observe these photos whilst 
lying down in the fMRI scanner, as seen in the picture below. During the scan you will be given a 
pair of headphones to wear for your safety.  
 
 
 
 
During this time an initial localizer scan will be taken, requiring you to lay still and relax for 5-10 
minutes. A functional scan will then begin where you will be required to respond to the task 
presented to you as part of the main study; this will last for approximately 40 minutes in total 
(totalling 50 minutes in the scanner). Once the task is complete, the scanner will power down and 
you will be removed within 1 minute. Finally you will be debriefed on the details of the study and 
asked to sign a receipt for the appropriate payment, which you will then be given.   
What is the device or procedure that is being tested? 
 
Brain activity imaging 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits from participating in this research, but your data will  contribute to a 
greater understanding of tasks involving social interaction 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no direct risks to the participant; there may be some anxiety related to the noise or 
small space of the MRI scanner. This will be minimized by giving you short breaks. You will also 
be given an alarm button which you can use to alert the experimenters should you experience any 
discomfort.  The researchers will adhere to strict safety protocols designed to protect your 
wellbeing at all times.  
Can I withdraw from the research and what will happen if I don't want to carry on? 
As a participant you have the right to withdraw yourself or your dataset at any time and for any 
reason during the experiment, with no need to disclose the reasons for withdrawal and without 
penalty.  
Are there any expenses and payments which I will get? 
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You will receive £10 pounds as a token of appreciation. If you are a first year Psychology student 
at the University of Exeter, you can instead choose to receive 1 credit for your participation. You 
will incur no expenses.  
Whom do I contact if I have any questions or a complaint? 
Queries about the study should be directed to the researcher and supervisors of the project (see 
below for contact details) and complaints should be communicated to Dr. Cris Burgess, Chair of 
the Psychology Ethics Committee, University of Exeter. C.N.W.Burgess@exeter.ac.uk +44 (0) 
1392 724627 
What happens if I suffer any harm? 
No harm is envisaged during this study. However, if you feel unwell you should immediately 
alert the experimenter, who will offer you first aid assistance and arrange for further assistance, 
if needed.  
 Is it possible that you will find something unexpected on my brain scan? 
The scans obtained in this study are NOT diagnostic scans. The researchers are NOT medical 
professionals, and are not able to recognise or diagnose any form of medical disease or 
disorder as a result of physical brain defects. Researchers will therefore not check your scans 
for abnormalities.  
 
What will happen to any data I give? 
No samples will be collected. Responses to questions and brain imaging data will be stored and 
analysed on a lab computer. All data will only be analysed in aggregate form, which means that 
there will be no individual findings. If you wish to receive information about the results of this 
study, please contact us (see below). 
Will my records be kept confidential? 
All data will be kept anonymous. No identifying information will be kept. Only those 
immediately on the project research team will have access to the data, but they will not be able to 
identify the source of each individual response. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is organized by the School of Psychology, University of Exeter and funded by the 
Defence, Science, and Technology Laboratory, part of the Ministry of Defence. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
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This study has been reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics 
Committee (MoDREC). The detailed materials of each individual study have also been reviewed 
by the Psychology Ethics Committee, University of Exeter. 
Further information and contact details. 
If you would like to request any additional information, please feel free to contact the primary 
researcher responsible for this project, Prof. Manuela Barreto, by emailing 
m.barreto@exeter.ac.uk or telephoning 01392-722674.  
 
Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
This research is in full compliance with the ethical principles documented in the declaration of 
Helsinki Sixth Revision, Korea, 2008. 
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Magnetic resonance imaging screening form 1 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT.............................................................................. Sex:  M / F 
Date of birth………………… Weight in kg…..........……(or Stones/lbs) Height in cm or m……....……… 
Please read the questions on the screening form CAREFULLY. Your safety in the magnetic 
environment is our primary concern. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT. For a very small number of 
individuals, being scanned can be uncomfortable, or endanger health or even life. The purpose 
of these questions is to make sure that you are not such a person.  The information you provide 
will be treated as strictly confidential and will be held in secure conditions. If you are unsure of 
the answer to any of the questions, please ASK the person who gave you this form or the person 
who will be performing the scan. You may also choose to not answer any of the following; 
however it would not be safe for you to participate and thus cannot participate in the study. 
Definitions of some of the more technical terms are given overleaf.         
            
Please answer all questions Circle 
answer 
1. Have you been fitted with a pacemaker, artificial heart valve, cochlear implant or any other implanted 
device? 
YES/NO 
2. Have you any surgical clips, aneurysm clips, shunts or stents in your body? YES/NO 
4. Have you ever had any metal fragments in your eyes? YES/NO 
3. Have you been exposed in your life to metal debris as a result of welding, grinding, filing, sawing or 
drilling of metal either occupationally or recreationally?  
YES/NO 
5.  Do you wear a hearing aid? YES/NO 
6. Have you ever had any metal fragments, e.g. shrapnel in any other part of your body? YES/NO 
7. Have you any surgically implanted metal in any part of your body (e.g. joint replacement or bone 
reconstruction). 
YES/NO 
8. Have you ever had any surgery that might have involved metal implants of which you are not aware? YES/NO 
9. Is there any possibility that you might be pregnant? YES/NO 
10. Do you have a contraceptive coil (IUD) installed?  YES/NO 
11. Have you been sterilised using clips? YES/NO 
12.  Do you have any dental work (including dentures, crowns, bridgework, braces) in your mouth, other 
than simple fillings? 
YES/NO 
13.  Have you ever suffered from any of: epilepsy, diabetes or thermoregulatory problems? YES/NO 
14. Have you ever suffered from any heart disease? YES/NO 
15. Do you have any Tattoos? Do you have any permanent eye makeup? YES/NO 
16. Are you wearing any skin patches? (eg. Nicotine ) YES/NO 
 
I have read and understood the questions above and have answered them correctly. 
 
SIGNED…………………………………         DATE………………………… 
 
In the presence of  …………………………………..  (Name)   ………………………………….. 
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Definition of Technical Terms 
 
PACEMAKER: An electronic device that is surgically placed in the patient's body and 
connected to the heart to regulate the heartbeat. The safe operation of a pacemaker can 
be temporarily or permanently disrupted if a person with a pacemaker goes near an MRI 
scanner. 
 
COCHLEAR IMPLANT: An electronic medical device that bypasses damaged structures in 
the inner ear and directly stimulates the auditory nerve, allowing some deaf individuals to learn 
to hear and interpret sounds and speech. 
 
ANEURYSM CLIP: A surgically implanted metal clip used to cut off blood flow through the 
neck of an aneurysm. An aneurysm is a deformity of a blood vessel in the body, which can 
swell and burst causing a haemorrhage. 
 
SHUNT: A surgically implanted connector, which allows passage of fluid between two parts of 
the body. A common use of a shunt is to allow fluid to drain away from the brain, thus reducing 
pressure in the brain.  May also describe a tube which allows blood to be moved from one part 
of the body to another. 
 
STENT: A surgical implanted device that is inserted into a blood vessel to provide support, 
keep the vessel open and promote unblocked and enhanced blood flow. Sometimes used in 
other fluid carrying vessels in the body such as bile ducts etc. 
 
THERMOREGULATORY PROBLEMS: Thermoregulation is the body’s in-built ability to 
keep all parts of your body at their correct temperature. Some illnesses prevent the person 
from properly controlling the temperature of their body. If you think you may have such an 
illness, please answer “YES” and discuss it with the person who gave you the form, or the 
person who is in charge of the scan. 
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Informed Consent Form 
ITY OF ETR – MRI UNIT  
 
NAME/CODE OF PARTICIPANT ………………………         Sex:  M / F       Date of 
Birth:………………  
 
If you have any questions, please ask the person who gave you this form. You are under no pressure to give 
your consent and you are free to withdraw from the MRI examination at any time. You may also choose to 
not answer any of the following; however by doing so it would not be safe for you to participate and 
thus your participation in the study will end.  By signing the form you are agreeing to the following: 
 
 
 
 
 I understand that I am to take part in a functional MRI experiment in which I will be placed in the 
scanning machine for up to 1 hour, while my brain activity will be measured by the machine. During 
the scan I will be shown visual images, such as faces, and will be asked to make simple judgments 
about them. I will make these responses using a button-box.  
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the fMRI Participant Information Sheet and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about it. 
 
 I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw from the 
study at any time without giving a reason. 
 
 I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time and that I am free to withdraw or discuss 
my concerns with the lead researchers (Matt Richins, Prof. Manuela Barreto, Dr. Natalia Lawrence, 
or Dr Anke Karl). 
 
 I understand that I can talk to the operators via an intercom and that I will be given an alarm that I 
can use at any time to end the scan and signal to the operator.  
 
 I understand that I can request, for any reason and at any time that I be immediately removed from 
the MRI machine. 
 
 I understand and agree that the MRI scan is not a medical screening procedure and that the 
researchers are not qualified to provide a clinical diagnosis or identify potential abnormalities. For 
these reasons the scans will not be checked for abnormalities and therefore there will be no report 
of incidental findings.  
 
 I have completed the initial screening form and have been told that it is safe for me to be scanned. 
 
 I understand that the information provided by me will be held anonymously, such that my data 
cannot be traced back to me individually. The information will be retained for up to 100 years when 
it will be deleted / destroyed. I understand that I can have access to the information at any time. 
I, _______________________________(NAME) consent to participate in the study conducted by The School of 
Psychology, University of Exeter. 
Signed:    …………………………………......        Date: …………………………………... 
Do not write beneath this line, For Staff Use Only 
UNIQUE IDENTIFIER:……………………………… 
Statement by the Researcher carrying out the scan: 
I certify that the above participant signed this form in my presence. I am satisfied that the participant fully understands the 
statement made and I certify that he/she had adequate opportunity to ask questions about the procedure before signing. 
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Magnetic resonance imaging screening form 2 
This form should be completed and signed immediately before your scan, after removal of any jewellery or other 
metal objects and (if required by the operator) changing your clothes. 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT ………………………………………………… 
Date of birth……………………………….   Sex:   M / F    
 
Please read the following questions CAREFULLY and provide answers. For a very small number of 
individuals, being scanned can endanger comfort, health or even life. The purpose of these questions is 
to make sure that you are not such a person.  
 
You have the right to withdraw from the screening and subsequent scanning if you find the questions 
unacceptably intrusive. The information you provide will be treated as strictly confidential and will be held 
in secure conditions. 
 
BEFORE YOU ARE TAKEN THROUGH FOR YOUR SCAN IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU REMOVE ALL 
METAL OBJECTS INCLUDING: WATCHES, PENS, LOOSE CHANGE, KEYS, HAIR CLIPS, ALL 
JEWELLERY, BRASSIERES WITH METAL FASTNERS, METALLIC COSMETICS, CHEQUE/CASH POINT 
CARDS.  
    
Please answer all questions Circle  
your answer 
1. Are you wearing or carrying any metal items such as those listed above? YES/NO 
2. Have your answers to any of the questions in the initial screening form changed?   
(The initial screening form must be shown to you before you answer this question.) 
YES/NO 
3. Have you been fitted with a pacemaker, artificial heart valve, cochlear implant or any other implanted 
device?  
YES/NO 
4. Is there any possibility that you might be pregnant?  YES/NO 
5. Are you currently feeling unwell (colds, flu etc.) or have you been unwell in the last week? YES/NO 
6. Have you taken any illicit drugs within the past 48  hours?  YES/NO 
(we require the following information in the event that we observe structural features  in your brain scan that we would not 
expect to routinely find – we are not trained medical professionals and so ask your permission that we might contact your GP 
should this situation occur) Note: we will not inform you of any abnormalities, nor in the event that we contact 
your GP. 
Name of General Practitioner: ………………………………… 
 
Surgery Name/Address: ………………………………… 
 
 
I have read and understood the questions above and have answered them correctly. 
 
 
SIGNATURE…………………………………        DATE………………………… 
 
FOR STAFF USE: 
I have taken adequate steps to ensure that the volunteer has no ferro-magnetic metal in or on his/her person and 
I am satisfied that the scan can proceed. 
    
 
SIGNATURE…………………………………        NAME (print) ………………………………….. 
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Debrief form 
Understanding how social identities shape empathy and failures to 
empathize: A social neuroscience approach 
Individuals’ abilities to empathise with others are compromised by a variety of factors. One 
important factor that has been shown to decrease the extent to which empathy is 
experienced is the group membership of those who perceive (i.e., perceivers) and those 
being perceived (i.e., targets). Indeed, prior research has shown that when perceivers and 
targets belong to different social groups (or have different social identities), perceivers 
experience less empathy than when they belong to the same social group (or share a social 
identity)—a phenomenon we label ‘empathic bias’      
 The aim of this PhD research is thus to understand the socio-neurological mechanisms 
underlying empathic experience. We aim to improve our understanding of empathy. The 
individuals you observed during the task were randomly allocated to a either student or 
admin position within a University and the University affiliation was also randomised.  
We expect to demonstrate that your responses will be affected by the social membership of 
the target i.e., whether the target is someone you consider part of your social group 
(ingroup) or someone that is not (outgroup). We expect your responses will display less 
empathy in the face of a negative event when the target is an outgroup (vs. ingroup) 
member.  
We remind participants that all data is kept strictly confidential and you have the right to see 
and withdraw your data at any time. If you wish to know the outcome of the study, or have 
any further questions or comments please contact: 
 
Matthew Richins: m.richins@exeter.ac.uk or 07473860651 
Prof. Manuela Barreto:  m.barreto@exeter.ac.uk or 01392-722674.  
Any complaints should be communicated to Dr. Cris Burgess, Chair of the Psychology Ethics 
Committee, University of Exeter. C.N.W.Burgess@exeter.ac.uk +44 (0) 1392 724627 
 
We greatly appreciate your participation.  
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One version of the bogus news article from Study 4, Chapter 4 (the alternative simply 
switches Cardiff with Sussex) 
 
 
 
 
 
University in world top 100 but still not the best in the South.  
         163      By Comment – September 09, 2015  
     
        
 
 
 
 
 
The University of Exeter has broken into the top 100 universities in the world for the first time. Photo: ALAMY  
 The University of Exeter is now ranked 93rd in the Times Higher Education World University 
Rankings, placing it among the very best institutions across the globe. The new ranking marks a 
significant rise for the University, having leapt from 154th last year. With this, Exeter may yet reclaim 
pole position as the top university in the 
South of the UK—for that, however, we still 
need to overtake our longstanding rival 
university, Cardiff. There are currently 3 top 
universities in the South: Exeter, Cardiff, and 
Sussex, all of which are well-known for a 
high level of graduate training and academic 
prowess. It is Cardiff University, however, 
that we consistently meet in both academic 
and sporting conflicts: Over the past years 
Exeter have met Cardiff on the battlefield 
matching victory with defeat, leaving no 
clear overall victor. Both universities are 
members of the prestigious Russell Group 
and, as such, offer their graduates the best 
opportunities for employment. Recent 
records indicate that graduates of Cardiff, 
however, are currently far more likely to be 
employed within 6 months of graduating and 
earn a salary that is, on average, £4k more than 
graduates from Exeter or Sussex. As we rise in 
the world’s rankings, perhaps our latest 
graduates can begin to close the gap, but there’s 
work to do. Professor Sir Steve Smith, Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Exeter, had this to 
say:  
“Please don’t think that our job is done. Our 
goal is long term sustainable achievement. Let’s 
make our next goal to be the best in the South” 
 With this new accolade, we ask the students of 
Exeter: Can we beat Cardiff and reclaim our 
crown? 
Employability in the south is stronger than ever for graduates 
of Cardiff University Infographic: HESA 
 Appendix C: Description of Stimuli Used in Studies 5 and 6 from the Set of Fear 
Inducing Pictures database (SFIP; Michałowski et al., 2016) 
 [Animals_004_v] A dog snarling towards the camera 
 [Animals_069_h] A large spider set to pounce towards the camera 
 [Animals_035_h] A snake slithering towards the camera 
 [Objects_148_h] A gun pointing towards the camera 
 
 
 
